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This doctoral thesis asks what ideational factors underlie parties’ national role 
conceptions in narratives on violent conflict and crises abroad. It explores French 
and German parties' national role statements in the case of the 2011 military 
intervention in Libya. The thesis lies at the intersection of Foreign Policy Analysis 
research focused on domestic foreign policy actors, International Relations studies 
on ideas in international relations and Party Politics scholarship looking at 
international issues in party campaigns and competition. It develops a theoretical 
framework using role theory and combines it with scholarship on international 
norms and ideologies. It contributes to role research on domestic role contestation 
and role socialisation. It adds a study of parties' national roles to this scholarship. 
It also advances the conceptual development of the role theory approach through 
an exploration of the responsibility concept within national roles. 
The main finding of the thesis is that parties often agree on the national role but 
sometimes interpret the same role differently. Moreover, sometimes parties can 
propose alternative national roles. The theoretical framework permits to trace 
variation in role interpretation to foreign policy traditions, international norms 
and ideologies. The central argument is that parties do not necessarily agree on the 
national role and its interpretation even when confronted with the same situation 
and events. It suggests that variation in national role interpretation can matter 
because parties contest the national role and, thereby, may point to role conflicts 
and dilemmas that may have an effect on future role selection and performance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In February 2011, protesters in Libya took to the street after the spread of a popular 
uprising that had started in Tunisia and had ousted the long-term dictator there. 
colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya responded quickly with violence to suppress 
the protests. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was fast to denounce the 
violent reaction and take action against the Libyan regime. UNSC resolution 1970 
was unanimously adopted on February 26. It condemned the government’s use of 
force on protesters, imposed an arms’ embargo, travel bans and asset freezes, and 
referred the situation to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
(UNSC 2011a). On 17 March, 10 UNSC members voted in favour of resolution 1973 
(UNSC 2011b), the first to invoke the responsibility to protect (R2P) to authorise a 
military intervention in a state without its consent (e.g. Bellamy and Williams 
2011). The resolution passed with permanent UNSC members China and Russia 
abstaining, alongside Brazil, Germany and India.  
The German decision led to domestic debate and international criticism (Spiegel 
Online 2011c; The Guardian 2011c). Germany was a non-permanent UNSC 
member. The occasion had been seen as a chance to show-cast Germany's readiness 
to take on more international responsibilities. Policymakers attached hope to the 
country’s UNSC tenure, given its regional role and its ambitions for a greater global 
role. In the first phase of the protests and escalating violence, Germany led calls for 
sanctions against Libya a few days after the Libyan regime's violent reaction to 
protest (Die Zeit 2011; Reuters 2011a). In a second phase, France and others 
argued in favour of and took steps toward military intervention. In a first in 
contemporary German history, the country did not align itself with any of its three 
main alliance partners (e.g. Oppermann 2012; Brockmeier 2013). The dual decision 
to abstain and not participate led to domestic and international criticism.  
France’s decision equally led to domestic controversy and international criticism in 
the lead up to UNSC resolution 1973 (Le Monde 2011b; Spiegel Online 2011a). As 
a permanent UNSC member, France was quick to demand firm action, when the 
Libyan regime responded with violence to domestic protests. A week after the 
protests had been met with violence, president Nicolas Sarkozy declared that 
Gaddafi had 'to go', effectively calling for regime change without as yet defining how 
(Reuters 2011b). France was the first state to recognise the National Transitional 
 




Council (NTC) as legitimate Libyan government on March 10 (BBC News 2011). It 
led the drafting of UNSC resolution 1973 and, on 19 March, French armed forces 
started the air campaign to impose the UN-mandated no-fly zone. The president 
and key policymakers quickly carved out a leader role for France. The French 
response came after policymakers had controversially offered help to the besieged 
Tunisian president, when he faced growing unrest in his country, a former French 
protectorate, at the start of the uprisings (Le Monde 2011a). The decision-making 
on Libya was unexpected and contrary to past intervention cases (e.g. foreign 
minister de Villepin’s statements to the UNSC on Iraq, The New York Times 2003; 
Davidson 2013). Criticism in the Libya case focused on the need to militarily 
intervene and the process and style of decision-making. The domestic controversy 
cast doubt over the existence of a French elite foreign policy consensus.   
There is a relative absence of research on domestic controversies that surrounded 
the decision-making in the existing literature on French and German foreign policy 
on the 2011 Libya intervention. Most studies focus on explaining decision-making. 
They stress the national interest and identity, individual leaders and domestic 
political incentives, with regional and national elections due in 2011 and 2012 in 
the two states. Scholars also focus on whether the decision-making constituted 
foreign policy continuity or change.  
This thesis addresses the gap that this relative dearth of research on the domestic 
controversies represents. It offers a study of domestic debates. It proposes that 
such debates are instances in which actors can express criticism and contest foreign 
policy. It suggests that it is worth studying these instances in their own right. They 
can influence future decisions by putting new ideas and perceived dilemmas into 
the public domain, even if they did not influence decision-making in this case. 
1. Research question, aims and relevance 
France and Germany took decisions on Libya that led to domestic controversy. The 
research on these decisions largely focuses on the state- and elite-level, identity, 
interests and causality. I propose to pay attention to the party-level1 to unpack state 
elites, and to hone in on the domestic criticism and contestation. 
                                                          
1 Chapter 3 discusses caveats to studying parties. Chapter 7 makes suggestions on future 
research unpacking the party and paying more attention to intraparty processes and actors.  
 




This thesis explores a two-pronged research question:  
(1) What ideational factors shape and interact in influencing political parties’2 
foreign policy stances, national role conceptions and domestic role contestation? 
(2) How did parties frame the situation of violent conflict and ‘crisis’ in Libya, and 
how did they come to think about military intervention as the appropriate policy 
tool (or not) to address the situation?  
The thesis examines how we can make sense of the decisions and the ensuing 
domestic controversies. It explores how domestic differences on foreign policy 
affect the construction of narratives and the selection of foreign policy tools. The 
study focuses on ideas underlying views about the state’s role in the world rather 
than on causal explanations for the state’s decisions. The thesis pays attention to 
parties’ national role selection and national role conceptions, i.e. their ideas about 
what types of decisions and actions are appropriate for their state (Holsti 1970).   
1.1. Research aims 
A first aim is to unpack the ideational layers contributing to parties’ understanding 
and framing of situations and events abroad. Through parties, the thesis adds a 
multi-level dimension. It explores ideas from the domestic arena that influence how 
actors make sense of international relations and events, and it examines ideas from 
the international sphere that interact with domestic ones.  
A second goal is, thereby, to contribute new empirical evidence to existing findings, 
building on the increasing number of challenges to the waning assumption of elite 
foreign policy consensus. The thesis also adds to claims that challenge that military 
intervention is an a-political foreign policy tool and practice, and assumptions that 
decisions on the use of military force are not contested between parties. It adds to 
evidence that foreign policy and military intervention are contentious issues that 
parties contest as part of their national role proposals. 
A third aim is to demonstrate the usefulness of role theory for studying parties and 
foreign policy. Role theory is used to analyse how domestic policymakers define 
their respective state’s national role, and to explore the domestic and international 
sources of these definitions. The thesis proposes that a role theory is useful because 
                                                          
2 Political party/parties are thereafter referred to as party/parties. 
 




parties need the state to operationalise foreign policy. In the current international 
system, parties are likely to express their foreign policy positions in narratives that 
include national roles, using the state as the actor through which to enact foreign 
policy. Using role theory also adds to studies of parties and foreign policy. Such 
studies often focus on causality traced in decision-making processes, and on 
explaining parties' left-right positions on an issue. Role theory offers tools to 
unpack contested positions and decisions. It can also help understand criticism and 
controversy, despite party agreement on policy positions and decisions. 
1.2. Thesis relevance 
So what if parties disagree on national roles and role enactment ensuing from 
foreign policy decision-making? This thesis adds to understanding parties' military 
intervention stances and position-taking more generally. Unpacking political elites 
and a focus on the differences in how parties conceptualise their respective state’s 
role can inform about variation in decisions and outcomes. Focusing on parties’ 
national role conceptions in decision-making cases that engendered domestic 
controversy can also help to identify domestic role conflict that may lead to role 
change (Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011). Moreover, a study of parties' national 
role conceptions can provide insight into cases where decision-makers selected a 
national role and sought the state to perform it but other actors considered the role 
inappropriate. Such situations can lead to failed role location when powerful other 
states in the international system refuse to accept another state's role selection. 
(Thies 2012) This can add to understanding role conflict and role change.  
In these ways, this thesis can improve explanations and lead to a higher degree of 
accuracy in predictions of continuity, nuance and change between governments 
and legislative majorities regarding role selection, conflict and change. A better 
grasp of the ideas underlying national roles, their contested and evolving nature 
can explain changes and inconsistencies and can improve predictions based on who 
enters government after an election (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016c). Thus, a focus on 
parties’ national role conceptions can advance understanding of party differences 
on military intervention and foreign policy more generally.  
Having established research aims and the thesis’ relevance, it is opportune to point 
out what the intention is not. First, the aim is not to argue that parties and ideas 
matter to foreign policy decision-making and outcomes. Studies already indicate 
 




that they can matter and influence foreign policy decision-making and outcomes, 
as will be outlined in this chapter (part 3). Parties have opportunities to shape and 
incentives to pick up cues on foreign policy. Hence, they are not irrelevant in foreign 
policy. Instead, the evidence that they can matter is taken as the starting point to 
explore parties and foreign policy in more depth.  
Second, the goal is not to demonstrate that the ideas that underpin national role 
expressions have causal power or are solely constituent of actors' stances and 
decision-making. Foreign policy decision-making is complex and a variety of factors 
interact for anyone decision to be taken (Breuning 2007; Alden and Aran 2017). 
Rather, this thesis focuses on the step before such causality takes place, looking at 
the ideas evident in domestic controversies surrounding decisions.  
Third, the thesis does not deny the importance of material factors, interests and 
human rationality in foreign policy decision-making. Strands of party research have 
long posited that parties are rational actors that seek to win elections to get into or 
retain power (e.g. Strom 1990). This study does not deny these objectives. It 
suggests that in a complex electoral context various factors can impact how the 
situation is analysed and what policy position is chosen. The thesis assumes 
statements about actors' rational interests and aims reveal the expectations of the 
person making the statement rather than necessarily interests and aims of actors.  
The thesis starts from the perspective that material factors do not acquire meaning 
and value un-mediated and that reasoning is not an abstract, subjective process. 
Human actors engaging in rational choice decision-making are constrained by their 
context and positionality and with regards to foreign policy, access and distribution 
of information. Thus, actors are situated. (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012) This 
situatedness and issue complexity matter when accommodating and addressing 
material factors, and when claiming actors' rationality and agency. Rationality is 
bounded. Thus, actors' policy positions and decisions uttered as part of debates are 
inherently based on ideas that give meaning to the material world. This is not to 
argue that there is no commonality between actors or a shared understanding of 
the value of material objects. It is to posit that even shared meanings build on 
preconceived ideas that evolve and are not static across time and space.  
Fourth, it is not the aim to establish universal patterns and to generalise across all 
possible parties and military intervention cases or to provide a comprehensive 
 




study of the 2011 Libyan conflict and intervention or of French and German 
decision-making. This thesis pays attention to controversies that surround 
decision-making instances to explore whether parties differ on the national role 
and whether they contest other parties on this, in these particular cases. Yet, if 
partisan contestation, or its absence, and ideational sources can be identified in 
these country and party cases, there are grounds to explore others.  
Finally, it is also not the goal to identify and trace the sources of role change. 
However, the thesis can improve explanations for incremental role change, casting 
light on alternative roles and role contestation that can lead to future perceptions 
of dilemmas, if the public and/or other parties recognise raised issues as such. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. After part 1 
spelt out the research questions, aims and relevance, part 2 defines parties for the 
purpose of this foreign policy study. Part 3 presents an overview of scholarship. 
The chapter closes with the thesis chapter outline.  
2. Defining parties for foreign policy research 
What are parties and what do we know about their foreign policy stances? Partly, 
this thesis seeks to answer the second part of this question. Before turning to the 
literature on parties and foreign policy, part 2 addresses the first part of the 
question. The aim is to define parties. Party research provides some insights that 
are relevant and build the basis for the definition of parties in this PhD study.  
2.1. Party origins and representational functions   
Party scholarship casts light on the origins, types, structures and inner workings of 
parties. In particular, parties’ societal origins are of relevance to the study of foreign 
policy. Parties formed along cleavage lines, aggregating group interests and, 
thereby, organising social conflicts, mobilising and integrating groups into the state 
along those conflict lines. The existence of diverging and conflicting interests 
between groups in society led to the emergence of multiple parties and a party 
system. Parties express those conflicts and lead to the articulation of underlying 
interests. Thus, parties have a representational function. (King 1969; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967; Inglehart 1971; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987) 
 




Parties' representational function makes them links between domestic society or 
societal groups and the state’s political institutions (e.g. Duverger 1954; Katz and 
Mair 1995). This linkage function is arguably declining. However, there is evidence 
that parties still connect to the public, linking society/societal groups to state 
institutions. Moreover, parties do not only learn and feed back between these levels 
on domestic but also on international issues (Lawson 2006). Parties are also 
present on the supra-national level. They form international or regional groups 
(e.g. Hill 2003; Pettitt 2014) and are elected into supra-national institutions. Parties 
are intermediaries, linking between the domestic, supra-national and international 
levels. This adds a multi-level dimension to parties’ representational functions.  
2.2. Party cleavages and party competition issues  
The nature of cleavage and conflict lines shift in the evolving makeup of modern 
societies. This leads to the emergence of new parties and party competition issues. 
Earlier cleavages were mainly material, over territorial control and socio-
economics (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). New dividing lines emerged after the post-
WWII economic growth years and relative economic security ended in the 1970s. 
They contrasted material and post-material issues, such as women's rights, and 
centred on the environment and immigration. Recently, the European Union (EU) 
has become a dividing issue, as part of the GAL/TAN cleavage (Green-Alternative-
Libertarian/Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist) (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 
2002; Hooghe and Marks 2017; Katsanidou and Otjes 2016).  
There is a rich body of party research on old and new cleavages. There are studies 
of the Europeanisation process, positions on Europe and European integration 
within and across party-systems or of one party-family or type of party (e.g. 
Ladrech 2002; Dunphy 2004; Külahci 2011; Charalambous 2011, 2013; Grande and 
Hutter 2016; Holmes and Lightfoot 2016; Hooghe and Marks 2017). There is also 
literature on parties and globalisation (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2005). A large body of 
scholarship is concerned with the populist type of party (e.g. but not exhaustive 
Mudde 2007, 2010, 2013; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Schulz et al. 2017). 
Such parties have been particularly apt at setting the agenda and framing issues in 
novel ways (e.g. Balfour et al. 2016; Meijers 2017). They use trans-national issues.  
 




In sum, trans- and supra-national changes affect the rise of cleavages and parties, 
creating new competition issues and political incentives for parties to campaign on 
issues. Research on parties and foreign policy is slowly forthcoming. 
2.3. Parties as carriers of ideas and thesis’ party definition 
Parties are also ideas-based actors. An understanding of human nature, the nature 
of society and of change influences parties. Morse (1896, 68) defines the party as 
‘a durable organization which, in its simplest form, consists of a single group of 
citizens united by common principles ....’ Founding ideas mostly remain 
unchanged. Policies deducted from principles shift with time and context. 
This thesis defines parties as having emerged from social conflict around interests 
of segments of domestic societies. They have representational functions that link 
between different levels and provide opportunities to learn and feed back. They are 
intermediaries. Parties seek votes to gain or retain office to represent the interests 
of (parts of) the electorate and to exercise power. Thus, they take cues from the 
public on salient issues. Yet, founded on, influenced by and carriers of ideas, parties 
can also try to shape public opinion based on principles and convictions. In sum, 
parties are defined as organisations with societal functions, motivated to seek 
positions of power to represent societal interests and shaped by and carriers of 
ideas. This definition has consequences. Parties need to balance their functions and 
the different levels on which they operate, between members, voters, internal 
divisions on issues and cues and pressures on their respective states. This makes 
parties a complex level for foreign policy analysis.  
 





Image 1.1. Definition triangle for parties and foreign policy and focus of this thesis  
The above definition also implies that choices had to be made on which element(s) 
of the definition to focus. The stronger focus on ideas rather than other definition 
components is not a value judgement. Instead, a choice had to be made for focus 
reasons. Where relevant and possible, the other elements will be addressed. 
Having defined parties, the next part turns to the state of the art on parties and 
foreign policy. The aim is to stress the insights and strength of the scholarship on 
which this study builds and to stress literature gaps this thesis is seeking to address. 
3. Foreign Policy Analysis and Party Research 
Research on parties and foreign policy evidences that they compete on foreign 
policy issues and that there are ideological differences between parties on these 
issues (e.g. Wagner et al. 2017a, 2017a, 2018). There is a large body of literature on 
the practice of and decision-making on military intervention, including on domestic 
actors and processes. A small part of it takes parties as the unit or level of analysis. 
Within this small field, attention is paid to differences and effect of ideology and 
parties' stances on decision-making procedures. New research on parties and 
military interventions provides insights into the relevance of ideology. However, 
the scholarship still lacks an engagement with different types or combination of 
ideas, such ideology and the international normative dimension. This thesis seeks 
 




to address this gap and to strengthen the empirical literature linking parties, 
ideologies and international norms.  
Part 3 introduces Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and the reasons not to study parties 
and foreign policy. Then, it makes the case for this study mirroring the definition of 
parties (table 1.1.). Part 3 ends on parties and military intervention state of the art.  
3.1. FPA: parties’ opportunities, incentives and ideas 
This is a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) study. While classical realism includes 
domestic social groups’ beliefs (e.g. Morgenthau 1963), liberalism recognises the 
importance of public opinion, domestic actors, culture and political structures (e.g. 
Moravcsik 1997) and constructivism assumes agency and domestic actors' roles in 
the norm construction (e.g. Katzenstein 1996), FPA moved beyond International 
Relations (IR) state-level wedged analysis.  
A major contribution of FPA was to unpack the state ‘black box’. It focused on 
decision-making processes, dynamics and actors to explain policy behaviour or 
outcomes. FPA scholars are concerned with processes and actors within the state. 
They pay attention to individuals and groups, societal and institutional factors. 
They also take into consideration the sources of foreign policy decision-making, 
including ideas. FPA’s strength is its recognition that foreign policy decision-
making and contexts are multi-factorial and multi-level. FPA can explain variation 
and change, has room for agency without neglecting structural constraints and it 
permits the integration of approaches within IR and the political science field. FPA 
stands between grand theories that seek to generalise about the universe of cases 
and the specificity of each case. Most FPA remains positivist in its endeavour to 
establish patterns and find explanations for foreign policy decision-making. 
(Hudson 2014, 2005; Breuning 2007; Rosenau 1968; Alden and Aran 2017) 
Parties stand out by their relative absence in FPA studies. This is surprising given 
the domestic turn in IR (Kaarbo 2015). To be sure, parties' indirect influence is felt 
in various studies, including on political systems, domestic norms and the role of 
public opinion (e.g. but no exhaustive Maoz and Russett 1993; Auerswald 1999). 
Part 3 covers three FPA research strands in which parties’ influences on foreign 
policy decision and by extension behaviour and outcomes can be discerned. The 
 




three strands are identified as the basis for this thesis. The next sections begin with 
a discussion of the common assumptions that this thesis indirectly challenges.  
Assumptions about parties and foreign policy 
There are two relevant arguments against the study of parties' foreign policy for a 
military intervention for proclaimed humanitarian reasons case. They are mostly 
implied in IR realism. The first holds that foreign policy is fundamentally different 
from domestic policy. The second view is that where differences on foreign policy 
exist between parties, they do not matter to decision-making or outcomes and/or 
are set aside in times of crisis when state security or survival is at stake. Foreign 
policy is portrayed as consensual because state interests are considered immediate 
and obvious. Realist build this view on the assumption that states are rational 
actors. In an anarchical international system, states' primary aim is survival and 
security, and state interests and decisions derive from this. Domestic institutions 
and values have little to no influence on how states conduct international affairs. 
Where differences exist they are rarely expressed and dissent often framed as 
reckless and feared to reveal weakness and providing other states with an 
advantage to exploit, as Gaskarth (2016) describes was long the case in the UK. The 
domestic-foreign policy dichotomy assumption has long been challenged (e.g. 
recently Charillon 2017) and Putnam (1988) described how foreign policy 
decision-makers play two-level games, performing at once to an international and 
a domestic audience. Other IR theorists stress that domestic values and institutions 
can matter to relations between states (e.g. Wendt 1992; Owen 1994). Even 
classical realists accommodated the notion that the domestic level is not without 
effect on international relations (e.g. Morgenthau 1963). Yet, most IR theories 
remain focused on relations between states and do not look at the domestic level.  
Another related assumption was that the public is not interested in foreign policy 
(e.g. Merle 1978) and, hence, international issues are less salient. From a rationalist 
perspective, this increases parties' costs because they need to invest time in 
developing foreign policy programmes without reward from voting behaviour.  
Public opinion and research on voters challenges this assumption of voters' lack of 
interest or the low priority of foreign policy issues compared to domestic ones. It 
shows that electorates are interested in foreign policy issues and that these can 
become salient (e.g. Eichenberg 2017; Coticchia and De Simone 2014; Oppermann 
 




and Viehrig 2009; T. Jäger et al. 2009; Clements 2011). Moreover, evidence exists 
that parties compete on foreign policy (e.g. Fordham 2002). Studies also suggest 
that foreign policy issues and decisions can impact election outcomes (e.g. Gartner 
and Segura 2008). Finally, social cleavages and party competition around trans-
national issues add to blurring the distinction between domestic and foreign policy.  
The assumption about essential state survival function and security arguments 
does not apply to the 2011 Libya case. Humanitarian military interventions are by 
definition not about the intervening state's survival or security. They are about 
saving strangers (Wheeler 2002). Hence, the notion of a national defence crisis that 
requires a nation to hold together and implies one course of action did not apply. 
Party competition was mentioned among the incentives of policymakers in the two 
selected country cases. A non-territorial defence and state survival case may allow 
for more open domestic disagreement on policy goals and tools.  
Having addressed key challenges, the following sections turns to the question ‘why 
parties?’ Parties have opportunities to influence foreign policy decision-making, 
incentives to position and campaign on and ideas about foreign policy. This justifies 
a closer scrutiny of parties' foreign policy. 
Opportunities to influence foreign policy  
FPA casts light on the relationship between democratic institutions and foreign 
policy. It notes that bargaining over foreign policy decision-making takes place in 
political institutions in contemporary democracies. This adds to parties’ linkage 
functions described. This section stresses that the sites in which parties operate can 
constrain and influence foreign policy decision-making. This provides parties with 
opportunities to try and shape foreign policy. It increases the likelihood of parties 
expressing views on foreign policy. Moreover, parties’ presence and activities in 
these locations add to parties as links between international and domestic levels.  
FPA research on coalition cabinets interrogates why and how coalitions' foreign 
policy can differ from single-party government decision-making (Oktay 2017). It 
shows that junior partners in coalitions can exert influence (Kaarbo 1996; Kaarbo 
and Lantis 2003). This influence can take place at different stages, for example 
when coalition programmes are being negotiated (Joly and Dandoy 2018). It can 
also take place through different mechanisms and processes once a coalition 
 




government is formed (Oppermann and Brummer 2014). Coalition influence can 
have an impact on the type of decisions taken. Coalition research suggests that 
coalition cabinets are likely to be more extreme in whichever policy they select 
(Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Beasley and Kaarbo 2014). Evidence exists that ideas 
matter to party influence type and outcome. Moreover, ideological composition and 
fractionalisation impact influence (Ozkececi-Taner 2005; Clare 2010; Oktay 2014; 
Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Brummer 2017; Oppermann, Kaarbo, and Brummer 
2017; Oppermann, Brummer, and Van Willigen 2017; Evans 2017). 
FPA research on parliaments demonstrates the existence of checks and balances, 
enhancing foreign policy decisions' democratic accountability and scrutiny. It also 
shows variations between states on 'war powers' (Wagner 2017). It illustrates that 
this variation is subject to change (Clare 2014; Shea, Teo, and Levy 2014; Peters 
and Wagner 2014; Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall 2015; Raunio 2016; Raunio 
and Wagner 2017; Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Mello and Peters 2018). In some states, 
opposition parties have more opportunities to contest and influence governments' 
foreign policy decision-making. While such agency remains contested (Auerswald 
2017; Mello 2017), it has increased in some traditionally weak parliaments. In the 
UK parliament, such a trend can be traced back to the 2003 Iraq intervention and 
increased public scrutiny since. The 2013 Syria vote illustrates this. (Ihalainen and 
Matikainen 2016; Strong 2015b; Gaskarth 2016; Kaarbo and Kenealy 2015) 
The coalition and parliament literature shows that parties can exert influence on 
foreign policy agenda setting and outcomes. The research reveals that parties can 
matter to decision-making, that there is not necessarily party consensus on foreign 
policy and that even small parties can influence foreign policy decisions.  
Incentives to position on foreign policy 
Parties are also motivated to express difference and campaign on foreign policy 
because international issues can be salient to the public. Parties’ incentives link 
back to the party definition. This section illustrates this point with contemporary 
political incentives for parties to position and campaign on foreign policy and, in 
particular, on humanitarian military intervention.  
The post-material cleavage issues provided the basis for the rise of the notion of 
humanitarian military intervention, centred on protecting human rights abroad 
 




and 'saving strangers' (Wagner et al. 2017a, 2017b). This incentivised parties to 
express and frame foreign policy in humanitarian and ethical terms. Some party 
scholars argue that new cleavages appeared and centre around protest against the 
status quo, the EU and constraints on domestic policy-making (at least framed to 
be) imposed by European integration (e.g. Katsanidou and Otjes 2016; Otjes and 
Katsanidou 2017; Hooghe and Marks 2017; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). 
European and international economic integration, as recent protests against free 
trade agreements, party-positioning on and the 'politicisation' of the issue showed 
(e.g. Jančić 2017), and related issues can incentivise (some) parties to establish 
links between domestic policy-making, and international developments.  
Populist parties tap into the public's interest in international issues, often framed 
in terms of domestic security. The success of such parties is not only measured in 
electoral victory but also in their ability to set the agenda and frame issues. Populist 
parties have been particularly apt at doing this on trans-national issues, such as 
migration, security and European integrations. There is still little research on 
populist parties’ capacity to influence foreign policy (Balfour et al. 2016; 
Chryssogelos 2017). If the influence of some populist radical parties as junior 
coalition partner is an indication, such parties have foreign policy agendas and seek 
to exert influence (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Coticchia and Davidson 2016). 
Populist parties illustrate the potential effect of the (framed) tension between a 
foreign policy geared toward ‘saving strangers’ and domestic welfare spending 
cuts. As Western European democracies experience a resurgence of material 
inequality and social cleavages around material issues, decisions to commit 
budgets to foreign policy increasingly need to be justified against reductions in 
domestic spending. This contest for state resources can make humanitarian 
military intervention a salient topic. This salience can incentivise parties to position 
on foreign policy. This motivation adds to parties’ likelihood to express and 
campaign on foreign policy, given that foreign policy issues can be and have been 
framed as relevant to cleavages that shape party systems and competition.  
Ideas about foreign policy 
Some of the literature reviewed point to ideas, suggesting that ideology matters in 
foreign policy. Studies of coalitions, parliaments and public opinion propose that 
ideas are important and sometimes relevant to policy decisions and outcomes 
 




(Ozkececi-Taner 2005; Clare 2010; Oktay 2014; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; 
Brummer 2017). There is research looking at the relevance and effect of ideology 
on foreign policy preferences and positions (Nincic and Ramos 2010; Rathbun 
2007; Rathbun et al. 2016). Moreover, there is evidence that ideology can shape 
government foreign policy orientation. Brommesson and Ekengren (2013) show 
that ideology matters to foreign policy change between predecessor and newly-
elected governments, albeit that political culture and institutions constrain impact. 
They find that foreign policy ideology can change in majoritarian systems (UK). It 
can also change in consensus-oriented political systems (Sweden). The authors 
explain this finding of alteration in less confrontational systems with contextual 
factors and a shift in foreign policy reorientation.  
Research shows that there are domestic ideological differences on international 
issues. There are differences on Europe, as noted above. There are also ideological 
differences on the  North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Hofmann 2013, 
2017), international political economy (Haupt 2010), trade (Milner and Judkins 
2004), foreign aid (e.g. Thérien and Noel 2000; Carbone 2007; Allen and Flynn 
2018) and the use of force (Martini 2015). 
These strands of ideas and foreign policy research reveal the importance of beliefs 
and principles in foreign policy decision-making. Table 1.1. illustrates the links and 
mirroring effect between the party definition (part 2) and this three-step review. 
For this study, parties, defined as founded on principles, shaped by ideologies and 
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Representational 










society and state 
Incentives to 
position on foreign 
policy issues 
Public interest and 
opinion, salience of 
foreign policy 
Founded on 
principles and a view 
of human nature and 
society 
Ideas about foreign 
policy, ideology and 
foreign policy 
Left-right divide, 
foreign policy values 
mirror domestic 
policy values etc. 
Table 1.1. Mirroring party definition and foreign policy research 
3.2. Parties and military interventions: State of the Art 
Parties and military interventions scholarship is still relatively small but growing. 
There are some studies directly concerned with parties (Carbone 2007; Heffington 
2016). These studies provide insights into the contentious nature of interventions 
and stress ideological differences between parties. Yet, they mostly focus on 
individual parties or party systems. They largely neglect the domestic ideational 
context in conjunction with the international ideational context.  
A key study of parties and military intervention remains Partisan Intervention. 
Challenging the assumptions to the study of parties and foreign policy, Rathbun 
(2004) demonstrates that ideology matters in defining the national interest, to 
parties’ foreign policy stances and states’ decision-making on what he calls peace 
enforcement. Examining parties’ positions in France, Germany and the UK, he finds 
evidence that they are based on ideology. Crucially, he also notes that foreign policy 
ideology stances mirror domestic policy. ‘The values that parties represent in 
domestic politics, which rest on particular moral understandings of how society 
should be ordered, are often the values underlying their foreign policy as well.’ 
(2004, 2) His study challenges the claim that an unmediated national interest or 
 




national identity can causally determine foreign policy positions. He disproves the 
party consensus assumption on humanitarian military intervention.  
Rathbun (2004) finds a tendency on the left to be sceptical of the use of force and 
that right-wing parties have fewer problems with military means. He argues that 
parties face dilemmas when deciding support for military interventions. Left-wing 
parties pit a definition of the national interest that includes welfare and human 
rights of people outside the respective jurisdiction of their state against a general 
scepticism on state use of force. Right-wing parties see a conflict between a narrow 
definition of the national interest as concerning the nation and the need to be 
perceived as strong through using force. Rathbun posits that moderates/centrists 
are more likely to resolve such dilemmas because they are better at evaluating 
complexity and learning lessons from past experience in government.  
Research substantiating the central finding that parties differ on foreign policy and 
that ideas matter was published recently. Ostermann (2016) challenges elite 
consensus assumptions that foreign policy stances are evident and immediate, 
based on interests or identity. He traces variation in that French parties’ discursive 
construction of the 2011 Libya intervention. Such constructions would not be 
necessary if interests were clear. He shows that parties differed on and contested 
other parties' framing. Wagner et al (2017a, 2017b) provide fresh evidence of left-
right differences between parties in positioning on military interventions. Their 
studies substantiate previous findings that parties across Europe have different 
stances and that they contest military interventions policy on substance and 
procedure. Their findings support the claim that parties’ positions are based on 
ideologies. They confirm a tendency of left-leaning parties to be more sceptical of 
military intervention. Right-leaning parties are more pro-interventionist. However, 
they also find support for military intervention strongest among centrist parties 
and that support gradually declines toward the fringes of the political spectrum. 
This suggests a convergence of policy positions at the centre and at the extremes. 
This finding mirrors Rathbun's dilemma resolution claims.  
A Partisan intervention (2004) weakness was the prima facia assumption of the 
existence of humanitarian as distinct from other forms of military interventions. 
Thereby, it failed to recognise the political and contested nature. Despite the overall 
argument and evidence that ideas underlie parties’ definitions of the national 
 




interest, the book rejects the notion that international norms could have mattered 
in the 1990s context analysed. While it notes that the end of the Cold War was a 
‘window of opportunity’ and recognises the role the evolution of domestic norms 
can play, the book denies such norms’ relevance in case of military intervention 
(2004, 31). Equally, it downplays the role of ideas and ideology in actors’ lesson 
learning; implying, instead, that there were no other lessons to be drawn from the 
1990s genocides than those of centrists who argued in favour of intervention. 
Moreover, Rathbun’s (2004) normative commitment is clear, when he argues that 
'idealists' do not recognise dilemmas between principled concern for the welfare 
of all and scepticism regarding the use of force. He reasons that unconditional 
attachment to principles was why they rejected interventions. So-called moderates 
in centrist parties, by contrast, had the capacity to evaluate policy and situational 
complexity. He notes the creeping in of ethical foreign policy without critically 
assessing its underpinnings. He seems to claim that ‘whatever works’ pragmatists 
in parties are non-ideological while idealists are inflexibly ideology-led. This is a 
fallacy because the assumption that there is a non-ideological political concept or 
position is in itself an ideological standpoint (Freeden 2008). It reveals the author’s 
view of ideology as essentially negative and its possible absence.  
This thesis does not accept the existence of humanitarian military intervention as 
more than its proponents’ belief in the possibility to differentiate between forms of 
military interventions based on motives.3 Rather, it takes these claims as part of the 
normative context in which interveners act in accordance with norms and proclaim 
motives in order to be seen as acting legitimately. The aim is not to diminish the 
belief of those favouring such interventions, but to accept that the normative power 
of ideas is not necessarily based on inherent goodness or on alleged non-ideological 
nature. Centrist and moderates are idealists in pragmatists’ clothing. The idealist-
pragmatist dichotomy is as misleading as the claim that there is no ideology.  
Centrist parties’ 'ethical foreign policy' is steeped in ideology. Chandler (2003) 
proposes such foreign policy defined humanitarian military intervention as the 
                                                          
3 It refers to humanitarian military intervention not as a separate practice. The intervention in Libya 
are called humanitarian only to denote actor invocation of a motive or a distinction in the literature. 
Humanitarian military intervention is preferred to humanitarian intervention to make clear that 
there are civilian, non-military forms of intervention in conflict and that humanitarian largely refers 
to non-partisan, non-violent work, such as that of the red cross or doctors without borders. 
 




expression of a foreign policy that proclaims not to pursue any national interest. 
Instead, this foreign policy is framed as a fight for the lives and human rights of 
others, based on principles and values (Wheeler 2002). It was a reaction to what 
was perceived as ‘politicised’ era of bipolarity. Non-state actors had tried to 
‘depoliticise’ foreign policy through a stress on ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ as anti-
ideology. (Chandler and Heins 2007) The politics-morality dichotomy is contested. 
Jahn (2012) argues that it is a fallacy. It was constructed to present humanitarian 
military intervention as moral as opposed to political. Scholars also argue that such 
foreign policy was part of an ideational crisis and loss of mission experience by the 
centrist left and right parties (e.g. Vickers 2000; McCormack 2011). They propose 
that in the perceived absence of a domestic political project and vision, after the 
end of the Cold War, some parties turned to foreign policy to fill the void, find 
validation and a new project. Such missions resonated with segments of the 
electorate concerned with post-material issues and were under less domestic 
scrutiny and control if they went amiss. While most ethical foreign policy studies 
do not directly look at parties, their focus on ideas and political frameworks links it 
back to parties, in particular Third Way left-parties (e.g. Gaskarth 2006a, 2006b, 
2013) but also centrist parties more broadly (Beech 2011; Beech and Oliver 2014; 
Daddow and Schnapper 2013).  
In sum, research on parties and military intervention provides insights into the 
ideational foundations and differences between parties. This thesis builds on the 
recent resurgence of research on parties and foreign policy of military intervention. 
It adds a focus on contestation when a domestic controversy on decisions arises.  
4. Overview of arguments and contributions  
The present study makes several contributions to the growing research on parties, 
foreign policy and military intervention. The thesis adds to empirical evidence on 
parties’ foreign policy contestations. The theoretical framework is a contribution 
to FPA role theory research. Finally, some practical implications can be identified.  
4.1. Research on parties’ foreign policy and intervention  
This study contributes empirically to scholarship on parties. It adds to research 
unpacking the state in foreign policy decision-making by focusing on parties. It 
speaks to the proposition that: 
 




In many respects, political parties can be seen as the key site for a number of 
activities attributed in FPA to domestic sources of foreign policy. These include 
the simultaneous role of political parties as agenda setters in foreign policy, 
through ideological discourses reflecting their distinctive political orientation 
(e.g. rightist or leftist), as agenda followers in foreign policy, and through their 
positions as interest aggregators derived from the support they court from 
within domestic society. (Alden and Aran 2017, 81) 
The thesis contributes a cross-spectrum study of parties’ foreign policy on the issue 
of military intervention to the growing scholarship on parties and foreign policy in 
comparative politics. Most work on foreign policy partisanship so far is on the 
United States (US). Research on European parties and international issues often 
focuses on the topic of Europe, from the Europeanisation process, left-right 
variation on the EU or parties’ and Euro-scepticism, to stances on current salient 
issues, including on the European Common Foreign and Security Policy or the 
effects of the 2008-2009 economic crisis (e.g. Ladrech 2002; Külahci 2011; Grande 
and Hutter 2016; Kriesi et al. 2005; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Tavits and 
Letki 2009; Dunphy 2004; Charalambous 2011; Holmes and Lightfoot 2016; 
Chryssogelos 2015). Other studies on European parties and foreign policy 
concentrate on one party family (e.g. Charalambous 2013; van Kersbergen 2003; 
Bailey et al. 2014) or on individual parties (e.g. Brunstetter and Brunstetter 2011) 
or one political phenomenon (e.g. populism Hadiz and Chryssogelos 2017).  
The thesis also adds to party and foreign policy research on France and Germany. 
In the case of France, it adds a more direct engagement with domestic politics and 
parties as potential domestic foreign policy actors to studies of French foreign 
policy mostly focused on the state, elite or individual president-level. In the case of 
Germany, the thesis adds to research already covering domestic foreign policy 
actors. The thesis finds that there are differences in foreign policy stances, despite 
parties' relatively small role in decision-making in this case and in general. 
This PhD also contributes theoretically to research on parties and foreign policy. It 
adds role theory to the toolset. This contribution begins from the observation that 
within role theory research, including recent advances, there is no direct focus on 
parties as potential drivers of domestic role contestation (e.g. Özdamar 2016; 
Gaskarth 2016). The scholarship on parties and foreign policy, including on military 
interventions, is also still relatively small. Recent advances have noted that parties 
compete on foreign policy issues and that there are ideological differences between 
them that can influence decision-making. Studies look at parties' contestation of 
 




intervention and the drivers of such differences, noting positions on the process of 
decision-making and the content of decisions (Wagner et al. 2017a, 2017b, 2018). 
Others show that radical parties as junior coalition partners can exert influence on 
foreign policy decision-making (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Coticchia and Davidson 
2016). The comparative studies indicate partisan variation on foreign policy across 
different political systems. The single country studies find that parties' strategic, 
negotiation position in political institutions and their ideological positions on the 
left-right spectrum can impact government agreements and priorities (e.g. Joly and 
Dandoy 2018). Research shows that parties can disagree on foreign policy, and that 
differences are to be expected based on political incentives, opportunities and 
ideas. Yet, much of the scholarship is focused on parties' influence on decision-
making processes, and explaining parties' positions and their voting decisions.  
The first rationale for using role theory for parties and foreign policy research is 
that, in the current international system, parties need the state to enact foreign 
policy. Hence, they are likely to express foreign policy proposal using the state as 
the actor, proposing national roles for it. Role theory is actor-orientated, leaving 
room for parties’ agency to define national roles. A second reasoning is that the 
strengths of role theory and parties and foreign policy research resemble each 
other. Role theory is lauded for bridging the agent-structure debate and for 
recognising ideational and material factors as relevant. Similarly, some party 
research in FPA stresses that parties are actors with some agency and 
opportunities that can (directly or indirectly) influence foreign policy decision-
making. They are domestic actors operating on and influencing states' 
international-level behaviour. Moreover, while parties are carriers of ideas, they 
are also constrained (and motivated) by material demands, incentives and 
objectives, such as winning elections and holding office, and constraints posed by 
other parties, the party and political systems. The foreign policy and parties and the 
role theory foreign policy research strands, thus, both focus on the domestic and 
international level, material and ideational factors, and actor agency and structural 
constraints. Bridging and complexity make their combination interesting.  
Thus, this thesis proposes to use role theory to delve deeper into understanding the 
ideational factors shaping the variation between parties, building on the parties 
and foreign policy research. It explores ideational sources away from the pressures 
to establish influence or explain decisions. It argues that a role theory approach is 
 




a useful lens and starting point for doing that because it is in national roles and role 
statements that more general and abstract ideas about foreign policy become 
concrete for foreign policy actors and relevant for a particular case. Thus, 
identifying variation in national roles and national role conceptions, and exploring 
domestic national role contestation can help locate differences between parties. 
This variation may else go undetected, because of assumed or surface consensus on 
policy, i.e. agreement on the need to militarily intervene or not. Role theory helps 
make policy positions become more concrete and can help with identifying the 
sources of consensus and contestation.  
4.2. Foreign Policy Analysis’ role theory research  
The thesis makes two theoretical contributions to FPA role theory, an approach 
that focuses on decision-makers’ own definitions of their state’s role in 
international relations. 
The first contribution is a focus on parties’ national roles and speaks to the 
suggestion that:  
[a]n examination of the domestic political conflicts over roles would provide 
role theory the underlying mechanisms to account for the emergence of shared 
roles, the imposition of a dominant role, and the changes in roles and foreign 
policy when domestic political conditions change. (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016c, 
16) 
Parties are an understudied foreign policy actor in role theory. Building on FPA's 
domestic actors and ideas research and role theory’s recent advances on domestic 
role contestation, this thesis argues that parties are a useful entry point for 
unpacking the elites, dominant roles and assertions of role consensus. In party-
based democracies, foreign policy stances and decisions mature within parties and 
are (in most cases) taken by party politicians. The argument is that differences in 
how national roles are interpreted play a central role in domestic controversies on 
state decision-making and that these differences can (in part) be traced to 
ideologies and engagement with international norms. This thesis demonstrates 
that there is variation in how parties interpret national roles, including dominant, 
salient ones. Ideas from multiple levels influence national role interpretations, 
affect domestic differences in role socialisation and domestic role contestation. A 
focus on parties can help identify underlying ideas, informing about the origins of 
national role conceptions and domestic role contestation.  
 




A key finding of this thesis was that parties disagree on the priorities and how the 
role is to be performed, despite consensus on terminology and the national role to 
perform. They propose variations of the same role that merit a qualification of the 
agreed upon role. In France, parties of the centre and the radical left agreed on the 
leader role. However, they disagreed greatly on how such a leader role ought to 
play out in practice. There was evidence of the same foreign policy tradition in all 
three parties under study. Again this did not lead to the proposal of the same 
national role in detail. Parties interpreted it differently and chapter 4 suggested 
that this was due to ideological differences and international norms engagement. 
In Germany, all but one party agreed on the alliance partner role but differed 
greatly on how they defined it. Chapter 5 suggested that this was in part due to 
different foreign policy traditions on which parties drew and ideology and 
international norms. The empirical analysis, thus, suggested that at least three 
ideational layers can be traced in parties' national role interpretations in the 
context of the Libya 2011 case.  
This leads to the central argument that foreign policy traditions, international 
norms and ideologies are key sources of the domestic contestation of national roles. 
The research conducted also shows that contestation takes place in different ways: 
as the criticism of past roles performance and alternative national role proposals 
or based on different priorities within a role consensus. 
A second theoretical contribution to role theory is a discussion of responsibility and 
the problematisation of the concept. It followed the empirical observation is that 
national role conceptions include and are related to notions of responsibility. The 
argument is two-pronged. First, responsibility is central to national roles and 
variation in responsibility definitions links to divergences on national role 
interpretations. This conceptual, theoretical contribution speaks to the proposition 
that role theory can benefit from engaging with international norms (e.g. Breuning 
2011; Hansel and Möller 2015). The concept of responsibility shapes views on how 
the state ought to act. The present study suggests that paying attention to the 
definitions of international responsibility in role statements contributes to a better 
understanding of the variation in national role interpretations. Also, it proposes 
that invoking responsibility in national roles has a political function.  
 




4.3. Practical contributions: policy implications and uses 
This thesis first practical contribution is a better understanding of differences 
between parties’ foreign policy stances and national role conceptions can inform 
about variation in foreign policy decision-making and outcomes. Thus, this PhD 
framework can improve explanations and increase prediction accuracy about 
change and continuity between governments and legislative majorities.  
The second practical contribution is an improved grasp of foreign policy narratives 
for expert-practitioners. In many states, foreign policy bureaucracies and 
practitioners stay in place when governments change. They put into practice, 
explain and sometimes defend administrations’ decisions. They can benefit from 
tools to identify implied national roles and the nuanced differences between parties 
or different political actors.  
This thesis can also be useful for expert-practitioners and expert-commentators as 
it can provide a map on how to influence parties’ (and other political actors’) 
national role conceptions and selection. It can point to where to link in with novel 
ideas to create or point to dilemmas and the need for new frames and solutions. 
Thesis outline 
Chapter 1 introduced the research questions, aims and discussed the relevance of 
the thesis. In a next step, the chapter situated the thesis in the FPA scholarship and 
reviewed the state of the art on parties and military intervention. The chapter 
argument was that existing research on parties pays attention to the domestic level 
processes and ideologies, but neglects the interplay between domestic and 
international-level ideas. The chapter closed with the theoretical and empirical 
arguments of the thesis and its contributions to scholarship. 
Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework. Starting from a theoretical 
discussion of role theory, in particular, advances in research on role socialisation 
and domestic role contestation, it points to the relative absence of parties in role 
research. The chapter then discusses the theoretical research on international 
norms and ideologies, R2P and humanitarian intervention. It highlights the overlap 
between national role conceptions, international norms and ideologies, as ideas 
about appropriate behaviour of inherently contestable nature. The central 
argument is that role theory is a useful lens and that national roles are a useful focus 
 




to pin down parties’ proposals of policy action because this approach as actor 
orientated theory recognises agency in defining roles for the state that translate 
into policy proposals. Role theorists recognise that ideas influence actors’ 
definitions of appropriate behaviour for their state. Combining role theory with an 
international normative and ideology framework helps identify the ideational 
layers in national role expressions. This can help grasp parties’ understanding and 
framing of conflict situations and events (and proposed solutions).  
Chapter 3 is devoted to methodology and the research design. It operationalises 
the theoretical lens and details how parties’ national role expressions, variation and 
contestation will be identified. The argument is that an interpretive methodology 
and a narrative focus are suitable for a study focused on identifying and analysing 
national role statements and on extracting ideas. This chapter also addresses the 
epistemological challenges of the thesis. It presents the research design. It closes 
with the case selection, providing detail about why the intervention in Libya and 
French and German parties with respect were chosen. 
Chapters 4 to 6 are the empirical chapters. In chapter 4 and 5, role theory is used 
as a lens. The chapters trace the foreign policy narratives and role statements. Role 
interpretations and contestation are identified and ideational sources are 
discussed. Chapter 6 explores responsibility in role statements identified in the 
narratives in the preceding chapters. It is experimental, combining role theory with 
a conceptual discussion. It builds on the observation that the concept of 
responsibility is ubiquitous. The key contribution is the linking of national roles and 
responsibility. The argument is that paying closer attention to responsibility in role 
statements, i.e. how it is understood and what ideas underpin its definitions, 
contributes to a better grasp of role interpretations and contestation. 
Chapter 7 discusses the theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis. It 
draws conclusions on the expectations in the theoretical chapter. In this chapter, I 
















Chapter 2: A role theory framework for analysing 
parties and military intervention 
The previous chapter described the aims of this thesis to contribute to the growing 
literature challenging the elite foreign policy consensus assumption. It proposed to 
focus on parties' national role conceptions. It posed research questions seeking an 
answer to which ideas shape domestic national role interpretations and contestation. 
The review of the FPA scholarship on domestic sources of foreign policy decision-
making pointed to the relevance of parties and ideas. The state of the art on parties 
and military intervention further revealed the thesis' potential contribution.  
This chapter develops a theoretical framework that uses role theory. It proposes to 
combine it with an ideational approach. The aim is to identify ideas sustaining parties' 
national role statements. Role theory is a bridge between theories that are reliant on 
interests and those focused on identity and ideas. It takes into account the complexity 
and social nature of the international system. The developed approach is an answer to 
calls for more dialogue between role theory and FPA research on domestic foreign 
policy sources. It follows challenges to role theorists’ tendency to black-box domestic 
elites assuming a horizontal role consensus (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016c). The 
framework also integrates the international normative context (Breuning 2011). 
The central argument is that international norms intertwine with ideologies’ 
international dimension in parties’ national roles. Teasing out these ideas points to 
the potential factors influencing domestic actors’ national role socialisation. Exploring 
parties’ role statements provides information about the range of domestic carriers of 
roles and the (political and ideational) nature of domestic role contestation. The 
inclusion of multi-level ideas seems particularly relevant because of the challenges to 
the liberal 'consensus' that has dominated debates about military intervention.  
The theoretical framework makes an original contribution to role theory. Drawing out 
the overlap between the role theory socialisation and international norms research 
fields, it combines them with FPA research on parties and ideas and research on 
ideologies. It adds to knowledge on the domestic origins of roles, effects of role 
socialisation on domestic actors, domestic carriers of roles and the drivers of domestic 
role contestation (Kaarbo and Cantir 2013).  
 




Part 1 introduces role theory and its utility for this study. It discusses role socialisation 
and role contestation. Parts 2 and 3 turn to the ideational layers that form the context 
in which parties operate. Part 4 points to overlap between the role theory, 
international norms and ideology research. The chapter closes with expectations.  
1. Role theory, parties and ideas 
In his seminal article National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy, Holsti 
(1970) imports and adapts role theory from sociology and cognitive disciplines to the 
study of international relations and the behaviour of states. His approach provided a 
novel way of looking at foreign policy decision-making by way of focusing on foreign 
policy decision-makers’ image of their state and its place in the world.  
The role theory approach borrows from theatre postulating that actors are provided 
with a role script, information on how it has been played before and expectations on 
how it ought to be played. Holsti (1970, 245–46) defined national role conceptions as:  
[...] the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, 
commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of functions if any, 
their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or 
subordinate regional systems. It is their “image” of the appropriate orientations 
or functions of their state toward, or in, the external world.  
Role theory is a social theory. The roles foreign policymakers define in national role 
conceptions are a state’s social positions in the international system and socially 
recognised categories of actors (Thies 2013). In Holsti's adaptation of role theory to 
foreign policy, the state is the actor (also called ego). The state is confronted with other 
actors in the system (called alters) from which expectations in forms of role-pressures 
are emanating. Roles, inherently relational/social, are the awareness of ego’s position 
in relation to alters and of the expectations toward the state in question. Roles 
manifest in an enactment that becomes visible as state behaviour.  
Role theorists expect causality between national role conceptions and state behaviour. 
Holsti argues that policymakers’ national role conceptions affect foreign policy role 
performance, i.e. decisions and actions, including patterns of attitudes, responses, 
functions and commitments (1970, 245). National role conceptions shape interests 
and policies (Krotz 2015). Ego- and alter-role cues exert influence on decision-makers’ 
perception of appropriate behaviour in specific situations. There is a socialisation 
effect via interaction with external and demands of domestic actors (Harnisch 2011).  
 




Holsti identifies ego and alter national role conception sources. Ego-sources are 
domestic sources. These include a number of ideational factors like ‘[...] national 
values, ideology, traditional roles, public opinion [...]’ (Holsti 1970, 245) and material 
and other factors like political needs (see image 2.1) Krotz (2015, 3) adds to these ego-
role sources 'historically rooted and domestically anchored views of self and purpose.' 
A policymaker's national role conception is also influenced by alter-role prescriptions. 
Sources include ‘[...] system structure, system-wide values, general legal principles, 
treaty commitments, informal understandings, “world opinion” [...]’. (Holsti 1970, 
245) Thus, national role conceptions and alter-role prescriptions include domestic 
incentives for parties, for example, in the shape of public opinion and political needs. 
 
Image 2.1. National role conceptions and prescriptions, Holsti (1970, 245) 
The following sections review role theory's core concepts, role socialisation and role 
contestation. The assumption is that parties also experience alter-role expectations 
and the pressures exerted on the state to comply with role performance. However, it 
is further assumed that parties can also experience role conflicts and contest roles.    
 
 




1.1. The role theory revival and its relevance to this thesis 
Early role theorists focused on the constraining nature of the international system 
while later studies focused on agency and actors’ role conceptions without ignoring 
the systemic constraints (Breuning 2011; Thies and Breuning 2012). Later and recent 
role theory coincides with the rise of and shares affinities with IR Constructivism due 
to its focus on identity and ideas. Yet, early role theory was by no means a move away 
from IR Realism. Instead, Holsti and others sought to refine existing theories. In his 
discussion of state role socialisation, Thies (2013) shows that the choice and selection 
of roles and role socialisation are conditioned on material capabilities. He (2010, 690) 
suggests that '[...] material factors constrain ideational factors' and that the study of 
roles may be a bridge between Constructivism and Realism.  Role theory has also been 
welcomed as a bridge between IR and FPA because it focuses on domestic actors’ 
agency and systemic pressures (Thies and Breuning 2012). Role theory’s attraction is 
the potential to overcome structural IR theories and approaches overestimating 
agency and ideational factors because decision-makers have a level of agency to define 
and enact roles, despite the constraints role scripts (Hollis and Smith 1986).  
Role theory experienced a recent revival. Research has looked at the system level and 
role socialisation (Thies 2010, 2012, 2013). Studies focus on the domestic level. A 
particular innovation has been the challenge and calls to test assumptions of vertical 
(between elites and public) and horizontal (among elites) role consensus (Cantir and 
Kaarbo 2012, 2016c). This led scholars to explore role conflicts and role contestation. 
The present theoretical framework builds on this recent role theory research strands.  
The role theory revival also demonstrates the eclecticism and scope for development 
and application of the approach. Some scholars continue to challenge IR assumptions 
(e.g. Gigleux 2016) and propose to combine role theory with other FPA subfields (e.g. 
Harnisch 2012 on policy learning; Jones 2017 on bureaucratic politics). Role theory 
has moved beyond US and Euro-centrism (Adigbuo 2007; Shih 2012; Wehner 2011, 
2015, 2016; Thies 2012, 2014) and away from its state-centrism to role conceptions 
of/in regional institutions (Aggestam 1999; Flockhart 2011; Bengtsson and Elgström 
2011, 2012; Chelotti 2015; Koenig 2016) and of aspiring states (Beasley and Kaarbo 
2017; Beasley, Kaarbo, and Solomon-Strauss 2016). The renewed interest has led to a 
number of edited volumes (Elgström and Smith 2006; Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 
 




2011), a Foreign Policy Analysis special issue (Thies and Breuning 2012) and a Role 
Theory and International Relations series (Routledge 2010). 
This thesis builds and contributes to this research. I challenge assumptions of elite 
role consensus and the irrelevance of elite disagreement, implicit in some role theory 
studies. I propose to unpack elites. I selected a central actor among national elites in 
representative democracies to disentangle ego and take a closer look at role consensus 
and contestation. The next two sections discuss two role research strands of particular 
pertinence for the aims of this thesis: role socialisation and domestic role contestation.  
1.2. Role socialisation 
Thies (2012, 29) defines role socialisation based on the role location process:  
Role location refers to the process whereby a social actor locates a suitable role 
in a social structure. The role location process is where role expectations of the 
self and other, role demands of the situations, and cues from the audience all 
come together to produce a role for the actor and set the conditions for its 
appropriate enactment. Suitable roles are determined through the interaction 
of relevant actors in a role bargaining process. Socialization itself is essentially 
a role bargaining process.  
This definition has two implications for the study of parties' national role conceptions. 
First, in 'expectations of the self' we can assume domestic actors' self-views are 
aggregated, including parties. Second, in 'cues from the audience' we can include 
domestic audiences, i.e. electorates and public opinion, given the demands of domestic 
audiences and international actors (Putnam 1988). Thus, the role socialisation is 
relevant because it implicates domestic electorates and decision-makers, hence, by 
extension, parties. This is, not to argue that ego-internal, domestic role expectations 
are more important than alter-role expectations or the international audience and 
opinion. However, a focus on parties unpacks the ego in role socialisation processes.  
Role socialisation focuses on the role relationship side of ego-alter. National roles are 
inherently social. There are different ways in which the social nature of roles plays 
out. Thies (2013, 3) describes a '[...] role bargaining process in which ego and alter ego 
interact to determine an appropriate role.' He locates this game at the heart of role 
socialisation. Actors select a role for a situation. Thies suggests that role learning can 
take different forms, including role imitation if states are novices in the system. Yet, if 
a state selects a role considered inappropriate by dominant others in the system this 
role selection can be challenged, leading to diverse outcomes, including punishment:  
 




If the role selection is determined to be inappropriate, then, we should expect 
socialization activities to prevent the state from enacting the role. If the role is 
enacted inappropriately, then we should see socialization activities to bring 
behavior in line with expectations. Socialization activities could include the full 
spectrum of behavior from diplomacy to war; […] (Thies 2010, 697) 
Harnisch (2012) proposes that role learning sources emerge from the interaction of 
ego with the international structure. He suggests that actors 'make roles'; '[w]hen 
embedded in social interaction, role making implies that an agent sets out to 
reconstruct a role, setting in motion a reconstruction of counter-roles or 
commensurate roles.' (2012, 49) The implication is that a process of role learning 
takes place as part of role making and taking. Roles can also be adapted by changing 
strategies and tools of role performance (Harnisch 2011). This social interaction, as 
part of role relationships and role location, implies that roles come with counter-roles 
or in role sets. To be socialised there must be a socialiser and a to-be-socialised actor.  
While Thies (2013) focuses on relations and interactions between states as the actors 
in the role location process, he also notes that his model provides a bridge between 
different levels of analysis '[...] from the individual to the state to the international 
system.' (2013, 29) This accentuates the relevance of role socialisation, as parties are 
located between these levels and even incorporate or link between them. In his 
approach, Harnisch (2012) seeks to take into consideration the social structure of 
states (egos), as he proposes that '[...] in many political systems, interaction between 
individual citizens, parties, and political institutions may reshape the domestic 
institutional roles that inform the process of foreign policy role taking and making.' 
(2012, 51) While his own studies mention parties only in passing (e.g. Beneš and 
Harnisch 2015), this recognition provides further encouragement for this thesis.   
Moreover, and finally, role socialisation research is at least doubly relevant for the 
study. Focusing on novice states, Thies (2012, 2013), analyses how the US and Israel 
emerged into the international system and were socialised into roles. This happened 
sometimes against the role they had selected. His research provides insight into the 
process by which dominant states perform socialiser roles and stresses the role 
expectations such states derived from an emerging state's capabilities. It explains why 
even dominant; materially resourceful states are constrained in the roles they can 
select for themselves. Apart from dealing with novice states’ role socialisation, Thies 
also clarifies that such socialisation is a general, ongoing process and that role location 
bargaining can take place with more than one role, sometimes at the same time. The 
 




interaction shapes the socialisee and the socialiser. The relevance of these findings for 
the study is, first, that the case selection includes two regionally strong states, one on 
the ascent (Germany) and one arguably showing resilience and resistance against its 
descent (France). They may at once be socialisees in relationships with stronger states 
in the international order and socialisers in their region and, thus be shaped by both 
roles. They may even compete as socialisers within the region (Koenig 2016).  
Second, a military intervention case situation puts pressure on such states to perform 
certain roles, especially where international norms on behaviour in such situations 
exist and if socialiser states perceive a state as having the capabilities to act. This could 
mean that dominant socialisers expected Germany and/or France to perform certain 
roles. Simultaneously, as was alluded to before, domestic audiences’ role expectations 
may pull national role performance into other directions, creating domestic tension 
and controversy, if not all experience these two-level pressures in the same way.  
The next section explores domestic tensions in more depth, introducing to role conflict 
and domestic role contestation. 
1.3. Domestic role contestation 
Role conflict is inherent, because of roles' social nature and competing pressures on 
role holders on which role to select and how to enact it. Cantir and Kaarbo (2016d, 5) 
define role conflict as:  
… a clash between domestically defined national role conceptions and 
externally defined role expectations …; as a clash between two role 
prescriptions for the same situation; or a clash between elements of the same 
role. 
Role conflict occurs between role-performers (ego) and those with role expectations 
toward them (alter), in what is known as intra-role conflict. Role conflict also occurs 
when an actor (ego) plays more than one role and these roles can be or become 
perceived as in conflict, in what is termed inter-role conflict. Role conflict results from 
the complex structure of roles that are composed of several core tenets, values and 
beliefs. This diversity and actors’ agency in re-interpreting roles can engender the 
perceptions of contradiction over time (Harnisch 2011; Bengtsson and Elgström 
2012; Kaarbo and Cantir 2013; Wehner 2016). 
Domestic role conflicts can lead to domestic role contestation. Domestic role 
contestation occurs when elements of a role or several previously performed roles are 
 




seen to be in contradiction with each other. Cantir and Kaarbo (2012, 2016d) propose 
that to pay attention to the domestic origins of role conflict permits to unpack the state 
and to explore domestic role contestation. This can reveal the nature of role conflict; 
who carries the role(s) and how they are framed (Kaarbo and Cantir 2013). 
The occurrence of role conflict and domestic role contestation challenges assumptions 
of domestic role consensus. In a recently edited volume Domestic Role Contestation, 
Foreign Policy, and International Relations (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016a), the authors give 
empirical credence to the proposition that this assumption of consensus needs testing. 
They demonstrate that role conflict and domestic role contestation can take place in a 
number of circumstances and that exploring such contestation can help identify role 
continuity and change (Breuning 2016; Hirata 2016), explain change in inter-state 
relations (Özdamar 2016) and impact on the capacity to act (Koenig 2016). They 
further show that the entrenchment of conflicting role conceptions can persist in 
national crisis situations (Hagan 2016) and that the emergence of the electorate’s role 
contestation (vertical role contestation) can precede intra-elite role contestation 
(Gaskarth 2016). The volume provides the empirical evidence that domestic role 
contestation takes place and that it can have effects on policy outcomes. This research 
demonstrates that the public and elites do not always or necessarily agree on national 
roles and that this disagreement can impact decision-making. Exploring parties' roles 
contributes to this research. The thesis focuses on parties' national role statements 
and examines if national roles, like foreign policy stances, differ between parties. 
Existing role theory research on parties is encouraging. A number of authors point 
out that parties can be central to domestic role contestation (Brummer and Thies 
2016; Gaskarth 2016; Hagan 2016; Hirata 2016; Özdamar 2016). Özdamar (2016) 
shows that Turkey’s AKP rise and the consolidation of its domestic political power 
allowed it to alter long enacted Turkish roles with effects on decision-making. He 
demonstrates that parties can change long-established and expected national roles, 
despite constraints due to role performance history and roles institutional 
embedding.  He also provides evidence for such change prompting horizontal role 
contestation by opposition parties, despite their lack of power to affect the role 
location process, role selection and/or role enactment. Brummer and Thies (2015) 
find instances of domestic role conflict and contestation in the interaction between 
(and within) government and opposition, hinting at parties as carriers of roles and 
drivers of role contestation. Brummer and Thies (2016) also show that domestic 
 




actors can use institutional positions to push roles. They demonstrate that domestic 
actors contest roles even in the absence of chances of success, i.e. despite their lack of 
influence on decision-making and role performance. These studies point to parties 
and political ideas affecting domestic role contestation.  
Yet, parties remain relatively understudied in role theory research. This is the case, 
despite the growing recognition of the variety of national role holders (Wehner and 
Thies 2014; Paris 2014; Walker, Schafer, and Beieler 2016; Jones 2017) and despite 
FPA evidence that parties can be foreign policy actors, as discussed in chapter 1. 
Parties are often at most mentioned in passing (e.g. Beneš and Harnisch 2015; 
Oppermann 2012). Role theory research remains devoted to the individual, elite, state 
or supra-state level. Its negligence of parties may stem from the type of research 
questions posed and the decision to black-box elites for research purposes. Yet, 
explicit dismissals also hint at continued assumptions of role consensuses, based in 
part on claims that deep-rooted national identities and histories shape the 
construction of roles, hence, explain their longevity and acceptance (Krotz 2015). 
1.4. Roles and ideas: traditions, international norms and ideologies 
Role theorists have long explored the link between national roles and ideas. Holsti's 
(1970) ego- and alter-role sources already included such ideational factors as 
ideologies and system-wide values as seen above.  
Foreign policy traditions 
Wehner and Thies (2014) argue that foreign policy traditions and dilemmas are useful 
tools to look at the sources of policymakers' national role conceptions:  
… actions and practices of individuals are explained in reference to traditions 
and dilemmas. This tradition encompasses the historical inheritance (or 
patterns) as the starting point of human activity, in which individuals act and 
reason. Traditions are sets of understandings an actor receives during 
socialization. (Wehner and Thies 2014, 6) 
Their approach is ego-centred, exploring the bounded agency of foreign policy actors 
to interpret and re-interpret inherited foreign policy traditions that provide role 
scripts and patterns of past behaviour that actors are likely to orient along or against.  
The concept of dilemma adds to their approach an element that can engender and 
explain gradual role change. Wehner and Thies note (2014, 7): 
 




Whenever a new belief, idea, or practice emerges through the interaction of 
agents situated within an existing tradition and the new repertoire stands in 
opposition, then it tends to exert pressure on the agents to either 
accommodate the new belief into the tradition or to adopt a more radical 
posture of reforming the tradition. In either case, change takes place as the 
existing tradition evolves to incorporate a new idea. 
They suggest that dilemmas and change are constant, given actors' agency. They 
propose that when actors face dilemmas and role conflicts based on foreign policy 
traditions and when new ideas emerge, national roles are likely to change or be 
adapted. The authors argue that a focus on traditions and dilemmas is a good way to 
explore domestic contestation over the national role.  
Wehner and Thies' (2014) import of foreign policy traditions and dilemma to role 
theory draws the two fields of role socialisation and domestic role contestation 
together. They emphasise that ideas and, in particular, new ideas can shape how 
domestic actors view the national role in a given situation and they suggest that there 
are various and competing domestic voices over what this role ought to be. The 
authors also note the presence of 'liberal', 'socialist' and other traditions. 
Parties may be some of these competing voices engaging with old and new ideas of 
how the state ought to act and adapt to new ideas and contexts. Moreover, this chapter 
will suggest that foreign policy traditions are not necessarily ideologies but that some 
can be traced to ideological families. In this thesis, foreign policy traditions are part of 
a wider category of political traditions that can build on other concepts and individual 
legacies. Necessarily, such traditions include views about the domestic and 
international society based on ideologies, as defined in this chapter.  
International norms 
Some role theorists also focus on the impact of international norms. In a study devoted 
to the impact of embeddedness in multiple institutions, each with their own norms, 
rules and principles, Barnett (1993) shows how states can be exposed to multiple and 
diverse role expectations and demands. While his study does not incorporate the 
domestic level, it raises awareness of competing role pressures, role conflict and 
effects that such competing institutions can have on role performance or state 
behaviour in general. More recently, Hansel and Möller (2015) demonstrate that the 
emergence of norms can intensify intra- and inter-role conflict. Focusing on India, they 
show that norms, such as R2P, can stress role conflict. While the non-use of force 
 




dimension of R2P resonated with Indian role conceptions, such as the developing 
nation role, the force dimension clashed with long-held views that interventions serve 
selfish interests, reframe state sovereignty and pose a threat to equality between 
states in the international system. 
Domestic ideas and ideologies 
The proposition in this thesis is that role expectations and demands also emanate from 
the domestic level where party competition and public opinion can put pressure on 
decision-makers. Only rarely does role theory focus on domestic actors and ideas pay 
attention to parties, as described above. Most studies combining a roles and ideas 
approach are on the UK's foreign policy (e.g. McCourt 2013, 2011a, 2011b; Gaskarth 
2014). Mostly focused on leaders, it hints at parties as carriers of ideas and foreign 
policy actors. Gaskarth (2016) shows that New Labour’s 2003 Iraq invasion changed 
the parameters of foreign policy decision-making and led to increased vertical role 
contestation that led to more horizontal role contestation in parliament between MPs 
and within some parties. His study also indirectly focuses on international norms. He 
demonstrates that ideas of humanitarian military intervention resonated with elites 
in the UK, such as that of a human rights defender, but that the negative experience of 
interventions saw the public emerge as relevant other to elites’ role conceptions.  
In sum, taken together, role theory research on traditions and dilemmas, international 
norms, and, indirectly, on parties and ideologies is promising. This thesis contributes 
a study of parties and focuses on ideologies and international norms as ideational 
factors interacting with foreign policy traditions and influencing parties' role 
socialisation, selection and potentially domestic role contestation. Image 2.1. 
illustrates this 'ideational triangle'. This thesis does not make a judgement on which 
ideational layer came first. Hence, there are no arrows in the image. I propose that 
these ideas influence and reinforce each other. A party selects a national role 
appropriate to a certain situation and event from possible and plausible national roles 
for their state. A party's ideology in tandem with international norms providing more 
precise rules on how to act in the type of situation influence role selection and the way 
in which a foreign policy tradition is adapted to the present situation and 
contemporary context. The role selection and role performance of a governing party 
or coalition of parties then become part of the tradition repertoire for future situations 
and role selections.  
 





Image 2.2. Ideational triangle: parties' national role selection and interpretation 
2. International norms, local actors and contestation 
Research on international norms increased with the emergence of Constructivist 
approaches in IR in the late 1980s and 1990s, focused on the social construction of 
international relations, intersubjective meanings and identity (e.g. Kratochwil 1989; 
Wendt 1992; Checkel 1999). International norms are included in this theoretical 
framework because of the existence of such norms on the legitimate use of force and 
given the explicit reference to the R2P norm in UNSC resolution 1973 (2011) 
mandating the implementation of a no-fly zone in Libya.  
International norms are shared ideas about appropriate behaviour. They can be 
codified in law (Legro 1997) In the current international legal system, it is illegal to 
interfere in another state’s internal affairs, wage war or otherwise use force against 
another state, unless authorised by UN Charter chapter VII provisions, i.e. in the case 
of confirmed threats to or breaches of international peace, or in self-defence. This 
order is based on the concept of state sovereignty building on and guaranteed by the 
principle of non-interference (United Nations 1945, 3, Chapter I, Article 2.4 and 2.7). 
In IR, ‘international norms’ include non-legal norms.4 In the current system, a widely 
held view is that it is legitimate, as opposed to strictly legal, to militarily interfere in 
                                                          
4 International norms, hereafter, designate non-legal norms, unless otherwise stated. 
 




another state under certain circumstances and under certain conditions (Kennedy 
2006). R2P and humanitarian intervention are not international law.  
The international normative evolution is the subject of norm life cycle research. 
Finnemore and Sikkink trace how international norms emerge, spread, cascade and 
become taken for granted. These ideas do not emerge by themselves or in a vacuum. 
So-called norm-entrepreneurs actively construct new frames through which to view 
an issue. Successful international norms resonate or are made to resonate with 
domestic norms. Thus, as part of the norm life cycle process, old norms are challenged. 
New norms can provide new understandings (e.g. Legro 1997; Panke and Petersohn 
2012) and once taken for granted norms can also regress (McKeown 2009; Barnes 
2016; Birdsall 2016). The norm life cycle demonstrates that for novel ways of 
addressing an issue to become a shared understanding, other norms have to be 
actively contested and challenged. It points to the local contingency of such norms.  
2.1. Norm contestation and domestic actors 
Acharya (2004, 2011) demonstrates that international norms are not simply adopted. 
Sometimes they are rejected, despite the work of norm-entrepreneurs, challenging 
existing norms and pointing to dilemmas. He argues that this is the case when local 
actors perceive these new norms as imposed by powerful states and in conflict with 
older norms. In other cases, domestic actors actively adapt new norms to fit with 
domestically held and accepted ones (Acharya 2004; Vieira 2013). This process can 
lead to the reconstruction of international norms intermeshed with local ideas. This 
can lead to variations in norm interpretation and implementation that is traceable to 
domestic norms (e.g. Cortell and Davis 2005; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007). 
The rejection of international norms points to the agency to resist and contest norms. 
It raises the question of which international norms are pushed and by whom. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) observe that what motivates norm entrepreneurs is a 
strong sense of ‘appropriateness’, driven by empathy, altruism and ideational 
commitment. In their discussion of humanitarian military intervention, they suggest 
that an intrinsic quality marks successful international norms. While it is important to 
unpack states and institutions to look at the individual and domestic level to analyse 
norm success and failure, the focus on righteous individuals conceals the interests and 
power of those promoting international norms. Nadelmann (1990) argues that while 
 




promoted norms reflect promoters’ beliefs, they also ‘[…] tend to reflect the economic 
and political interests of the dominant members of international society.’ (1990, 480) 
The adaptation of international norms points to the importance of interpretation. 
Wiener (2009) argues that the meaning of norms is particularly contested situations 
when additional pressure to apply the norm is applied. The meaning of international 
norms is essentially prone to conflict and contestation. She notes: ‘… while a norm 
such as human rights may be agreeable within an international negotiating setting, … 
the actual meaning of this norm may differ in the actual contexts of norm 
implementation.’ (2009, 117)  
Resistance to and the essential contestability of international norms raise the stakes 
for domestic actors. It encourages closer scrutiny of domestic actors’ engagement with 
international norms. While much of the pertinent literature focuses on local actors in 
states resisting new norms, this thesis takes a closer look at domestic engagement by 
parties in two powerful states. This follows recent foreign policy research on domestic 
contestation over international norms when coalition parties disagree (Kaarbo 2017; 
Brazys, Kaarbo, and Panke 2017). 
2.2. Norms on the use of force: R2P and humanitarian intervention  
Interferences in other states have de facto always taken place and interventions with 
a humanitarian rationale can be traced across the centuries (e.g. Jahn 2012). It is the 
conditions under which such interventions are considered legitimate and permissible 
that changed (e.g. Finnemore 1996). Humanitarian military intervention became 
popular in the 1980s and 1990s. R2P is the most recent evolution of such intervention. 
It was a response to experiences. It transformed what some perceived as a non-legal 
right into a non-binding responsibility. It was a compromise between states who 
wanted to do something to end violence and other states’ unease with intervention 
and continued criticism of selectivity and power politics. (Doyle 2011; Welsh 2011) 
R2P is broader than humanitarian intervention. It includes preventive and 
reconstruction elements. It is also more precise. The first responsibility is a state’s vis-
à-vis its own population (pillar 1). A state can also call upon the so-called international 
community for help (pillar 2). As last resort the international community is implicated 
 




(pillar 3).5 R2P identifies four crimes: war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide and 
crimes against humanity, and conditions collective action on a UN mandate. 
The strength of this international norm is evident in the process of local adaptation 
underway in some sceptical states. States upon which R2P casts a role expectation, 
given regional status, global ambitions and more powerful states’ pressures, engage 
in R2P reinterpretation. In 2011, shortly after abstaining on UNSC resolution 1973 as 
a non-permanent Security Council member, Brazil proposed the ‘responsibility while 
protecting’. China has since come up with ‘responsible protection’. Meanwhile, India 
and Russia contest the concept (Job 2016; Stuenkel 2016; Tourinho, Stuenkel, and 
Brockmeier 2016; Prantl and Nakano 2011; Liu and Zhang 2014; Garwood-Gowers 
2012, 2016; Kurtz 2014; Aneja 2014; Kurowska 2014). Thus, R2P still sets the agenda 
and frames the debate on intervention, despite controversy over its implementation 
in Libya and the failure to in Syria, making it a powerful and relevant norm.  
2.3. The contestation of R2P (and humanitarian intervention)  
R2P remains contested because it challenges an existing international norm and a 
traditional interpretation of international law. It reframes state sovereignty as 
responsibility and, instead of replacing sovereignty, it reframes state sovereignty as 
conditional (Deng 1996). Pillar 3 involves a violation of a central building block of the 
current international legal system and order. It instigates a clash of norms.  
Another challenge concerns the action-inaction dichotomy on which humanitarian 
intervention and R2P are often premised. Orford (2003) argues that the international 
community is active in most regions prior to crises. She observes that it is often 
involved and ‘… is already profoundly engaged in shaping the structure of political, 
social, economic and cultural life in many states ….’ (2003, 17, also 1999)  
Moreover, R2P and humanitarian intervention critics contest the proposition that they 
mark progress. Jahn (2012) argues that this implies the conviction that this type of 
intervention is morally right. She contends that the success of the concept is due, in 
part, to a gradual separation of politics and morality and the construction of a tension 
between them. Humanitarian military intervention is framed as overcoming a violent, 
                                                          
5 As this thesis is concerned with R2P as invoked in UNSC resolution 1973 (2011) and 
implemented in Libya, R2P henceforth designates pillar 3 and the use of force for humanitarian 
reasons, unless otherwise indicated 
 




immoral past in which politics trumped morality. Jahn (2012) argues that morality 
and politics cannot be separated, because morality is the basis of all politics.  
In sum, R2P is contestable and political. This relates the practice of humanitarian 
military intervention back to questions of power and structural injustices that norm 
contestation scholarship raises. The contestation of such norms also calls for a closer 
look at the domestic political level, criticism and opposition to international norms 
and political frameworks underpinning the promotion of such norms. Parties are 
likely to engage with international norms, as domestic foreign policy actors and 
carriers of ideas.  
3. Political ideologies6  
Research on ideologies as constitutive and instrumental. The key ideology theorist 
Freeden (1996, 2008) defines ideologies as constructed views of the world upon 
which individuals and groups act. They constitute patterns that organise ideas and 
political concepts into systems of thinking. They are reflections, mediations of the 
nature and structure of society. Ideologies do not emerge out of a vacuum. They are 
themselves products or further developments of ideologies.  
Ideologies are constructions of reality, describing a view of the world. They are 
functional, simplifying, ordering and legitimising existing orders and/or actions. They 
are conscious and unconscious ways of managing plurality of ideas in human society, 
providing a common language and a shared lens through which to view and interpret 
reality. Ideologies are by definition social, relational, intersubjective understandings 
and views of the world, shared by groups. (Heywood 2003; MacKenzie 2003; Freeden 
2008; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009)  
Some Marxists, liberals and conservatives denounce ideology and claim the possibility 
of its absence. Some Marxists portray ideology pejoratively as imposition of 
consciousness by the dominant class on the subordinate one. Some liberals and 
conservatives denounce the term in order to denigrate political opponents and their 
ideas, while portraying themselves and their own propositions as non-ideological and 
common sense pragmatism. (Freeden 2013; MacKenzie 2003) 
                                                          
6 Political ideologies are thereafter only referred to as ideology/ideologies, there are no other 
ideologies in the definition used in this thesis. 
 




I take a neutral view of ideology, as neither good nor bad. In a study variation between 
parties and challenges assumptions of role consensus, it is useful to investigate 
ideologies in foreign policy stances. The claim is not that the researcher can stand 
outside looking in, identifying and analysing ideas. The aim is to identify ideological 
markers in parties' national role statements. This is not to imply that only parties have 
such markers in their national role interpretations. The next sections define ideology 
by breaking it down to operationalise it.  
3.1. The morphological approach  
In his theorisation of ideologies, Freeden provides a conceptualisation of ideologies 
that permits to study them beyond temporal change and cultural, national aspects. He 
proposes to look at the morphology of ideologies, as MacKenzie (2003, 10) notes: 
Morphology refers to the study of form and structure and it is Freeden's 
contention that the study of ideologies must address ways in which ideologies 
are structured by the linkages between the concepts that make up any particular 
ideology.  
Freeden (2008) suggests that the study of morphology is a way to focus on the changes 
and differences within ideologies. There are a variety of combinations of concepts. 
They are not necessarily exclusive to one ideology. Freeden observes that the 
compatibility of concepts with each other depends on how they are interpreted and, 
thus, on the structure different concepts form with each other and the meanings 
attached to them. This means that the identification of a political concept does not, in 
itself, identify a particular ideology. How concepts relate to each other and what 
meanings adherents attach to them delineates membership of an ideological family. 
These relations between concepts and meanings are contingent on time and place.  
Such concepts can be found in Rathbun's (2004) operationalisation of ideology for his 
study of parties and military intervention. He identifies values and describes a 
fundamental 'value' conflict that leads to the dilemmas parties face. He proposes: '[…] 
a theory of partisan preferences based on three foreign policy continua that can be 
traced to the fundamental values of equality and liberty.' (2004, 19) In political 
science, 'values' are often referenced. However, it is difficult to pin down a satisfactory 
definition of values, as van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) demonstrate. Given, also, the 
normative dimension of values, as a desirable and 'valued', I prefer the term 'concept' 
when describing ideologies. An actor's concept selection implies that he/she values it.  
 




Freeden (2013) proposes that each ideology is made up of distinctive combinations of 
political concepts. He suggests to view ideologies as fluid rather than contained by 
strict boundaries or totalising. He analyses ideologies as structures along two axes. 
The first axis consists of the concepts and their micro-components and what he calls 
‘macro-conceptual concatenation’, better explained as which concepts connect to each 
other in the ideology under scrutiny. The second axis (image 2.2) runs between core, 
adjacent and peripheral concepts within an ideology.  
 
 
Image 2.3. The morphological approach 
Freeden (2013, 124–25) notes:  
The relationships among concepts are decisive here: the relative positioning of 
concepts is not set in stone and will fluctuate …. The notion of core concept 
signals its long-term durability … and suggests that the concept is present in 
all known cases of the ideology in question. 
Adjacent concepts refine the meaning of the ideological sub-variant, providing 
different directions within ideological families sometimes perceived as contradictory. 
They temporally impart shared meaning. Peripheral concepts provide time and space 
contingency, i.e. they are contextual and explain cultural variants of ideologies.  
The advantage of Freeden’s morphological approach to ideologies is its usefulness for 
deconstructing ideologies. Rather than assuming that all parties share an ideology 
based on their use of the same concepts; identifying core, adjacent and peripheral 
concepts helps differentiate between similar statements.  
 




3.2. Ideology contestation and deconstestation 
Ideologies and their component concepts are contestable, contested and subject to 
change. Freeden (2008, 4) notes that the ‘… indeterminate range of ideologies is 
the product of the essential contestability of political concepts, and essential 
contestability provides the manifold flexibility out of which ideological families and 
their sub-variants are constructed.’ This inherent contestability of concepts explains 
the diversity within ideological families, such as conservatism or liberalism, over time 
and across space. It points to human agency in concept re-interpretation and the 
development of ideologies across time and their variation between countries. 
It is a marker of ideological decontestation to claim that an ideology does not exist. 
Freeden defines it as ideological decontestation when a viewpoint becomes so shared 
that it is taken for granted and accepted as common sense on an issue. He notes that 
such decontestation is temporary because ideologies remain essentially contestable: 
‘even the micro-level complete agreement on the meaning of a concept does not 
eliminate its principled and potential contestability; it merely points to the intellectual 
emotional force of the deconstestation ….’ (Freeden 2013, 124)  
For this thesis, the morphological approach helps differentiate between similar 
expressions of ideas in national role statements. It brings forms and changes within 
ideologies into relief and delineates the different levels of priority of concepts within 
one ideological sub-variant. It allows carving out of the difference where statements 
resemble each other and point to identical ideological underpinnings by reference to 
the same concepts. It also permits to trace ideological contestation and decontestation.  
There is relatively little research on ideologies' international dimension (e.g. Martill 
2017; Farneti 2012; Soborski 2012). However, ideology is sometimes referred to as 
variable in foreign policy studies. The next section returns to military intervention. It 
also discusses the ideological basis of the international normative context.  
3.2. Military intervention and ideology 
Rathbun (2004) demonstrates that parties’ stances on military intervention are 
shaped by definitions of the national interest which, in turn, are based on ideologies, 
and on political concepts. He argues that humanitarian military intervention creates 
dilemmas. He proposes that the central concepts on which parties’ positions differ in 
substance or in order of importance are those of equality and liberty. According to him 
 




the left is more egalitarian and the right is less active on equality. Liberty is more 
complex with the right positioning differently in different spheres (e.g. social versus 
economic ones) and given views on liberty affect how state sovereignty is defined and 
positions on multilateralism. Rathbun argues that two central foreign policy tensions 
are on whether the national interest is seen as inclusive (across borders) or exclusive, 
and whether the use of force is acceptable. A third tension is the preferences of 
unilateralism or multilateralism. These tensions lead parties to being more or less 
likely to be in favour or against intervention. Rathbun contends that ideological 
positioning on intervention is based on the concepts of equality and liberty. His 
operationalisation of ideology for his study aligns with the morphological approach 
above, as he recognises that the concepts of equality and liberty can take different 
meanings and priorities. Without using the morphological approach, he demonstrates 
that for some parties the core concept appears to be liberty and that equality becomes 
one of several adjacent concepts, while for others equality is the core concept and 
liberty a qualifying concept. One weakness of the study is the claim that humanitarian 
military intervention exists and the neglect of the international normative context. 
This international normative context is marked by the success of liberal ideology. 
Liberalism’s core concept is liberty/freedom and the individual; ‘… at the heart … 
a fundamental commitment to the importance of individual freedom and to the 
principles of individualism.’ (Heywood 2003, 18) For the international system, liberal 
theories posit in various forms that rules and cooperation through trade and 
institutions form the basis for peace. More, liberals argue that the spread of democracy 
reduces the threat of war as democracies do not fight each other (e.g. Doyle 1986).  
The practice of humanitarian military intervention and the norm of R2P build on 
liberal ideas. Debates in IR include liberal interventionism (e.g. Clark and Reus-Smit 
2013), liberal humanitarianism and internationalism (e.g. Wheeler 1997) and liberal 
peace-building (e.g. Richmond 2007; Paris 2010; Campbell, Chandler, and Sabararnam 
2011). Liberal ideas underpin the contemporary approaches to conflict. 
Ideological contestation or decontestation? 
Liberalism’s core concept of liberty is present in other ideologies and/or their sub-
variants. Claiming that R2P, humanitarian military intervention or ethical foreign 
policy are liberal does not mean that only liberal parties support or accept 
intervention as necessary. As Rathbun's (2004) study illustrates some left-wing 
 




parties support humanitarian military intervention and propagate an 'ethical' form of 
foreign policy. Studies of UK foreign policy show that support for such foreign policy 
enterprises can be found on the left and on the right. Some social democratic, green 
and neo-conservative parties support ethical foreign policy and humanitarian military 
interventions. Moreover, the qualifier liberal indicates that there are other approaches 
to internationalism, humanitarianism, peacebuilding and intervention. In his analysis 
of different positions underlying intra-party debates on the international, Sylvest 
(2004) shows that there was more than one internationalism in the UK Labour Party 
in the past, denoting a pragmatist and the idealist approach to internationalism.  
This section's purpose was to show a connection between international norms and 
ideologies. Part 4 returns to role theory. It maps the overlap between national roles, 
international norms and ideologies and closes this chapter with the link between these 
three kinds of literature.  
4. Role theory, international norms and ideology 
Having reviewed role theory, international norms and a useful approach to ideology 
and their international dimension, I now turn to the overlap between national roles, 
international norms and ideologies. Part 4 refines the theoretical lens of this thesis. 
The aim is to demonstrate that it is time that role theory explores parties’ national role 
statements because of functions, operation at different levels of analysis (domestic 
mass-elite-international) and as carriers of ideas.  
4.1. Ideas about appropriate behaviour 
International norms, ideologies and national role conceptions are ideas about 
appropriate behaviour. National role conceptions define the actors’ ideas about the 
appropriate behaviour of their state in the international realm. As was discussed 
(image 2.1), material and ideational factors influence ego’s national role conceptions, 
including worldviews and international norms/rules. These materialise as alter-role 
pressures. Moreover, foreign policy traditions also shape actors' role conceptions. 
International norms are ideas about the behaviour appropriate for states or categories 
of states in international relations. They are more general than national role 
conceptions. Some norms create particular pressures on some categories of states. 
R2P can in practice only be enacted by states that have the material capacities and 
political will to do so, while in principle postulating a responsibility for all states. R2P 
 




creates a role expectation towards states who can implement it and may wish alter-
role recognition by assuming responsibility. 
Ideologies are ideas about how society works and ought to work. They include and 
inform organised action, similar to national role conceptions and international norms. 
Unlike these two, ideologies are not restricted to state behaviour, i.e. acting in 
accordance with shared ideas about appropriate behaviour of states and/or a 
particular state. Yet, most ideologies are not limited to views of domestic society 
either. They are world-views, i.e. reasoning about the nature of international society, 
the working of the current international systems and how it could and ought to 
function differently/ideally. They contain ideas about what creates conflict and how 
conflict can be resolved or managed. 
The closeness of international norms and ideology is apparent when considering R2P 
and other humanitarian intervention norms. I assume that international norms build 
on ideologies and the concepts they are composed of. Thus, ideologies can be traced 
in international norms. Variants of liberalism, such as liberal interventionism, 
underpin R2P and humanitarian intervention.  
4.2. Role contestation, contested norms and decontested ideologies 
National role conceptions, international norms and ideologies are also inherently 
contestable and contested. The theoretical discussion of this chapter revealed this 
contestability and actors' bounded agency in interpreting and re-imagining national 
role conceptions, international norms and ideologies.  
National role conceptions are views about states' social positions in the system. It was 
stressed that role conflict is inherent and can lead to the domestic contestation of 
national roles. Similarly, it was emphasised that international norms emerge out of an 
evolving ideational context in which notions about the appropriate behaviour change 
when new contradictions become apparent or new contexts make new rules 
necessary. The contingency of international norms and the variation across space 
make them contestable and contested. Finally, the number of variants and possible 
variations of ideologies also makes them contestable across time and space. Role 
theory and a focus on national roles may, thus, also be a way of looking at the domestic 
contestation of international norms and of ideologies.  
 




The discussion on ideologies also added the notion of decontestation, i.e. when an idea 
becomes so accepted or common sense that it is - temporarily - no longer contested. 
Added to national role conceptions and international norms, it suggests that when 
inherently contestable phenomena appear to no longer be contested and become 
accepted we could speak of decontested national roles and decontested international 
norms. The identification of such decontestation does not mean consensus but rather 
points to the dominance of one ideology over all other ways of framing narratives 
about reality and how it should look like. 
4.3. Parties: role conceptions, international norms and ideologies 
The domestic level of analysis and parties are the third component that draws national 
role conceptions, international norms and ideologies together. In this chapter, I sought 
to carve out that relevance of the domestic sphere and parties. They have agency in 
how they interpret national role conceptions, engage with international norms and 
combine ideological components. They can adopt, adapt and reject ideas, and may 
identify dilemmas in and between foreign policy traditions, international norms and 
ideologies. Parties can be domestic national role holders, international norm 
entrepreneurs and are organised around and driven by ideologies. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 2 presented the theoretical framework. It introduced role theory, role 
socialisation and domestic role contestation. It proposed that parties are still largely 
missing in these role theory fields. It was further noted that this thesis builds on the 
existing research on ideational sources of role socialisation and role contestation and 
the (indirect) inclusion of parties in analyses. The second and third part of this chapter 
introduced to international norms and ideologies, based on the focus on Libya and 
parties, respectively. Part 4 closed this chapter with a brief overview of the overlap 
between national roles, international norms and ideologies. It suggested that these 
triple ideas about appropriate behaviour are usefully combined in this theoretical 
framework to study role consensus, contestation and potential decontestation.  
Based on chapter 1 and chapter 2, this thesis expects that different parties in one polity 
will express different national roles and/or have different role priorities and that they 
will contest national roles. The expectation is to find evidence for the challenge to elite 
role consensus. This builds on parties having different views on foreign policy. The 
expectation is, further, founded on the assumption that the state is instrumental for 
 




parties to act out their ideas about foreign policy. In an international system based on 
states, parties have to funnel ideas through the state as the principal actor in the 
international system. Parties formulate objectives, priorities and strategies for their 
state. Roles are the operational side of these ideas.  
There is a caveat to this expectation, some research also suggests that differences on 
military intervention do not always exist. Thus, it is possible that I will not find 
evidence for variation in parties' national role statements. There may be agreement 
on a role and/or its interpretation across parties. This possibility is anticipated. Yet, 
based on the norm life cycle and the discussion on ideological decontestation, any 
significant absence of variation and/or contestation will be subject to added scrutiny. 
The next chapter is the research design for this theoretical framework. It introduces 








Chapter 3: Methodology and research design 
The previous two chapters introduced the thesis, located it in existing scholarship and 
developed the theoretical framework. The thesis proposed to study parties' foreign 
policy using role theory combined with a focus on ideas. Chapter 2 carved out the 
overlap between role conceptions, traditions, international norms and ideologies.  
This chapter discusses the methodology. It proposes an interpretive approach. The 
aim is to identify parties' foreign policy narratives and national role statements. The 
argument is that using content analysis is best suited for this goal. It helps to carve out 
plausible evidence of ideas about states’ appropriate behaviour and points to the 
sources of parties' national role socialisation, interpretation and contestation. The 
methodology and research design build on existing role theory studies. The aim is also 
to contribute to the systematisation of the role theory toolkit. Thus, it also addresses 
the criticism that role theory is methodologically poor which scholars continue to 
point out as a challenge for role theorists to tackle (Breuning 2011; Thies 2013). 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Part 1 discusses the interpretive methodology. It 
reflects on ontological assumptions and epistemological challenges of studying the 
actor 'party' and of analysing ideas. It points out caveats. Part 2 presents the research 
strategy and design: data types and generation methods and the methods of analysis. 
Part 3 is the case selection. 
1. Methodology, ontology and epistemology 
Many role theorists use methodologies by which they identify roles verbatim from 
actors' self-definitions or from the occurrence of key vocabulary linked to a role. They 
follow, add to and refine existing typologies. Some role theorists employ interpretive 
methodologies (e.g. Wehner and Thies 2014; Teles Fazendeiro 2016; Shih 2012; H. 
Müller 2011; Maull 2011; Wolf 2011). This thesis uses an interpretive methodology to 
identify national role conceptions in parties' foreign policy narratives. 
1.1. Interpretive methodology and narrative research  
The selection of an interpretive methodology was made in recognition of the focus on 
parties as foreign policy actors and on national role statements in narratives. The aim 
is to show that political elites do not necessarily agree on national roles and national 
 




role conceptions. Interpretive approaches are concerned with actors’ interpretations. 
Hence, this actor-focused methodology appeared suitable.  
An interpretive approach is suitable because it assumes the importance of ideational 
contexts. Interpretive approaches recognise that the meaning of words, situations and 
events are subjective and contextual. While interpretive scholars assume actors 
reproduce meanings and structural constraints, they also acknowledge that 
individuals are not passive receivers of ideas; people can modify and change inherited 
norms and language. Yet, actors have this agency within contexts and contingencies; 
their agency is situated and their rationality is bounded. (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
2012) Parties' context is formed by the international and domestic, party-systemic 
and party-internal/historical contexts. Parties' agency is embedded in complex 
contexts and multiple contingencies affect it.  
Foreign policy researchers have used interpretive approaches, building on Bevir and 
Rhodes (2003, 2008) for some time (Bevir, Daddow, and Hall 2013; Bevir and Daddow 
2015). Interpretive approaches are also increasingly employed by role theorists (e.g. 
Wehner 2018; Teles Fazendeiro 2016; Wehner and Thies 2014; Shih 2012; H. Müller 
2011; Wolf 2011). Wehner and Thies (2014) note that an interpretive approach 
introduces a focus on and the conceptualisation of beliefs, traditions and dilemmas. 
The authors posit that these concepts are useful tools for the identification of domestic 
role contestation. Foreign policy beliefs and traditions are similar but different to 
ideologies. Foreign policy beliefs are assumptions about how foreign policy in general 
and specifically related to the state in question. Foreign policy traditions are views on 
and lessons learnt from past foreign policy decision-making and outcomes. They are 
often associated with individuals or key events. They can be a role scripts source and 
can introduce path dependency and alter- and ego-role expectations toward a state's 
international relations. Previously held and/or shared beliefs and practised traditions 
can become viewed as dilemmas and challenged by new ideas. This can induce role 
contestation and lead to role change. (Wehner and Thies 2014) 
Foreign policy narratives 
Narrative analysis is an increasingly popular method in politics and IR research. The 
use of narrative analysis often happens in parallel and frequently in tandem with the 
use of interpretive methodologies in foreign policy research and role theory studies. 
The interest in parties' interpretation of national roles, the meaning parties attach to 
 




them and in the ideas underlying their role selection, interpretation and contestation 
justify a focus on parties' narratives. Narratives are the level of analysis. It is within 
narratives that I look for the expression of national roles and their contestation. 
The following discussion engages with the existing research narratives in IR and FPA 
to situate the thesis in the growing field. Narratives are accounts of events, phenomena 
or situations (Suganami 1999). IR scholars using narratives argue that they are 
fundamental to human experience and explanations, building on narratology and 
narrative analysis in other fields (Suganami 1990, 1997b, 1997a, 1999, 2008; Spencer 
2016; Oppermann and Spencer 2016, 2018a, 2018b). Storytelling is a process of 
making sense to self and to others. Narratives are part of everyday life. They are not 
only told retrospectively; they constitute how humans experience and understand the 
present situation, and provide the basis for action. (Browning 2008) Narratives are 
central to causal reasoning and play a key role in the human cognitive activity. 
Through them, the human brain captures, organises and breaks down complexity. 
(Webster and Mertova 2007; Browning 2008; Subotić 2015; Oppermann and Spencer 
2016, 2018a) Humans tell different stories about the same event or situation, and 
causes. Thus, a focus on narratives can only half explain causes; it gets at how humans 
construct meaning from what they know and judge relevant. 
I use Wehner and Thies' (2014) definition of foreign policy narratives. This definition 
speaks to the above conceptualisation of narratives.  Its selection is also in recognition 
of the authors' efforts to adapt interpretive methodology and to stress the importance 
of narratives for role theory. Wehner and Thies (2014, 11) define narratives as:  
[...] the beliefs and stories told by actors to comprehend and frame the world in 
which they interact. They provide the background for elites to construct 
worldviews in foreign policy [...]. Narratives are thus understood as strategies 
constructed by political agents that speak on behalf of the state, in internal and 
external relations, to frame and cast roles and achieve specific goals and 
interests. 
Narratives are structured; they are composed of building blocks for making sense of 
causes. Suganami (1997b) notes that they require background, and the triangle (1999) 
of coincidence, process (structure) and responses to these factors by key individuals 
(agency). The presence of these elements shape narratives but also means that 
narratives on an event tend to resemble each other, with some room for interpretation 
and difference on who engaged when, how and why, and to what effect. Oppermann 
and Spencer (2018a, 2018b, 2016) suggest that narratives are made up of and sit at 
 




the overlap between setting, characterisation and emplotment and that these key 
elements are what foreign policy decision-makers and commentators contest. Thus, 
analysing narratives can proceed through the identification of background or setting, 
processes and chance occurrences that engender or accelerate a situation and key 
individuals. The way in which these elements combine begins to explain cause and 
effects for the individuals involved and/or observing. This means identifying how 
parties narrated the 2011 Arab uprisings and the Libyan conflict can reveal what 
parties perceived as the causes and how they reasoned about their states' roles. 
The centrality of narratives and the selected definition raise the question of whether 
they are conscious strategies or not, and whether this matters. A number of scholars 
studying narratives in IR and FPA argue that there are 'strategic' narratives (e.g. 
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Schmitt 2018). Actors use narratives with 
a purpose and to an effect. Suffice it to say here that it does not here if parties' 
narratives were strategically selected. It is assumed that parties are rational actors, 
but that they are situated and their rationality bounded. This means that it is possible 
that the stories they told were crafted and strategically deployed. However, it is also 
assumed that parties' narration happened within the range of possibilities for each of 
them. Finally, it is assumed that rationality does not preclude principled views. 
Narratives are related to discourses which have also been used in IR (e.g. Milliken 
1999; Hansen 2006; van de Wetering 2016). However, narratives are distinct. 
Oppermann and Spencer (2018a, 2018b, 2016) reason that narrative analysis is used 
to explore discursive constructions. They suggest that it is a specific form of discourse 
analysis. They propose that narratives socially construct foreign policy phenomena. 
Via narrative analysis, the discursive contestation of such constructions can be traced. 
Thus, Oppermann and Spencer relate discourse and narrative. Similarly, I view 
discourse as narrower than narrative. At the same time, a narrative is more concretely 
concerned with telling a particular situation or event. Discourse is a system or pattern 
of thinking about an issue. Discourse analysis often focuses on how language creates 
and influences how we understand the world. It also focuses on practices and patterns, 
and the social structure formed by them. (Hyland 2013) Critical discourse analysts 
examine the use of language in relation to social and political issues and explore the 
links between the use of language and its context. The assumptions include that 
discourses construct and reflect these issues; it negotiates and performs power 
relations; it reflects and reproduces social relations, and its use reproduces and 
 




reflects ideologies. The aims of critical discourse analysts include making of links 
between practices and values apparent. (Wodak and Fairclough 2009; Paltridge 2013) 
In sum, the focus of discourse analysis is less on the story told and more on how it is 
told and what patterns this reveals.  
The recent use by role theorists of narrative analysis has shown that a focus on the 
utterances and the sense-making of foreign policy actors' can reveal ideas underlying 
and evolving in national role conceptions. Wehner and Thies (2014) illustrate how 
new ideas can rise from the domestic context when long-held and widely shared 
interpretations of history become challenged. They note that such ideas can also 
emerge from the international level challenging foreign policy traditions. Domestic 
foreign policy actors can pick up these new ideas. This can lead to domestic role 
contestation and even role change. More recently, Wehner (2018) refined the use of 
narrative analysis and interpretive methodology for role theory. He suggests that a 
focus on ruling narratives of foreign policy elites permits the tracing of how these 
actors understand the present and constantly reinterpret the past in light of dilemmas 
that emerge from domestic and international contextual changes that challenge 
established foreign policy traditions. This thesis adds to this a closer examination of 
horizontal variation on these processes of narration and reinterpretation. It assumes 
that not all foreign policy relevant actors agree on the interpretation of a dominant 
foreign policy tradition in the first place, nor view new ideas and evolving contexts in 
the same light, due to other ideational differences. 
In sum, I focus on the stories parties – their representatives – tell about conflict and 
intervention in Libya. The assumption is that these narratives can reveal how parties 
make sense of events, i.e. how conflict emerges, escalates and can be resolved. It is 
further assumed that embedded in these stories are role(s) their state played, can play 
and ought to play, as part of reasoning about cause and effect. It is in parties' narratives 
that national roles can be identified, and variation in interpretation and the ideas 
underlying it can be studied. Thus, a focus on national roles in narratives can improve 
understanding of how role socialisation can vary among elites. This can improve our 
understanding of the roots of domestic role contestation.  
The unit of analysis is national role statements in parties' foreign policy narratives. 
The narrative method is used to identify national role statements within reasoning on 
 




conflict and intervention, and within ideational context(s). It is within narratives that 
ideas about appropriate behaviour become meaningful.  
An interpretive approach and narrative analysis focused the stories of the 2011 events 
parties told, seeking to identify national role expressions embedded in these 
narratives, requires a reflection on ontology and on the epistemological challenges the 
interest in interpretations and ideas pose. Taking statements seriously poses 
problems because of the domestic political role parties play and the various (rational) 
strategies they may employ to win elections and/or hold on to positions of power.  
Moreover, ideas are slippery, seeking to pin them down can seem ephemeral and can 
pose problems to generalisability and reconstruction of research.  
1.2. Ontology and epistemology: reflections and caveats 
Underlying this thesis' interpretive methodology is the assumption that reality cannot 
be known unmediated and that social actors interpret it and construct a narrative 
about it to make sense of it. This is not to argue that there is no material world and 
reality outside the human mind or the rejection of objectivity and embrace of absolute 
relativity. Rather, it is to suggest that the physical world cannot be known unmediated 
through language and the concepts it provides. This assumption implies that the 
researcher cannot study the social world from outside it. Just as the subject of my 
enquiry, I am situated. While uncovering other actors’ interpretations the choice of 
subject and line of enquiry are already shaped by who I am, my assumption about 
human nature and society, and so are the results. The point is to recognise this 
embeddedness and reflect upon it and its inevitable effects on the subject and process 
of my research, because it is impossible to escape it (e.g. Lynch 2008). Being 
transparent and making this reflection explicit helps to reconstruct the research 
process and trace the reasoning behind the analysis. The assumption that reality is 
constructed does not mean it cannot be studied. If positivists assume that the social 
world can be studied like an abstract phenomenon, this thesis is based on the 
recognition that reality can be studied but not without a form of bias.  
The main ontological and epistemological challenges are addressed below. The 
concluding chapter provides reflection on my personal subjectivity.   
 





This thesis' subject of inquiry leads to several epistemological challenges of which the 
three main ones will be addressed hereafter. The first concerns how to study ideas and 
make inferences from them. This conundrum can be illustrated using ideologies. 
Chapter 2 discussed that they, while shared by/in groups, take a number of forms and 
variants. Crucially, individuals interpret political concepts differently, even if 
similarly, if they share an approximate worldview. Patterns within individual parties 
and party families remain discernible in a form of family resemblance. Ideologies are 
also not closed and separate entities. They are social, inter-subjective, evolving and 
forming sub-families. Some separate ideological families are rooted in the same events 
or contexts. They took different forms, combining and interpreting political concepts 
differently and drawing different, sometimes nationally bound conclusions from them. 
For example, ideas of reform and progress influenced liberalism and socialism. Yet, 
socialists and liberals have different views on whether and how progress and reform 
can be achieved. Hence, it is not surprising that adherents of these two ideological 
families have similar value-systems and use comparable vocabulary. This makes 
studying ideas and making inferences from the presence of concepts complicated.  
I take the position that words and political concepts are expressed within a context of 
their use: nationally, in the institutional setting of parliament and foreign policy 
decision-making, but also within the context of a party and its history of 
understanding of specific concepts. I assume that I can trace plausible meaning 
through an analysis of the use of words and concepts in relation to each other and 
based on knowledge of the specific context. I also assume that parties and their 
sympathisers share an approximate understanding of the meanings of particular 
words. This is because language is interpersonal and expressions are embedded in the 
same/similar environments. Where there were strong inter-party differences on the 
meanings of relevant concepts there will be traces of debate in the literature. 
Interpreting statements 
A second, related challenge is how to know what is in the minds of those speaking and 
acting for the party. It emerges from giving ‘voice’ to parties by studying their role 
expressions. There are two concerns in particular. For one, by analysing national role 
statements in narratives, I am interpreting others' interpretations of situations, events 
and concepts. This runs the risk of bias, as I select and focus on what appears relevant 
 




by having already framed the issue, even if based on my reading of an authoritative 
body of literature. This thesis is not an intellectual history, tracing interpretations to 
their original source. Instead, it makes inferences from traces in parties’ role 
expressions. This is a challenge I seek to lessen by reflecting on my biases during the 
research process. I accept that studying ideas means plausibility rather than certainty.  
Moreover, politicians, and by extension parties often stand accused of dishonesty, 
cynicism and stances calculated to gain votes. Their public statements may not reveal 
what is really in their minds and what really motivates a stance and action. I assume 
that emotive foreign policy issues, such as using force, can lead to less premeditated 
statements, more conscientious expressions and, in some cases, even opposition to 
party lines where possible, or silence, where impossible. Furthermore, parties' and 
those speaking on their behalf are likely to stay within acceptable party lines. Where 
this is not the case there may be notable intra-party contestation. Even if speakers do 
not believe what they say, this study assumes that statements reveal dominant and 
acceptable ways of thinking about the issue in the party and parts of the electorate. As 
Wehner and Thies (2014) note political actors cannot come up with random 
narratives. They draw on cultural registers to resonate with and convince an audience. 
However, dominant and acceptable does not mean everyone in a party agreed. Intra-
party disagreement is likely, despite the existence of dominant views. Moreover, it is 
possible that there was little consultation within a party to come to an official party 
line or the statement put forward by key speakers during parliamentary debates and 
in press releases.  
I do not pass judgement on honesty because the aim is not to ascertain if what was 
said at the time or during interviews was genuine. Instead, I take parties' statements 
seriously because they are indicative of an agreement on the acceptable. 
Identifying roles: interpretations, identity and policy 
The third epistemological challenge is how to know a role. What is the difference 
between national role statements and policy proposals? How are national roles to be 
distinguished from role performance, national identity and national interest? What is 
the distinction between roles and role conceptions?  
There are analytical differences between roles and policy proposals. Roles are the link 
between identity and policy proposals, decisions and actions. (Breuning 2011) Thus, 
 




policy proposals will contain role statements. Parties are likely to position on foreign 
policy and need the state as an actor to implement their ideas. Parties policy proposals 
contain role statements but are not roles or role interpretations themselves. Policy 
proposals are data sources in which roles can be identified and roles are the 
operationalisation of ideas on the international in policy proposals. In practice, this 
means that within a policy proposal, for example on military intervention in general 
or in a specific situation, we can identify role statements that give indications about 
how a party interprets this role by looking at the further content of the proposal. 
There are analytical differences between national role, role conception and role 
performance/enactment. Roles are social positions, while role conceptions are the 
actors' own definition of a role. Role performance is action and behaviour with role 
prescriptions being norms and expectations. (Holsti 1970) Aggestam (1999) 
conceptualises national role as the bridge between perceptions of national identity 
and interests, and foreign policy behaviour. National roles base themselves on 
perceptions of identity. But, they are more concrete 'roadmaps' to decisions and 
actions. This distinction is important for understanding the differences and 
relationships between concepts that are related but analytically separate.  
How to differentiate between a national role and a role interpretation in practice? This 
challenge relates to the position and agency of the researcher. Holsti categorised 
national roles that were already in existence and used by states. By their social and 
intersubjective nature, there is a shared understanding of a variety of roles and what 
they imply. A role conception is the policymakers' take on an already existing national 
role. It adapts a role to the state in question. Any (party) role statement, therefore, is 
a role conception, rather than the national role itself. National role interpretations are 
(ego) variations in the definition of the national role conceptions. 
Fazendeiro (2016) notes the difficulty ascertaining and naming a national role. How 
can we know which role is being enacted from the way a state is acting? This naming 
process implies assumptions about which decision and actions are leader behaviour 
and, by extension, which are not. Fazendeiro observes that role ascriptions, by foreign 
policy actors and researchers, and the systematic generalisation it implies in practice 
can influence how actors understand themselves. Roles, role conceptions and role 
interpretations are part of the process of sense-making in human narratives. 
Fazendeiro argues that, while scholars and state actors use national roles to improve 
 




the understanding of decision-making, roles also inherently generalise and over-
determine how actors understand themselves and others. Consequently, the 
researcher, by ascribing national roles to actors’ statements, partakes in the 
construction of reality.  
I take this challenge seriously. Scholars have ascribed master roles in the country 
cases and foreign policy actors often repeat these same roles in their statements on 
foreign policy. I cannot escape the challenge that by ascribing national roles, I partake 
in the process of normalising meaning. However, the focus on parties, based on the 
assumptions that they are role holders, socialised into roles and drivers of domestic 
role contestation, is part of seeking to move beyond the role ascriptions that erase 
domestic actors and differences.  
Caveats to studying parties and expecting contestation 
There are in-built limitations to this thesis. The need for focus required the black 
boxing of the party. The aim to unpack the state and challenge an elite-consensus 
assumption via parties runs the risk of portraying parties as unitary actors. It was also 
decided to concentrate on one defining characteristic of parties: as carriers of ideas. 
It is not the aim to argue that parties are homogenous and consensual entities. Party 
research vividly demonstrates that there many types of parties and that they have 
different internal processes and structures, within the same party system. The 
influence of individual leaders, leadership groups and/or members varies 
considerably. Programmatic processes differ. Moreover, parties are not internally 
united on all policy issues. In political systems that encourage the formation of catch-
all parties, in two-party systems and those with inbuilt hurdles for the representation 
of smaller parties in parliament, parties can consist of official and informal fractions 
that can substantially differ on many issues, including foreign policy. Finally, parties 
and party systems undergo changes. For example, in the case of France, the party 
system changed across the entirety of the Fifth Republic with new parties emerging 
and others being pushed to the margins. In Germany, the Green Party underwent an 
internal struggle the 1990s between those accepting the use of force and those 
rejecting in it on principle that still divides the party. Parties are not closed and unified 
units that can easily be generalised about.  
 




For the purpose of focus, parties are taken as the level of analysis. This research is not 
concerned with intra-party-level processes or the effects of party structures. I am 
interested in the traces of multi-level, diverging and persistent ideas in parties’ 
national role expressions. Thus the research traces role interpretations that are 
shared within a party. It is assumed that positions expressed in military intervention 
cases are not internal general programmatic debates per se. Those speaking on behalf 
of parties present positions agreed upon internally or at least shared and in 
accordance with party programmes and manifestos. In cases of competing views and 
role statements, these are expected to be reflected in the data. Where leaders have a 
strong voice in foreign policy, an agreement on positions is to be expected. Lack of 
access and/or party-discipline may at present prevent a closer look at possible intra-
party differences in case of apparent absence of competing views. Given that I focus 
on an instance during the parliamentary calendar rather than an election campaign, I 
assume that calls for party unity may not have been strong and that where parties 
allow diverging positions these will be discernible.  
To counter the possible criticism of black-boxing the party, disagreement is noted 
where discernible and individual voices were they stand out. Intra-party consensus 
on the state’s national role is unlikely. Moreover, party-internal role contestation 
between factions and individuals is a likely constant and part of role location 
processes within parties.  This is true even if roles are temporarily pinned down in 
party documents and parliamentary debates. It is plausible that internal dynamics 
influence parties’ role conceptions and contestations (e.g. Hazan 2000). 
A final, related reflexion is on the absence of role differences and/or contestation. 
What if parties do not express different national roles and role interpretations and/or 
do not contest the national role? What if there is no evidence for the influence of 
international norms and ideologies? The absence of such differences in the Libya case 
does not mean the absence in all other cases. Consensus on national roles and role 
interpretations also raises questions. Related, it is unlikely or, in my definition of 
ideology, impossible that role statements do not express a worldview. Given the 
diversity of parties, plausible intra-party differences and the variety of possible views 
on the issue of military intervention, it would be puzzling to find no variation at all 
between otherwise diverse parties. This would at least raise questions about the 
freedom to express inter- and intra-party different views and about a dominance of 
one narrative in public debate. It would suggest the existence of role decontestation. 
 




This conceptualisation of no apparent disagreement on a national role may be more 
analytically useful than the claim of role consensus. 
2. Research strategy and design 
The research methods are guided by its focus and aims. Most role theory is qualitative 
research with some quantitative exceptions (Chelotti 2015). Role theorists use a 
variety of methods to analyse national roles. There are some discursive studies (e.g. 
Nabers 2011; Shih 2012). However, most role theorists use content analysis of 
narratives and process tracing methods to identify roles and/or their effects on 
foreign policy (e.g. Krotz and Sperling 2011; Gottwald and Duggan 2011). The majority 
of studies consult leader and/or official statements as primary sources to study 
national role conceptions. Some role theorists also refer exclusively to secondary 
sources reporting on primary sources (e.g. Thies 2014).  
I focus on one intervention case and two states' respective parties across the political 
spectrum. The intention is to identify the plausible ideational factors underlying 
national role interpretations. Part 2 outlines the research strategy and design. The 
thesis is a qualitative case study. It uses primary documents as the main data source 
and relies on content analysis as the chief method of analysis.  
This research was conducted with a data collection plan and coding manual developed 
as part of the methods process. The aim was to structure and focus the case studies. 
Lack of methodological rigour and systematic description of methods has been a noted 
weakness of and challenge to role theory. Scholars call for more systematic empirical 
studies and hypotheses testing (e.g. Thies 2013; Breuning 2011). The annotated 
interview questionnaire and the codebook are in the annex. 
2.1. Qualitative research 
The case study method 
This thesis is a small n case study. It understands case as ‘[…] an instance, or a data 
point, […] [obtained] through an empirical examination of a real-world phenomenon 
within its naturally occurring context, without directly manipulating either the 
phenomenon or the context.’ (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, 372) This case study design 
is suitable for the thesis’ aims. It permits thick description which is useful for 
identifying ideational layers in parties’ narratives on national roles and for noting 
 




variations in the roles proposed and/or in their interpretations. It also allows the 
observation of domestic role contestation.  
A quantitative large N case study was not selected, because the complexity of analysing 
how ideas intermesh and feed back renders in-depth study using a large case sample 
difficult. The single case study was also discarded of, as I seek to analyse the ideational 
layers interplaying in more than one party’s role interpretation and in more than one 
country case. The aim is to achieve a higher degree of generalisability without seeking 
to generalise across all possible cases. 
A possible criticism of the case study design is the focus on one particular episode and 
on a short period of time. Party stances and individuals’ positions evolve. The ability 
to generalise about national role interpretations and their inevitable changes across 
time, beyond the actual case, is therefore intrinsically limited. The focus on role 
expressions at one chosen moment is, thus, limited. Role selection and interpretations 
may even have shifted during the short Libyan episode (February-October 2011).  
Yet, the aim is to identify the ideational layers underlying national role interpretations, 
affecting role socialisation and domestic role contestation. The intention is not to 
ascertain national roles and interpretations once and for all. The role location and 
selection process is only ever temporarily resolved. This means that national roles are 
not fixed. States can change national role or be forced to switch. National roles may 
also undergo a process of reframing across time. Harnisch (2011, 9) clarifies: a role 
defined as a social position is 'limited in time and scope and it is dependent on the 
group's structure and purpose'. Similarly, Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) note the 
temporality of role selection. By concentrating on one intervention instance and a 
short period of time the analysis achieves depth instead of breadth. This can point to 
the type of ideas underlying role conceptions at other times. Besides, to alleviate 
above-mentioned shortcomings, two country cases and parties across the political 
spectrum were selected.   
To compare or not to compare 
This thesis contrasts parties’ national role statements and role interpretations while 
not being a formal comparative case study. The purpose is to establish whether there 
is variation in and domestic role contestation based on different role interpretations. 
 




There is, hence, a comparative element within country cases and between parties 
across the spectrum in the respective states. This increases the number of cases.  
Building on Wehner and Thies’ (2014) narrative approach, the aim is thick description 
for inferences on ideas underpinning the interpretation of events. This also requires 
the tracing of the events to contextualise parties’ interpretations. The research 
strategy’s aim is a deeper understanding of the cases, context and differences (Bennett 
and Elman 2007b). It can help identify shared meanings (Stake 2000; Hollis 2002). 
The purpose is a theory-informed exploration and reconstruction of how parties make 
sense of situations and events and interpret their state’s national role. The aim of the 
inferences is description. It is not to claim causality between ideas and outcomes, or 
even between ideas and interpretations. Similar political concepts and reliance on the 
same international norms can evidently lead to different interpretations. This means 
that I make inferences about unavailable data (for example a debate explicitly about 
the principles or ideas underlying the national role). I make inferences about concepts 
from observations in parties' statements on military intervention that include national 
roles. The challenge is to identify recurring ideas and worldview patterns instead of 
noting every concept. (Burnham et al. 2008)  
The thesis is not a country case comparison. Formal comparative methodologies use 
various models, such as most similar-least similar cases, to isolate causal variables 
(e.g. described in Levy 2008; Bennett and Elman 2006, 2007a; Lijphart 1975, 1971; 
Przeworski and Teune 1970). However, the aim is not to establish causality between 
parties' national role selection, interpretation and/or contestation and foreign policy 
decisions and outcomes. Thus, the object is also not to identify the variables that 
explain causality. Moreover, there are considerable, relevant differences between 
France and Germany, detailed in the case selection in this chapter. Hence, it would be 
difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from a formal country comparison. 
Consequently, I am not seeking to advance comparative case methodology.  
Instead, the case selection was based on the position of the state in the international 
and respective regional system, domestic controversy and their role in the UNSC 
decision-making on the Libya intervention. Yet, the weakness of French parties and 
parliament, arguably, make France a least-likely case for parties' to rationally invest 
resources to formulate foreign policy positions and to contest each other on them. 
Thus, if variation in national role selection and interpretation, and contestation can be 
 




identified in this case, it is likely that parties in other states of similar status and with 
similarly weak parties also differ on national roles. Germany is a likely case for 
partisan differences. However, as the case selection will detail, parties have relatively 
less influence on actual decisions that often claimed. Moreover, it is often stressed that 
there is a foreign policy consensus, even if evolving, on the use of force. Thus, if 
variation in the case of Germany is identified, it is likely to be found in other states of 
similar status as Germany. This finding is relevant, as Germany's material/economic 
power has only risen since unification. Thus, to find a central issue contested and 
political, in a state of rising and consolidating strength in Europe and internationally, 
can help formulate expectations toward similar states. 
The two cases are contrasted with each other in the case selection in this chapter, 
despite the declared aim not to compare France and Germany. Moreover, chapter 6 on 
national roles and responsibility introduces a comparative element by analysing the 
country cases in parallel and on a common theme. Finally, general conclusions on the 
usefulness and theoretical advantages of the case selection will be drawn in the final 
chapter to explore the scope for generalisations and expectations for similar cases. 
Given the two states’ pivotal role in European integration history and their special 
relationship with each other since WWII, such conclusions are particularly relevant, 
e.g. with respect to questions of future European defence.  
2.2. Content analysis  
The data analysis method was content analysis. It entails making inferences from the 
text on the meaning of words in communication. (Hermann 2008) Klotz and Lynch 
(2007, 53) describe the process as:  
… to identify a basic template that designates an actor’s view of a fairly narrow 
issue … and other key assumptions that reflect strategies for manoeuvring 
through the policy-making process and promoting specific prescriptions for 
action.  
Burnham et al (2008) and Hermann (2008) each provide steps for content analysis. 
These were adapted. The first step was the identification of the fairly narrow issue of 
national roles within the context of the 2011 military intervention in Libya. The step 
further consisted of the development of the research questions and aims.  
 




The second step was the identification of the materials and sampling methods. At this 
stage, the decision to paper code was taken based on the small number of sources and 
time-cost efficiency concerns.  
Saldaña (2016) describes coding as cyclical; he proposes two cycles adaptable to 
various types of coding. I used two cycles. They are described in more detail next. 
Cycle 1: the structured coding of national roles based on the literature 
The third step was an initial definition of the coding categories and coding procedures, 
described in the coding manual. Its purpose was a more precise and systematic 
process to make the research findings more intelligible. Part of this step was the case 
study preparation and the review of the secondary literature. This step consisted of 
identifying national role statements and associated vocabulary in academic literature. 
It set the thesis up to be deductive. This created expectations for when the primary 
sources were first approached. The coding categories were organised into national 
roles, narratives, ideas and context.  
The fourth step was the first coding cycle: the identification of national role 
expressions in party statements on the military intervention in Libya. 
Cycle 2: the refinement of the structured coding and recurring themes 
The completion of the first coding cycle led to the conclusion that the initial categories 
based on the secondary literature did not capture variation in national role 
interpretations. I decided that a fifth content analysis step would be the second coding 
cycle. The focus was not on frequency of the mention of a national role but rather 
depth or intensity. It was assumed that the more attention a party paid to a role the 
more likely it ranked high in role priority and/or it was contested. It was also assumed 
that important points are not necessarily repeated but rather given more space when 
they were raised. Thus, attention was paid to the detail provided in definitions and 
justifications of national roles. The appearance of words together and of adjectives 
used with keywords and themes was noted as part of this step.  
This second coding cycle was also structured. This time, two additional measures were 
taken. First, the four organisational categories (national roles, narratives, ideas and 
context) were coded one by one instead of together. The assumption was that this 
would increase the focus and the understanding of these narratives. Second, within 
this measure, the coding was party by party.  
 




The result of the second coding cycle was national role qualification. The decision was 
taken that where an agreement on the national role seemed to exist, it was preferable 
to note such agreement through the addition of an adjective. This made the contrast 
with the alternative role proposals clearer. 
During the first coding cycle and role qualification, themes emerged. The frequent use 
of analogical reasoning, references to past interventions, lessons learnt from past 
experiences, the notion of there is no alternative, the description of alternatives and 
the use of war or the avoidance of the term were noted. Moreover, the recurrence of 
responsibility in connection with national roles was observed. Part of coding cycle 2 
was dedicated to these themes and, in particular, the reference of responsibility.  
The final step: the content analysis  
The analysis consisted of summarising and interpreting the findings from the coding 
cycles. The aim was to track spread and definition of words and linked national roles 
and to understand them within their context. This final step led to further refinement 
of the role qualifications and included the analysis of the findings from the coding.  
2.3. Data sources 
Documentary research  
The majority of the generated data was text-based and represented the spoken and 
written word of parties’ functionaries and spokespeople in 2011. The timeframe was 
from the start of the uprising on 17 February 2011 until the violent death of Gaddafi 
on 20 October 2011. The main focus, however, was on the period around the vote on 
UNSC resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 (and in the case of France, the military 
operation prolongation vote in July 2011). The analysis of the data also drew on other 
primary sources in order to test for consistency.  
The study mostly relied on documents as primary sources. Traditionally, national role 
conceptions are evidenced in policy speeches and statements (Holsti 1970). Aggestam 
(1999) uses foreign policy speeches, documents and interviews. Krotz (2015) draws 
on a range: official publications, statements, speeches, memoirs, newspaper articles, 
and diverse accounts of foreign policy communities. 
The advantage of documentary research is that data is in existence and relatively 
unaffected by the research process (Bowen 2009; Platt 1981). The data sources were 
 




parties’ official statements and press releases relating to their state’s decision-making 
(McCourt 2011 and 2013 on an eclectic mix of primary sources and also extensive use 
of secondary sources). The focus was on minutes of parliamentary debates, as FPA 
scholarship suggests that they are locations where parties are likely to express, debate 
and contest foreign policy (Strong 2015a). Speeches, press conferences and interviews 
were also included (e.g. Hermann 2008). The advantage of the described documents 
is that they provide an immediate – if in sometimes scripted – reaction to the situation.  
The rationale for the inclusion of government, president/chancellor and foreign 
ministers' speeches, statements and press releases was the assumption that they 
reflect the ideas of governing and coalition parties even when expressed on behalf of 
the state. White papers were considered but ultimately not included, because they are 
more durable policy proposals and not immediate reactions to specific events and 
situations. Their production process also means that they are less party-political.  
The inclusion of party manifestos and other party materials on military intervention 
was based on the rationale that they permit to identify recurring ideas, despite not 
being a reflection of the specific case. However, they were handled with care given that 
their relevance to policy-making is arguably limited and dependent on context.7 The 
decision was made not to include Manifesto Project, Chapel Hill Expert Survey and 
Eurobarometer sources, as manifesto materials were only drawn on for consistency.  
There were limitations to the types of documents gathered and some choices were 
made on the basis of access to the type of materials across the cases.8   
I also used academic literature on foreign policy and national roles, as secondary 
sources. Such literature was used to contextualise the case and as the first content 
analysis step of the traditional role ascription identification.  
                                                          
7 In Germany party manifestos are distinct from electoral manifestos and, in some parties, 
members have more say on content and overall direction of programmes than in others. In 
France, such party documents are highly personalised electoral pamphlets with little policy 
relevance. 
8 Foreign relations committee meeting minutes were read for background but not included. 
They were only available for France. Similarly, memoirs were not included, because the 
relative recent history and some political actors still being active politicians meant that 
memoirs were not available for all relevant party actors. 
 




Complementary semi-structured interviews 
A possible drawback of primary documents, despite the extensive use of secondary 
academic literature to contextualise the case, is that such data sources do not always 
provide sufficient information or detail (Bowen 2009; Bechhofer and Paterson 2000; 
Bryman 2012). To address this, semi-structured interviews with party officials and 
foreign policy experts were conducted in May and June 2017.  
The aim of the interviews was to gather additional information and detail, respectively 
clarification. Not being primary data sources for analysis, the interviews were timed 
toward the end of the research project. This reduced the risk of systemic error in the 
sample, given unequal access to interviewees in targeted parties (Burnham et al. 
2008). A challenge was the time elapsed since 2011. This increased possible 
misrepresentations, memory lapses and hindsight, given the evolution of the situation. 
Moreover, terrorist attacks in France and Germany further complicate recollections 
and assessment. However, reflections, distorted memories and hindsight can be 
interesting sources of how the past informs the present. Libya today has become an 
analogy to draw lessons from for Syria and other conflicts. The questionnaire used for 
the interviews was focused, consisting of two open questions and two targeted role 
theory and partisan foreign policy questions (see annex, appendix 2). 
Another aim of the interviews was to gauge the context in which the primary 
documents were produced and to add dimension by gaining more insights into some 
key actors’ interpretations (Bowen 2009; May 2001). Interview responses are more 
spontaneous than speeches or press statements that are more reflective of what the 
party wants to project (Hermann 2008). Thus, they provide a good source of 
triangulation of more scripted party statements. 
An unintended consequence of interviews was the provision of voice to actors and, 
thus, a richer picture of the context (e.g. Brummer and Thies 2015 on adding voices of 
contemporaries through memoirs). This reduced the likelihood of distortion, 
providing a more balanced representation of parties' national role statements.  
The interviews took place over the course of six weeks in May and June 2017 in Paris, 
Berlin and over the phone. Each took between 30 minutes to an hour. Taking into 
account the time elapsed since the events and the timing of the interviews half a year 
before parliamentary elections in Germany and shortly after the presidential elections 
 




and the less significant parliamentary elections in France, a relatively low response 
rate was not surprising. Four interviews were conducted in France. one with a 
communist and three with Parti Socialist (PS) representatives. There were no positive 
replies from the Union pour un movement populaire (UMP), the governing party in 
2011, renamed LR (Les Républicains) since. This was the case despite contact via 
gatekeepers. It was not surprising given the legal proceedings some associates of 
former president Sarkozy face over the Libyan case (e.g. The Guardian 2013; Le Monde 
2016; Mediapart 2017) and the developments in Libya. Yet, given that governing party 
representatives and ministers took up most of the time during the parliamentary 
debates, this absence was less significant for the analysis than if all potential 
interviewees of the former opposition parties had declined to talk to me.  
In Germany, nine interviews were conducted, with members of all parties, one 
representative each from the two largest parties, and two to three each from the 
smaller parties, including the junior coalition partner at the time. The smaller number 
for the two largest parties was not considered a problem, given that there is more data 
on their policy proposals and stances, allowing for context and narrative analysis. 
3. Libya, France and Germany: case selection  
Part 3 provides the rationale for selecting the 2011 Libya military intervention case 
and for focusing on French and German parties. The intervention in Libya was the 
motivator for this thesis. However, personal interest in the region and this case does 
not suffice for a scholarly effort. The academic rationale for this case selection starts 
from it being the first time the UNSC invoked R2P in a resolution mandating the use of 
force against the will of the target state. The unusual nature of French and German 
foreign policy decision-making, as described at the start of chapter 1, forms the 
bedrock for the country case selection.  
The case selection locates the Libyan case in the scholarship on French and German 
foreign policy decision-making. It offers background on the French and German 
political and party systems and on past roles and foreign policy decisions toward the 
region in which Libya is located to contextualise the intervention case and the country 
case selection. While I am not strictly using a comparative qualitative methodology, 
part 3 provides some insight into why contrasting the two states makes theoretical 
and methodological sense. Thus, the case selection proceeds by drawing out notable 
variances and parallels between the country cases.  
 




3.1. UNSC resolution 1973 and the military intervention in Libya  
This section addresses the question: 'why the 2011 intervention in Libya'. The 
rationale is threefold. The first reason is the potential for contention and, thus, the 
nature of intervention decisions per se. Second, UNSC resolution 1973 mandating the 
intervention was the first time R2P was invoked without the consent of the target 
state. The third reason relates to France and Germany being comparable in capability 
or position, and UNSC members at the time.  
Military interventions: instances of domestic controversy 
Decision-making on the use of force is prone to be controversial. As one aim of this 
thesis is to study the factors underlying parties' ideas about foreign policy and to argue 
that there are differences between parties on foreign policy such a case study can be 
particularly productive. Since in democracies parties can matter in foreign policy 
decision-making it is arguably time to look at them in more detail. Thus, the case 
selection for such a study ought to be one in which difference is likely. Hence, the 
choice of an instance surrounding a military intervention decision. Such decisions are 
likely to lead to controversy and disagreement, as military interventions bear a 
financial burden and often also the risk of loss of human lives for the intervening state. 
As military interventions for proclaimed humanitarian motives are by nature not 
responses to immediate national security threats, these costs are more likely to be 
seen as a burden and to be politicised in electoral competition. Moreover, moral 
opposition to such forceful interventions can also be based on the expected or real loss 
of human lives in the targeted state, the risk of a moral hazard, with insurgents 
escalating violence in the hope of such intervention, in their favour and a risk of 
aggravating conflict rather than to managing or solving it. At the same time, there is a 
strong moral case to be made in favour of intervention as well. These factors all lead 
to an increased likelihood of domestic debate on military intervention cases. 
UNSC resolution 1973: R2P first 
The Libya intervention case instance is particularly relevant for the international 
norm of R2P and, thus, a good case for looking at the influence of an international norm 
on parties' national role conceptions, role socialisation and role contestation. UNSC 
resolution 1973 (2011) was the first (and so far only) to invoke the norm to mandate 
the use of force against a UN member-state without its consent. It was the first 
 




practical application and test of this emerging, controversial and much discussed 
international norm. The invocation, application and, as some argue, misuse of R2P in 
Libya links this intervention case to R2P's future fate. The intervening coalition's 
pursuit of so-called regime change went beyond the UN mandate and has arguably 
increased reticence concerning R2P, notably in China and Russia. Resolution 1973's 
crucially hinged on these two permanent UNSC members not making use of their veto 
power by abstaining. Some speculate that the military action in Libya at least 
influenced if not determined international decision-making on Syria. The further 
development of the R2P norm also is likely to hinge on the evolution of events in the 
North of Africa and the Sahel. This includes instability and unrest in, e.g., Mali due to 
fighters and weapons emanating from Libya, a now essentially failed state which also 
fails to control its territory and borders and coasts. The Libyan case and its 
consequences are thus essential for R2P's future as a norm.  
Libya, France and Germany 
The final selection criteria of the Libya intervention case links it to the country cases. 
R2P is ultimately reliant on state action. It invokes a responsibility of the so-called 
international community to act. Given that not all states have the resources to conduct 
a military intervention, R2P in reality only implicates certain states. This creates role 
expectations for states capable (and willing) to act. France and Germany are two such 
candidate states. France is a residual global and regional power, with nuclear power 
status and a permanent UNSC seat. Germany is a regional power with a strong 
economy and global ambitions. In 2011, it was a non-permanent UNSC member. Based 
on the type of states they are, we can expect role expectations from other states and 
domestic actors to conform to R2P's responsibility demands, i.e. to vote in favour of a 
relevant resolution and/or to fulfil the UNSC mandate. We may, thus, observe R2P’s 
influences on domestic role socialisation and role contestation, due to such pressures. 
3.2. International relations, and national roles in the region 
France and Germany's history of relations with the Middle East and North Africa 
region provide the context for the 2011 decisions. This section reviews the history of 
French engagement in the Arab World and Africa, and Germany's tackling of the 
question of the use of force and German participation in interventions. The aim is to 
contextualise the decisions and to locate it in country cases' history of foreign policy.  
 




France in the international system: a challenged power  
France is a nuclear power with a permanent UNSC seat and, hence, a great power by 
status and capability. Successive US administrations challenged its role selection in 
the second half of the twentieth century by not providing the role recognition French 
presidents craved. Yet, successive French presidents did not give up on the pretence 
of a global leader role via a European leader role (e.g. Hoffmann 1974; Krotz 2015).  
While France has some capabilities that provide it with a high status it lacks others. 
Its economic deficiencies appear in dissonance with its global role leader ambitions. 
Pressures from significant others and powerful socialisers in the international system 
for France to comply and act according to its limited capacities rather than its 
aspirations are probable if not inevitable, as was the case in Franco-American 
relations since the 1950s (Krotz and Sperling 2011). This challenges contemporary 
pretences of independence. It also makes domestic disagreement over more likely.  
In 2011, France's woes were at least twofold. The European dimension had become a 
challenge, since the rejection, in 2005, of the European Constitutional Treaty in a 
referendum. Germany took the lead in the management of the so-called Eurozone 
crisis  (e.g. Koenig 2016). France's declining influence in the 2000s threatened its role 
in Europe and affected Franco-German capacity to shape European politics together. 
The 2011 context, included the perceived need to balance against Germany as the 
emerging European hegemon (Simón 2013). 
As part of this handling of its European challenges, France renewed Franco-American 
relations. In 2009, it decided to fully reintegrate into NATO military command. The 
decision led to political debate and opposition party criticism. In 2011, Sarkozy was 
initially not keen on NATO command of the Libya mission (The Guardian 2011b). 
Eventually, he had to concede on the matter, in part for financial reasons, as the UK 
and France did not have the means to carry the operation. NATO's implication also 
showed the US' continued strength vis-à-vis Europe and, in particular, France. 
Germany in the international system: a rising power  
The German 2011 context differs from that of France. The international context changed 
since the end of the Cold War. After German unification, the state was freed from the 
immediate international constraints of limited sovereignty and the bipolar world order. 
Maull (2006) notes that Germany faced a post-1990 dilemma between 'normalising' as a 
 




state of its material capacity, and continuing in the path and role that it was socialised 
into since the WWII. There was and still is a German preoccupation with how decisions 
and behaviour, i.e. role performance, could be viewed by significant and relevant others. 
The role socialisation also engendered strong domestic role pressure. 
Still, realist IR scholars expected Germany's behaviour to normalise and realign with 
realist expectations of states with great power capabilities (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 
1993). They assumed that Germany would return to an assertive, forceful role, given its 
economic strength. To be sure such predictions were not immediately realised. Maull 
(2006) observes that continuity marked German foreign policy. Germany even further 
embedded itself in multilateral cooperation, limiting its regained sovereignty. However, 
while deterministic and antagonistic, these realist expectations of Germany's reassertion 
of great power rank were cast into the future and may yet prove partly accurate. 
Constructivist, institutionalist and culturalist scholars assumed that Germany's 
socialisation into the civilian power role had altered its national interest to the extent 
that its foreign policy was more likely to continue than change (Maull 1990, 2000b; Krotz 
2015) The strength of this role socialisation was assumed as largely responsible for 
Germany's resistance to allies' demands and expectations for it assume a greater role to 
address global challenges and work toward international peace and security, i.e. to 
contribute more militarily and not only financially in the changing international context. 
(Otte and Greve 2000; Philippi 2001) At the same time, Germany did not act as expected 
by multilateral partners on a number of occasions since unification (Crawford 1996), 
weakening the socialisation arguments, and showing that foreign policy decision-making 
is complex, involving domestic and international level factors.  
If the context and international and domestic expectations toward German foreign policy 
changed after the end of the Cold War, it was further complicated in the new millennium. 
Germany's transatlantic relations suffered and the EU was split over the issue of the Iraq 
invasion post-September 11, 2001. The SPD-Green coalition refused to participate in and 
support this military action, consternating the US, a key partner. There is no scholarly or 
political agreement over whether the decision constituted a radical change or modified 
continuity, and some scholars revealed themselves normatively committed pro- or 
contra-intervention (Maull 2006). The post-2001 'War on Terror' era marked another 
change in the international environment and expectations toward allied states with 
Germany's capacities and, in particular, toward Germany as an alliance partner. Germany 
refused to comply with expectations, while also trying to mend relations with partners. 
 




By 2011, the context had again changed with effects on Germany, its relations with others 
and alter-role expectations and perceptions. At least since the 2008-2009, Germany 
was/is in a dominant economic position in Europe. As a driving economic force in the 
EU, it took on a central role in managing the Eurozone crisis. This European position and 
role opened a policy field for Germany in which it could enact a leader role without 
immediately being perceived as a threat or needing to use conventional violent means. 
It arguably also permitted Germany to successfully refuse other alter-role pressures and 
expectations. It was arguably one reason why chancellor Angela Merkel priority in 2011 
was not the Libya conflict, leaving decision-making largely to the foreign minister, and 
why Germany could confidently reject pressures to share the tasks of military 
intervention. Yet, it also created international pressures to more consistently and 
comprehensively enact a leader role and act according to Germany's – newly and now 
more clearly predominant - position in Europe and to its economic capabilities 
superiority. Despite expectations and pressures, Germany remained – at least 
performativity wise – a hesitant, reluctant hegemon (Paterson 2011; Bulmer and 
Paterson 2013).  
Then, in 2011, Germany was elected a non-permanent member of the UNSC. This 
provided Germany with the opportunity to live up to alter-role expectations based on its 
economic position in Europe and the international system, given its material capabilities. 
It also suited German ambitions successively stated in coalition agreements for Germany 
or, since the signing of the Lisbon Agreement 2007, for Europe in its place to be granted 
a permanent seat in a reformed Security Council that gradually emerged in Germany 
after unification (SPD-Bündnis 90/Die GRÜNEN 1998, 45, 2002, 72; CDU/CSU-SPD 2005, 
158; CDU/CSU-FDP 2009, 113; Andreae 2002, 2; Schmidt, Hellmann, and Wolf, Reinhard 
2007, 36; Hellmann and Roos 2007). UNSC membership provided the opportunity to 
show that Germany could meet international expectations.  
Thus, it was in within this context that Germany decided to first pursue a leader role 
pushing for sanctions and a non-violent solution to the emerging conflict in Libya 
(Harnisch 2015). It was also as a UNSC member, exposed to various role demands and 
expectations, and with its own ambitions, that German decision-makers decided to 
abstain on resolution 1973 and not to participate in the military mission.  
 




Germany's struggle over the use of force 
The 2011 long view context needs the inclusion of Germany's struggle over the use of 
force. Since the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy did change. Germany 
accommodated some demands of its allies, such as participation in military operations, 
under some circumstances and in some cases. Yet, most changes remained incremental 
and modifications rather than policy revision. Maull (2006) suggests that there is a 
paradox between Germany's traditional civilian power role and the demands of the 
changing international context in which there are pressures on Germany to give up its 
'culture of restraint' and 'assume responsibility'.  
Gradually, in the post-1990 era, domestic expectations toward Germany normalising 
emerged on its contributions to 'peace enforcement.' At the same time, the desire to 
be (seen as) normal and to eschew German exceptionalism (Sonderweg), created a 
dilemma or tension with the drawing of lessons from an apparently unique history on 
which this desire to (appear) to fit in allegedly derives. Consequently, Germany has 
continued to cultivate a benevolent, economic power image, embedded in European 
institutions and primarily a trade and good – mostly civilian – alliance partner.  
Parties were instrumental in the debate on German participation in military missions. 
This indicates that parties played a role in shaping orientation and changes, beyond 
the actual decision-making on cases. The CDU/CSU initiated the debate to initial 
criticism from the other parties, in particular on the left. At first, Germany, in the 
1990s, increased financial and material contributions to military interventions (1991 
Gulf War, 1995 Bosnia). The SPD and the Green Party took the landmark decision to 
participate in military missions (Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001). This required a 
substantial reconsideration of the policy orientation and context in previously fewer 
interventionist parties, especially in the Green Party which was, in part, based on a 
pacifist tradition (Rathbun 2004, 2006; Brunstetter and Brunstetter 2011).  
Scholars are divided on the degree to which the 1999 decision was an abrupt or 
gradual fundamental change of foreign policy orientation and whether or not it is, at 
all, a departure from the past. Suffice it to say that the acceptance of military 
intervention as last resort and the decision to participate in such missions enjoy cross-
party consensus, bar one (Die Linke). All other parties accepted the need to sometimes 
intervene, nevertheless, they position differently case-by-case for political and 
declared principled reasons. In 2003, the centre-left coalition decided not to 
 




participate in the invasion of Iraq alongside Germany's key allies UK and US. This 
decision was criticised by the opposition CDU/CSU. The argument was the same as the 
centre-left parties' criticism of the 2011 Libya decision not to align with key partners.  
Some scholars suggest that elite consensus waxes and wanes, in part with salience and 
acuteness of issues, and that there is no real consensus on priorities between the 
parties with government experience (Crossley-Frolick 2013). Other scholars propose 
that, where differences between parties emerge, the existence of variation tends to 
gradually erode toward consensus. Different parties have at different times initiated 
foreign policy changes, but eventually, all but the fringes followed suit. (Karp 2005)  
Arguments stressing elite consensus often remain incomplete. A tendency toward 
consensus does not mean that party differences do not exist, nor do such arguments 
help to understand which stance will become the new consensus. Moreover, culture 
such as that of 'restraint' can be interpreted in various ways (Link 2015). Thus, a 
consensus on a culture or shared use of vocabulary do not mean the same foreign 
policy conduct in practice. Agreement on policy details in practice (e.g. pre-emptive 
strikes) also does not necessarily imply agreement on the actual policy (e.g. 
intervention) nor do they prove the irrelevance of domestic politics. (Harnisch 2004)   
Even accepting the tendency toward consensus, there are still ideological differences 
between parties (inter-party). The literature suggests a tendency on the left to 
prioritise civilian conflict prevention (Rathbun 2004; Forsberg 2005; Allers 2016). 
The shift from the rejection of participation to, sometimes, acceptance of the need to 
participate also illustrates that parties' stances can evolve. Finally, despite the 
evolution on the issue toward an acceptance of intervention for humanitarian reasons, 
parties also remain internally divided on the issue (intra-party). Contradictory 
statements in the case of Libya illustrate this vividly. A key foreign policy 
representative of the governing CDU/CSU criticised the government's abstention vote 
decision (FAZ 2011). Some in the foreign minister's party criticised him, voicing 
concerns about consequences for elections and the country’s reputation (Spiegel 
Online 2011e). The SPD and the Green Party immediately welcomed, then later 
condemned the German UNSC abstention vote, and even criticised the criticism (dpa, 
Reuters, and AFP 2011; Spiegel Online 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). 
The literature remains divided over whether civilian power is still the German master 
role and the degree to which a consensus on it exists or existed. To be sure, the 
 




existence of such a consensus strongly depends on what one looks for agreement on. 
On the one hand, if one allows pro- and anti-intervention stances to coexist within the 
civilian power role, it is easier to observe continuity and consensus on the role. On the 
other hand, the continuing rejection of military action by one party and the 
discrepancy between the public and a majority of the political elite on participation 
in such interventions, suggests that there is no elite-public consensus on this matter, 
despite gradual evolution toward tolerance of such missions. Moreover, an 
apparently shared 'culture of restraint' and vocabulary associated with the civilian 
power master role do not necessarily mean that there is agreement on the practical 
implications of the role. The analytical usefulness of such a master role must be 
questioned if it can include contrary positions on the central issue of participation in 
military intervention and can lead to divergent decisions. 
The review of the evolution of stances on the use of force among German parties and 
the still existing tensions it reveals shows that there is a preoccupation with alter-role 
expectations toward Germany. In its international relations, including the use of force 
in a number of cases since the end of the Cold War, the salient relations appear to be 
less with the states at which interventions are aimed and more with key partners. By 
contrast, France's international relations and its elites' perceived role expectations 
are defined by a long history with states in regions in which France intervenes.   
France's international relations in the region 
France's embeddedness and relations in the international system and the link to its 
economic situation and dependencies are also important for the 2011 context. Its 
relations to North Africa and the Middle East complete the context. Successive 
presidents conducted so-called Arab policy (politique arabe) and cultivated relations 
with former French colonies in Africa as African policy (Françafrique). These relations 
continued after the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) and the 1956 North 
Africa decolonisation wave. (Bozo 2016; Charillon 2011) They reveal a pattern in its 
relations with the Arab World, and with Africa. They also suggest that it has a history 
of colonial and post-colonial ties and of role performance with states in the region.  
Arab Policy was sketched by president Charles de Gaulle. His successor George 
Pompidou (1969-1974) extended oil supply and arms trade relations with Iraq and 
the Gulf Monarchies and renewed links with North Africa. They included an arms deal 
with Libya in 1969. Valérie Giscard-d’Estaing (1974-1981) consolidated Arab policy 
 




and the country’s dual dependency on oil-producing states in the Middle East for the 
French balance of payment: energy supply for France and arms exports to Arab states. 
François Mitterrand (1981-1995) continued these policies. Jacques Chirac (1995-
2007) relaunched Arab policy as part of his ambitions for France. Like his 
predecessors, he considered French influence in Africa as a means to power. These 
ties reveal dependency relations on Arab petrol and arms' sale revenue. (Cohen 2013; 
Chenu and Krulic 2013; Banégas and Marchal 2013; Filiu 2013; Grosser 2013)  
Successive presidents claimed to reform relations with former colonies to make them 
equal and less based on patronage. However, they largely failed in their attempts. 
Military interventions to protect dictators went counter such reforms. Giscard-
d’Estaing oversaw a number of military interventions to protect dictators in former 
colonies, in Zaire (1977, 1978), Mauritania (1977) and Chad (1978, 1980). Mitterrand 
maintained France's presence in Africa and French military interventions continued 
(e.g. in Chad 1983 and 1986).  
In the 1990s, democratic conditionality emerged as part of an international trend in 
the 1990s. France also sought diversification of relations toward non-Francophone 
Africa. This was in parallel to its reduced material capacities to maintain its presence 
in former colonies. International organisations, like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, complemented France's ties to African and Arab states, 
creating new dependencies on international funders in these states. Chirac sought to 
Europeanise France's foreign policy. Yet, contradictions and ambivalence, between 
military assistance to besieged dictators and talk of democratic and good governance, 
continued. From 2002 onward, the retreat from former colonies was being reversed. 
Chirac positioned France as an advocate for African interests. From 2009 on, it became 
apparent that the implication of the EU and Europeanisation of African policy had also 
failed and unilateral French military action in Africa rose again. France failed in its 
attempt to use the EU in Africa for its global leader role. Françafrique revealed the 
country’s lack of power and failures rather than its global presence, influence and 
power.  (Banégas, Marchal, and Meimon 2007; Koepf 2012) France also largely failed 
in its Europeanisation of Arab policy, alternating between a shared European and a 
national approach (Müller 2013). 
France's history of Arab and African policy and relations with states in Libya's dual 
regions (Arab World and Africa) show a pattern of French military interventions to 
 




protect dictators, the use of Africa and the Arab World for aspiration to a global role 
and, recently, a pattern of democratic governance rhetoric. In 2011, France had been 
dependent for decades on petrol and the revenue from arms sales to the Middle East 
and North Africa as part of the French arms industry's clients (Krotz 2015). Such deals, 
clientelism and military interventions still mark French relations with these states.  
The 2011 context circle closes in 2007 when Sarkozy welcomed Gaddafi on a state 
visit to Paris (The New York Times 2007). By 2011, the reception pomp was a source 
of embarrassment for the president and he was facing low approval rates. It was in 
this context that France acted in 2011. It drafted UNSC resolution 1973, coordinating 
with the UK and the US, and on 19 March started the military operations. On 22 March, 
the first debate on this military mission took place in parliament, after the prime 
minister's government declaration, as the Constitution requires. 
3.3. Political system constraints on parties' foreign policy influence 
The previous sections highlighted how different Germany and France's positions in 
the international system are, despite being similar types of states. The background on 
Germany also showed that parties played a central role in moving the debates on 
military intervention participation forward in the 1990s. By contrast, the literature on 
France shows continuity and path dependency that is hard to overcome regarding its 
relations and its use of military force in its zone of influence.  
This section notes that the French and German political systems are different. France 
is a presidential system. The Fifth Republic (1958-) was intentionally designed to give 
the president executive power and to side-line parties and parliament. Germany, by 
contrast, is a parliamentary system. The political system was specifically designed to 
spread and balance power, rather than centralise it in one institution and person.  
The French presidential prerogative: inbuilt limitations in the political system  
Why study French parties and foreign policy? Given the constitutional limitations to 
French parties' influence on foreign policy decision-making, their relative absence 
from scrutiny is unsurprising. The political system of the Fifth French Republic was 
intentionally designed to side-line parties. The experiences of the Third (1970-1940) 
and the Fourth Republic (1940-1958) imprinted in many the perception that parties 
were self-serving and irresponsible and the source of political instability. 
 




In the midst of decolonisation, the Algerian War (1954-1962) and state of emergency 
crisis that shook France, Charles de Gaulle, the General celebrated for this contribution 
to the liberation of France during WWII, conditioned his return to politics on the 
reform of the political institutions via a new constitution. In particular, the president 
as a unifying actor, stabiliser and independent of party interests must be strong. He 
argued that this was necessary for France to take its rightful place/position in the 
world, play its role and achieve grandeur. (Hoffmann 1974; Cerny 1980; Gordon 1993) 
The president's predominance in French politics was consolidated through reforms 
across the years, such as direct election (1962). This increased the presidential 
figure's authority vis-à-vis the head of government through the impression of a direct 
link between the president and the public. The 2000 reforms to the electoral calendar, 
the holding of presidential and legislative elections in a short sequence of each other, 
further consolidated the president's role. The side-lining of parties reduced their 
function to that of an instrument for personal presidential ambitions, providing the 
knowledge and personnel for presidential bids. Moreover, the institutional framework 
made the president the centre-stage of French politics and his/her election the key 
moment of the political calendar, thereby also side-lining parliament. (Bell 2000; 
Knapp 2002; Elgie 2003; Howarth and Varouxakis 2003) 
This political system hence made the president the key figure and foreign policy 
decision-maker. According to the 1958 Constitution, he/she is commander in chief of 
the armed forces (Article 15) and guarantor of national independence and integrity of 
the national territory (Article 5). The president negotiates and ratifies treaties (Article 
52) and is responsible for their respect and implementation (Article 5). At the same 
time, the side-lining of parties and parliament was achieved by strengthening the role 
of the head of government, creating a dual executive, a hybrid presidential system.  
The effect of this dual executive is that when the prime minister and the president are 
of the same party, the president is traditionally in charge of 'high politics'. He/she has 
the power to appoint a loyal prime minister who is acceptable to the parliamentary 
majority (Article 20). Yet, the president's influence is limited by the international, 
domestic and party-internal contexts and momentary situations or events. (Howarth 
and Varouxakis 2003) It has waxed and waned during the course of the Fifth Republic. 
Elgie (2003) argues party system composition and dynamics played a role in this. 
Parties are critical for the president's exercise of power, as he/she is dependent on a 
 




working majority in parliament to implement his/her policies. It matters whether this 
majority is provided by a single party or a coalition/block (so-called fait majoritaire) 
and what the nature of the coalition is and whether the dominant party is 
fractionalised or united. Arguably, intra-party division and coalition politics can 
weaken a president’s foreign policy prerogative, even when the government is of 
his/her party and commands a majority in parliament. 
A second effect is that the president's influence is limited, when, in so-called 
cohabitation (1986-1988, 1993-1995, 1997-2002) the prime minister is not of the 
same party. This can be a challenging period for the presidential prerogative. The 
president's authority is highly dependent on the working relationship between 
him/her and the prime minister in question. Yet, there have been cases in which 
president and prime minister of different parties worked together well and some 
cases in which president and prime minister of the same party were less compatible. 
Despite this, cohabitation weakens the president. The presidential image of non-
partisanship and authority is reduced because he/she has less control over policy 
initiatives. (Elgie 2003) Moreover, there are constitutional power overlaps between 
the institutions that are more consequential during cohabitation. The 1958 
Constitution states, e.g., that the prime minister is responsible for national defence 
(Article 21) and involved in drawing up treaties (Article 52). This overlap creates the 
potential for conflict between the two figures.  
Even so, during the course of the Fifth Republic, the president has remained the key 
figure and his/her authority was further consolidated with the 2000 constitutional 
change that reduced the seven-year term to five years and sequenced presidential and 
legislative elections within a few weeks of each other, making the parliamentary 
elections, effectively, the confirmation of the president. (Costa 2013b, 2013a) This 
reduced the likelihood of cohabitation in the future, more likely to provide the 
president with a fait majoritaire in the parliament. 
German government prerogative and inbuilt limits to its power 
The centrality of the president in French political life and foreign policy decision-
making contrasts with the key actors and processes in Germany. This section reviews 
the German government, constitutional and parliamentary powers in foreign policy, 
pointing to the role or options for parties to influence the process. The government 
formulates foreign policy, principles and guidelines of which are declared in 
 




government programmes. It also takes the decisions in the policy field (Oppermann 
and Höse 2007; Brummer and Oppermann 2017 for overviews of the domestic 
context and actors of German foreign policy). However, the need to form coalition 
governments, for stable parliamentary majorities that increase the likelihood of 
legislation passing, decisively influences foreign policy decision-making in Germany. 
The necessity of having two (or more) parties in coalition puts constraints on 
decision-making. The junior coalition partner has relatively greater influence if this 
party can credibly threaten to end this pact. While such threats depend, inter alia, on 
the ideological proximity and salience of issues, it is not without consequence in 
coalition bargaining processes. Foreign policy can become a site of contest between 
parties in government. In practice, the foreign ministry was for a very long time 
habitually allocated to the junior partner, providing smaller parties with relatively 
more influence and expertise in foreign policy and with the opportunity to carve out 
a 'statesman' profile via the engagement with international politics (Kaarbo and 
Lantis 2003; Paterson 2010; Oppermann and Brummer 2014; Oppermann, Brummer, 
and Van Willigen 2017). 
The German Constitution (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: [vom 23. 
Mai 1949 (BGBl. S. 1) 2015) puts restrictions on the deployment of the armed forces 
based on a German history of aggression in Europe. In the early 1990s, a debate was 
started whether or not Germany ought to and was constitutionally enabled to 
participate in out-of-area missions, as envisaged by a reformed NATO-doctrine. 
International and domestic pressures to ‘normalise’ after reunification were 
important factors. Parties played a role in putting this issue on the agenda. The 
CDU/CSU pushed for participation in military intervention, in part due to 
international/partner pressures and in part because of such decisions corresponded 
to the party's ideological acceptance of force as a means in international relations. 
(Létourneau and Räkel 1997; Forsberg 2000; Lantis 2002) A 1994 constitutional 
court decision, reinterpreted the German Constitution to allow out of area missions 
under the condition of the parliament's approval and within collective security 
institutions (Article 87, Article 24). A 2005 law (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz) forms 
the legal basis for parliament’s role in such decisions (BGBl 2005). (Wagner 2006; 
Peters and Wagner 2011, 2014; Brummer and Oppermann 2017) 
Parliament, and through it parties, has a say in the decision. Despite the legislative 
having a special role, as the only directly elected federal institution, the prevalence of 
 




coalition government with majorities in parliament means that, in effect, opposition 
parties have little actual influence through the parliamentary process on decision-
making, as was noted above. Governments can put decisions on the deployment of the 
armed forces to a parliamentary vote but are likely to receive approval given their 
majority in the legislative. Governments can also use the parliamentary votes on 
foreign policy for party discipline or to quell intra-party disputes (chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder, e.g., called for a vote of no-confidence on Afghanistan 2001).  
3.4. Parties' influence on foreign policy decision-making  
French and German parties are not irrelevant though they are constrained in actual 
influence on foreign policy decision-making. France appears to be a least likely case for 
parties even investing resources in expressing foreign policy narratives. Germany is a 
more likely case for foreign policy stances and narratives because parliament provides 
parties with the opportunity to influence foreign policy decisions. However, in France, 
parties in opposition have more avenues to influence foreign policy outcomes than 
expected; in Germany, the coalition majority in parliament actually reduces opposition 
parties' direct influence on foreign policy decision-making.  
German parties and decision-making on the use of force 
At first, Germany as a case for studying parties and foreign policy is obvious because 
of the parliamentary deployment powers. At the same time, agenda-setting and 
decision-making remain the government's reserved domain. Moreover, a coalition 
government with parliamentary majorities is a constant. Thus, parliament's and 
opposition parties' capacity to exert influence on foreign policy is limited by a de facto 
governmental majority in parliament. This requires case selection justification. Hence, 
this section provides background on the potential role of parties in foreign policy 
decision-making. Germany is a more likely case for criticism and role contestation 
than France, because parties here have a more prominent position and role in politics, 
despite the described constraints. These limitations are not relevant here, as this 
thesis is not concerned with actual decision-making but public disagreement that has 
the potential to influence future policy articulation and decision-making.  
German parties' lack of actual influence through the mechanism provided by the 
political system does not equate to irrelevance. Two (or more) parties form coalitions. 
In ministerial offices and through bargaining power, junior parties can shape foreign 
 




policy under certain circumstances and if they have interest or incentive to do so. 
Moreover, parties can also call upon the constitutional court to assess foreign policy 
decisions and, in particular, out-of-area deployment on a case-by-case basis. Two 
recent examples include the radical left's lawsuit regarding German participation in 
the interventions in Syria or the Green Party's lawsuit against the coalition's 2011 
decision to use the armed forces to evacuate from Libya without a prior vote in 
parliament. (Spiegel Online 2009; TAZ 2016; DW 2016; Spiegel Online 2015; FAZ 
2015; Zeit Online 2011; Bundesverfassungsgericht 2007, 2015) Thus, it can be 
proposed that this court is a domestic actor that governments and legislators have to 
take into consideration when making decisions and limiting the scope of foreign policy 
decision-making of any government. (Daase and Junk 2012; Oppermann and Höse 
2007) As Risse-Kappen (1991, 488) notes: '[…] parties constrain both the legislative 
and the executive branches.'  
German public opinion and the public are important domestic others. Parties are links 
between the state institutions and the public. They seek electoral success. At the same 
time, international issues can be salient. Thus, parties have incentives to be attentive 
to public opinion. Risse-Kappen (1991) suggested that public and elite opinion is 
divided and that the public's relevance increased. Parties became more 'democratic', 
taking cues from the voting public. Oppermann and Höse (2007) suggest that the 
societal context can influence formal foreign policymaking via informal processes. 
Public opinion, guided through media reporting, restricts German foreign 
policymaking. They also note that this restriction is not uniform and highly dependent 
on the issue and its salience.  In the hierarchy of priorities foreign policy often ranks 
lower than domestic issues and while there is an interest in foreign policy, its potential 
utility for mobilisation is limited. Yet, the public's relative interest that can force 
governments and opposition parties to consider public opinion, because foreign policy 
can become an issue. This is especially the case when reporting on an instance 
increases, there are clear alternative proposals and differences between parties, and 
it is used by at least one as an election mobilising issue. Salience increases with 
stronger (and more vocal) disagreement between government and opposition parties. 
At the same time, the more the issue becomes salient, the more likely parties will 
disagree on it. Such disagreements can be used for party political purposes. 
(Oppermann and Höse 2007) Thus, public opinion can indirectly influence foreign 
policy through parties. Public opinion is relevant because Germany's electorate is less 
 




inclined than its parties to use military force abroad and military interventions have 
been used for inter-party posturing between the two larger parties (Paterson 2010). 
The issue of military action interests the German public (Mader 2017). In sum, the 
public attitude toward the use has long been 'dovish', remains sceptical and is a 
domestic restraint on national roles. 
French parties and foreign policy decision-making 
Despite the side-lining of parties and the relative limitation of the parliament in the 
legislative process compared to other states', parties are not irrelevant in foreign 
policy. First, presidential candidates usually come from within parties or form parties 
for their purposes. This means that the president needs a party machinery to get into 
office (Howarth and Varouxakis 2003). But a candidate must transcend party lines to 
get elected in the two-ballot system requiring alliances in the second round. Elections 
are more a contest between individuals with a government programme than between 
parties, but candidates are still associated with a party (Elgie 2003). 
Second, cohabitation provides parties, and potential presidential candidates, with the 
opportunity to carve out a profile and influence foreign policy decision-making. Such 
governing constellation offers parties, via government office, the chance to exercise 
some influence on foreign policy in a bargaining process with the president. Third, 
constitutional reforms have affected parties' capacities to exert such influence. They 
have gradually increased parliament's influence in policy-making in general. A 1995 
constitutional reform led to professionalization, giving MPs more means to hire 
qualified staff, prolonged the sessions from three to nine months, introduced weekly 
questions to government and prioritised private members' bills in one reserved 
session a month. This increased MPs capacity to scrutinise legislation. While their 
powers to bring government to account remain limited, there are now new 
mechanisms for scrutinising government policy, including asking oral or written 
questions or to amend legislation. Kerrouche (2009, 67) notes: '[…] the position of the 
National Assembly and its members has evolved […] and has entrenched, or even 
accentuated, the indirect influence MPs have over legislative processes.' The role and 
perceptions of parliament have undergone change with the legislative body becoming 
a partner (rather than a key actor). Research proposes that the number of questions 
put to the government increased and that there are right-left differences in how the 
scrutiny of government policies is exercised. A more recent constitutional revision 
 




(2008) further increased parliament's and MPs' power and suggests that the 
remaining constraints to parliament's influence on foreign policy decision-making 
may not be set in stone. For example, the government is now required to declare to 
parliament the deployment of the armed forces and to allow a debate on the issue. 
Within three months of such deployment, the Constitution now also requires the 
government to allow a vote on the prolongation of the mission. Yet, parliament's 
powers to legislate and/or exercise control remains limited and weak compared to 
other European parliaments. (Kerrouche 2009)  
However, even relative increased opportunities to shape policy-outcomes raise 
questions about parties' place in parliamentary politics. Elgie (2003) suggests that 
party politics dominate the parliamentary 'game' with office- and policy-seeking 
motives. Parties must negotiate and cooperate to achieve or block legislative 
successes. While the Constitution provides the rules, parties play the game and shape 
parliamentary politics. Government parties seek to limit opposition powers and use 
constitutional means (Article 49) to pass bills as an issue of confidence. He argues that 
parliament is not weak because of institutional limitations but because 
parliamentarians are not focused on exercising an independent parliament role. 
Kerrouche (2009) points out that MPs often find themselves in the centre of conflicting 
political powers and use a range of indirect means to influence them. Oral question 
time is a good way for opposition parties to broadcast alternative views and be heard. 
It is an indirect means to restrain and moderate government decision-making, 
appealing directly to the public. Thus, these increased opportunities also provide 
parties with incentives to position themselves and oppose government stances.  
French parties differ on foreign policy issues, despite parliament's relative weakness 
in the legislative process and parties' limited influence. Rathbun (2004) argues that 
despite suggestions that Gaullism shapes foreign policy and the institutional 
framework constraining parliament's and parties' role, parties formulate distinct 
foreign policies based on political concepts and ideologies. He finds evidence for more 
or less interventionist stances. According to him the domaine reservé of the president 
in foreign and defence policy is rather a shared domain, at least in times of 
cohabitation, and while all parties may adhere to a form of Gaullism, interpretations 
thereof vary. More recently, Ostermann (2016) shows that parliamentarians' stances 
differed on the 2011 Libyan intervention and that a dominant discourse espoused by 
the governing party coalition was contested in the debates. He points to the influence 
 




of international norms and the construction of self-images that are based on political 
concepts drawn from and linked to French history.  
This country case selection argues that French parties play a greater role in foreign policy 
than often acknowledged. Their positions are not only shaped by personal ambitions and 
the electoral calendar but also based on ideas. The fact that parliament and parties are 
weak does not mean that they are irrelevant to French politics and policy-making. MPs' 
powers gradually increase, including in foreign policy decision-making. Challenges to 
parliament's limited role are likely to put pressure on granting parliament more power 
of scrutiny and decision making in the future. Parties are important for realising the 
personal ambitions of individuals and new parties emerged and shape the narratives and 
policy-making, despite the inbuilt constraints of the political system. (Knapp 2002) 
In sum, parties make up the parliamentary opposition. MPs and government ministers 
are dependent on parties and their structures for political careers, like presidents (and 
MPs). Their positions and decisions have to stay within what is acceptable for or 
expected of the party to stay credible, for the party membership base and for the 
public to retain support. This implies a certain policy coherence across the party and 
across time and the need to construct continuity between otherwise different stances.  
3.5. Party-case selection: the 2011 actors  
The party-case selection below provides some background to the key actors in 2011 
and the party system in which they operate.  
The French party-case selection: all or some parties? 
The Fifth Republic party system was intended as a counter-design of the multiparty 
'polarised pluralism' system of the Fourth Republic. (Knapp 2002) Its two-ballots 
principle shapes party competition and the entire party system. The first round/ballot 
of legislative or presidential election is more about the party, the second more about 
ideology (Lewis-Beck and Chlarson 2002). The first round encourages fragmentation. 
For the second round, parties and candidates form pacts and alliances and negotiate 
public support for the closest ideological party or candidate. This system consolidates 
a left-right-divide, cross-right/left cooperation to form majorities in parliament.  
In the early Fifth Republic, a 'bipolar quadrille' monopolised 90 per cent of the vote 
with two major parties on each side: the PCF (parti communiste de France) and PS 
(parti socialiste) on the left and the Gaullists and non-Gaullists (both with changing 
 




names) on the right. This system waned and disappeared, due to fierce competition 
and rivalry between the parties and to the major decline of support for the PCF from 
the 1970s onward and PS' monopolisation of the left. (Knapp 2002; Sauger 2009)  
The emergence of new cleavage lines and issues saw increased party realignment and 
the rise of new parties in the 1980s. This development was further encouraged by 
changes to party funding laws to curb illicit financing and by the model of the 
European Parliament elections held under a proportional representation system. The 
effects of the two-ballot system, providing smaller parties with more publicity to carve 
out a profile and lowering their entry costs, became diluted. At the same time, the first 
ballot of the national elections gradually developed into a protest vote mechanism for 
increasingly dissatisfied voters. A rise in abstention and protest votes for parties 
outside the established quadrille like the extreme right Front National (FN), led to the 
first cohabitation in 1986. Despite such deep changes, some argued, the party system 
was stable and resilient. Party coalitions continued to exist and were necessary for a 
governing majority. One party still dominated each side and the left-right divide 
survived, despite policy convergences at the 'centre'. (Knapp 2002; Knapp and Sawicki 
2008; Sauger 2009) Some argued that the 2007 elections re-bipolarised the system 
leading to an imperfect two-party system between the PS and the UMP. (Grunberg and 
Haegel 2007) A point that appears in need of new scrutiny and possible revision with 
the 2017 victory of the centrist Emmanuel Macron and a new period or even form of 
cohabitation, as Macron has invited personalities from the PS and the right-wing LR 
(Les Républicains) into the government cabinet of his 'movement'. 
The party cases included are the UMP, PS and PCF. In 2011, the UMP was in 
government, having won the 2007 elections and holding a majority of 313 of 577 seats 
in parliament. It formed a parliamentary group and held the presidential majority of 
345 seats together with smaller centrist parties. The PS was the main opposition party 
and formed the parliamentary group groupe socialiste, radical, citoyen et divers gauche, 
today’s Nouvelle Gauche, with 186 seats. The PCF was also in parliament, with 15 seats. 
It led the parliamentary unit groupe de la Gauche démocrate et républicaine, 
comprising smaller radical left parties.  
My focus is primarily on the UMP and PS, given their relevance in French party politics 
and having provided all but two (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Emmanuel Macron) of 
its presidents since 1958. The smaller coalition parties, such as the Nouveau Centre 
 




are not included in the analysis, despite MPs speaking during the debates, because 
they publicly only concurred with the official presidential, government and UMP line. 
The reasoning for including the PCF, despite its arguable electoral irrelevance, is the 
relevance of the deep historic divide of the French left (e.g. Agulhon 2007) and the 
PCF's dominance of the left in the Fifth Republic until the late 1970s. Moreover, I 
wanted to include an alternative voice that was raised during the debates. While it 
may not have been relevant or picked up at the time, it stands representative for the 
possibility of alternative national role propositions from the radical fringes. Radical 
alternatives and their presence (despite non-representation in parliament until 2012) 
in the public debate on various policy issues that can be linked to foreign policy, as 
research on the influence of the extreme right FN suggests. This concerns, e.g., the 
issue of security and its possible impact on policy-making (Shields 2008, 2014; 
Marlière 2009; Mondon 2013, 2014). Such parties can be in setting the agenda.  
With international issues increasingly salient and radical populist parties positioning 
and campaigning on them, as discussed in chapter 1, the inclusion of an alternative 
voice seemed reasonable. This is by no means to argue that the far right and far left 
are in any sense equivalent, except for their location at the party system fringes and, 
in some cases, their populist strategies and radical demands. I am also not suggesting 
that the PCF is the most radical of the highly divided left in France. The aim is also not 
to implicitly claim that the far left had as much of an impact on agenda setting as the 
far right in recent decades. Yet, as the success of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the 2017 
presidential election with nearly 20 percent of the first round vote in fourth place and 
ahead of the PS candidate at ca. 6 per cent (The Guardian 2017; Observer 2017; 
France-Presse 2017) and other radical left wins or increased support in Europe 
(notably Syriza in Greece, Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal and Podemos in Spain) 
suggest, it is far from impossible for such parties to become relevant in the near future. 
At the very least alternative national roles or radical national role interpretations and 
such parties' national role contestation put these in the public domain to be picked up 
by the voting public and mainstream parties in forthcoming debates or stress potential 
dilemma creating inter- or intra-role conflict over time.   
The German party-case selection: all parties in parliament 
The German party-case selection is less complex. Unlike the French electoral system 
that creates (or used to create) two blocks in which numerous smaller parties found a 
 




place, the German electoral system has created a relatively stable multi-party system. 
The threshold to enter parliament has meant that a relatively small number of 
relatively large parties regularly enter parliament. Hence, parliament is not composed 
of two larger parties and many smaller parties, like in France. Furthermore, the 
proportional system requires parties to form coalitions after elections to govern. Thus, 
in 2011, six parties were in parliament.  
My focus is on the CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD, Green Party and Die Linke. The party coalition9 
composed of CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union) and CSU (Christlich Soziale Union) 
were the largest party after the 2009 parliamentary election with 33.8 per cent of the 
vote (239 of 622 seats). In party family classification literature, this party coalition is 
habitually characterised as Christian Democratic. Christian Democracy is then related 
to but more or less distinct, depending on the author, from the conservative party 
family. (Pridham 1977; Hanley 1996; Gottfried 2007) They formed a government 
coalition with the FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei), which had come third with 14.6 
per cent (93 seats). The liberal FPD held the foreign ministry (Guido Westerwelle) and 
the CDU's Thomas the Mazière was Defence Minister (from early March 2011). The 
parliamentary opposition was composed of the Social Democratic SPD 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and the Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen) and Die Linke. In 2009, the SPD had come second with 23 per cent (146 seats), 
Die Linke fourth with 11.9 per cent (76 seats) and the Green Party last with 10.7 per 
cent (68 seats). (Tagesschau.de 2009) 
The parties were all included, given their relative strength and historic relevance to 
the party system. They span the political spectrum, with Die Linke on the left fringes, 
the SPD and Green Party centre-left, FDP economically liberal centrists, and the 
CDU/CSU as moderate, centre-right, middle-ground party. Conspicuously absent in 
parliament at the time was a more right-wing party.  
These parties are all historically relevant. The CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD have deep roots 
in the history of the second half the twentieth century Germany, alternating in 
government coalitions throughout. The Green Party emerged later, with the new 
cleavages described in chapter 1, and has been in coalition with the SPD twice (1998-
2002, 2002-2005). The Green Party's Joschka Fischer was the foreign minister in both 
                                                          
9 Referred to as CDU/CSU and one party hereafter for simplicity reasons, despite differences 
between CDU and CSU.  
 




governments. Die Linke formed in 2007, from a merger of the German Democratic 
Republic's party SED’s (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) successor PDS 
(Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus) and a smaller West German radical left 
party. Its inclusion is also justified because it is the only remaining party categorically 
against German participation in military interventions. 
3.6. The 2011 domestic context in France and Germany: incentives 
The case selection started with the international context in 2011. To close, it looks at 
the 2011 domestic context. This gives credit to the arguments that parties' narratives 
may have been strategic and that the positions and national roles embedded in and 
justified through these narratives were too. It addresses motives and incentives and 
provides background on public opinion and the electoral calendar. 
A foreign minister struggling party-internally and electorally? 
In 2011, regional elections were upcoming and Germany was two years before the next 
parliamentary election. The junior coalition partner and, in particular, its foreign 
minister, was allegedly struggling in the poll predictions. (Koenig 2016; Bucher et al. 
2013) At the same time, military intervention remains a central issue in foreign policy in 
the post-Cold War era. The continuity and change literature frequently focuses on it, 
described in the international relation context. The topic also still sparks domestic 
debate and criticism. While most parties accept that Germany is expected to sometimes 
participate in interventions, the public is still largely opposed, and parliament and the 
constitutional court still play restraining roles, as outlined above.  
It is within this domestic public attitude context that 2011 provided political incentives 
to the governing coalition. After the 2009 general election, the FDP had taken over two 
key institutions of the foreign policy executive: the foreign ministry and the ministry for 
economic cooperation and development. Within these, it could to shape German foreign 
policy (Oppermann and Brummer 2014). The FDP foreign minister Westerwelle (2009-
2013), was reportedly the driving force behind the decision-making on Libya. Although 
decisions were allegedly coordinated with the chancellor (Miskimmon 2012). Given the 
2011 context and the public's scepticism regarding German participation in military 
intervention, Westerwelle was accused to have used Libya for electoral strategy.  
These claims have been challenged on the basis that the government would have likely 
taken a similar decision without regional elections immanent (Hansel and Oppermann 
 




2014) and that positions were consistent with Westerwelle's record (Brummer and 
Oppermann 2017) and suiting the chancellor and her priorities set on the management 
of the Eurocrisis. Yet, the accusations are part of the domestic context, since they were 
expressed by scholars and political opponents during the debates. 
A president in need of a boost to his presidential image? 
In 2011, France was one year before the presidential election and president Sarkozy's 
approval rates were plummeting. It is probable that he used diversionary tactics to 
improve his image and his chances of winning the 2012 election. The public is socialised 
into recognising as presidential certain symbols and acts. (Koenig 2016) It has been 
proposed that Sarkozy's personal style as hyperactive president and the public's and 
elites' presidential role expectations may, in the end, have cost him the victory in the 
2012 presidential election (Cole 2012). In 2011, however, Sarkozy arguably also had 
other political incentives to appear as if acting decisively on Libya: He had to compensate 
for his government's first reaction to the so-called Arab Spring (Le Monde 2011a). 
Another possible motive may have been connected with Gaddafi’s alleged funding of 
Sarkozy's 2007 presidential campaign, as later emerged (The Guardian 2013). 
Be that as it may, public opinion on military intervention in Libya was not stable. A poll 
in early March 2011, suggested that the public was initially against it. (IFOP 2011a) 
Approval rates improved as the media and politicians expressed support for a military 
mission and once it was underway (Bucher et al. 2013; IFOP 2011b, 2011c, 2011e). It 
declined once the intervention continued into the Summer and French casualties made 
the news (IFOP 2011d). The evolution of public opinion supports proposed that 
Sarkozy's strategy was to improve his own ratings. It also showed that a majority of the 
public was not against military interventions in principle. Finally, it indicated that the 
president and his government had relative freedom in how to act in the case of Libya, 
because public opinion is easily swayed, so long as an operation is short and perceived 
as a success. This means that public opinion was probably not a strong domestic pressure 
for or against a more interventionist role selection, because it so easily shifts.  
Conclusion 
The country case selection's international background and context to the 2011 
intervention provided insight into the history of relations and interventions. It aimed 
to provide background on the country and party cases, and the 2011 international and 
domestic contexts, and to show that each country case selection is justifiable in itself. 
 




As noted in this chapter, the thesis is not a formal case comparison. Yet, there is some 
advantage in selecting France and Germany as country cases. The two are middle-
range powers with status and/or capabilities to back up this position in the 
international system. They have a history of conflict and of cooperation with each 
other via European institutions and integration in the twentieth century. In 2011, the 
two states were UNSC members. Expectations arose from these positions. The case 
selection also showed that there are significant differences between the two states in 
terms of the political system and the role of parties in decision-making.  The next three 
chapters present the empirical evidence of the two country cases selected in this 









Chapter 4: French parties’ national role conceptions 
This chapter explores French foreign policy, focusing on parties and national role 
statements. It applies the theoretical framework to the controversy surrounding the 
2011 Libya decision-making. The unpacking of the state, including the focus on domestic 
actors, opportunities, incentives and ideas, and processes influencing foreign policy 
decisions are FPA contributions. A strength of role theory has been to argue that identity 
alone does not prescribe actions and that national role conceptions are links between 
national identity, and policy ideas and behaviour. Yet, much of the role theoretical work 
and other foreign policy research on France still stresses identity and interests as key. 
This chapter finds that all three parties under study expressed a leader role. While all 
welcomed the Arab uprisings and condemned the violent reaction of the Gaddafi regime, 
they did not agree on the means and process for addressing the situation. The two main 
parties were in support of UNSC resolution 1973 (2011). They agreed on the need and 
the decision to use force in Libya, but disagreed on the process, style and preferred 
partnerships. The PCF disagreed on the use force, while also condemning the regime and 
its use of violence and proposing alternative roles. This chapter shows that while parties 
largely agreed on France's master-role, confirming its strength, parties disagreed on its 
interpretation. This suggests that role consensuses need closer scrutiny. 
The consensus on the leader role masked inter-party differences. A closer examination 
of what was implied in this national role conception and deducted in policy means from 
it revealed the existence intra-role contestation over the leader role. Parties disagreed 
on how to interpret the role and how to enact it in practice. The chapter qualifies the 
leader role to make sense of differences. The aim was to uncover ideas underlying 
parties' national role conceptions. The analysis of the sources of role interpretations 
suggests that there were differences in role socialisation and that foreign policy 
traditions, ideology and international norms mattered to which national role is selected, 
how parties interpreted and whether they contested the role. 
Part 1 reviews existing role theory literature on France, and studies on the French 
decision-making in 2011. Part 2 traces narratives and part 3 identifies parties' national 
role statements. It qualifies the leader role and points out role contestation, suggesting 
that parties interpreted the same role differently. Part 4 analyses these findings using 
the layered ideational theoretical framework. 
 




1. French foreign policy: role theory and 2011 Libya studies  
There are relatively few French foreign policy studies using role theory (Thumerelle and 
Le Prestre 1997; Aggestam 1999; Krotz 2001, 2015; Krotz and Sperling 2011; Hagan 
2016; Koenig 2016). Existing role research focuses on the state as the unit level and/or 
national elites as unitary actors. The reasons for this range from the need of focus to the 
arguments against studying parties. The argument in this literature review is that even 
studies explicitly stressing elite role consensus or excluding the possibility of meaningful 
domestic role contestation, provide some ground for a closer look at parties.  
1.1. Role research in foreign policy analysis of France 
A key study supporting the argument that there may not be an elite consensus is Hagan's 
(2016) analysis of role contestation during the 1914 crisis. He provides credence to the 
assumption that parties can select different national roles and can interpret national role 
conceptions differently. He notes that even in the case of a powerful French president, 
national roles were contested and role performance was far from determined by who the 
president was. He finds that political elites challenged and contested the meaning of the 
ally role and of alliance in the early twentieth century and that rival conceptions were 
entrenched, predated the crisis and intensified rather than muted during/by it. Hagan's 
study is on the Third Republic. The institutional parameters have since changed. 
However, even in the current Fifth Republic, the president is not all powerful, other 
domestic political actors are not powerless and parties are not irrelevant. Thus, Hagan's 
findings are taken as indications as to the possibility of variation in current national role 
conceptions, with the caveat that they are not simply transferable to the Fifth Republic. 
Role studies focussing on the Fifth Republic stress France's leader role conception. In an 
early role study, Thumerelle and Le Prestre (1997) identify roles from policymakers' 
statements in the early post-Cold War period. Their study provides an inventory of roles 
along national, European and international dimensions. In a later study on national roles 
and identities in the EU, Aggestam (1999) stressed France's independent role, building 
on Holsti's (1970) typology. 
The most extensive study of the French role, combining leader with independent is 
Krotz's (2015, see also 2001; Krotz and Sperling 2011 for a similar conceptualisation of 
roles). He describes the role as France's self-view '[…] of an active and independent 
regional leader with ambitions of global scale and presence.' Krotz argues that while 
 




adjustments to self-view and roles have taken place, the key ingredients '[…] reach deep 
into French history.' (2015, 66) The role is domestically rooted and constructed. Krotz 
characterises the dominant interpretation of history, its meaning and implications as 
'Gaullist consensus'. He recognises that this phenomenon predates de Gaulle but he 
singles de Gaulle out because he fused different elements into France's role conception. 
Krotz (2015) provides an insightful engagement with French history and the origins of 
contemporary role elements. He recognises the possibility of domestic groups' and 
societal influences that can affect the evolution of historically rooted role constructions 
and can lead to role transformation. Yet, he argues that dominant frames of 
interpretation shape perspectives and delimit the interests such societal groups enter 
politics with. 
Despite its strength, this study suffers from omissions and weaknesses. First, while 
noting disagreement on Sarkozy’s 2009 decision to reintegrate France into NATO 
command (2015, 88) which was seen as in contradiction to a key element of de Gaulle's 
role conception for France and his legacy, Krotz fails to discuss this disagreement and its 
possible meaning for an assumed national role consensus. 
Second, Krotz overly relies on de Gaulle's legacy for his historical framework. He does 
not engage with discussions of de Gaulle's legacy or the myth created around him 
(Hazareesingh 2012). Gaullism is arguably an empty vessel. Some even argue that the so-
called Gaullist consensus never existed. Profound political fissures persisted, sometimes 
behind closed doors. (Howorth 1984) Thumerelle and Le Prestre (1997) note that the 
consensus was at best superficial. Controversies over France's role dominated post-Cold 
War debates and are not separable from domestic politics and disagreement on values 
and ideology. Arguably, the only consensus was on what France's role was not. Others 
propose that the consensus was a constraining myth. It hindered political and foreign 
policy reform. Policymakers pay lip-service to Gaullism, a framework that allows ample 
room for interpretation. (Menon 1996) It was Gaullism's lack of specificity that allowed 
consensus. But, it only half masks inter- and intra-party disagreement and contestation. 
Third, Krotz's account of French history is extensive but selective. Two points bear 
particular importance with regard to a French national role notion and the case of Libya. 
Krotz does not mention the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Yet, it was the notions of 
progress and universality that informed revolutions and much of French intervention 
rhetoric derived from it. Instead, he traces these notions back to the French Revolution 
 




(1789). He provides, moreover and more crucially, little discussion on the Third Republic 
or republicanism. For him, the second half of the nineteenth century was only one in 
which France expanded its colonial empire and sought worldwide 'radiance' (2015, 47). 
Yet, republicanism is a key tradition informing French political debate (Chabal 2015). 
The omission of republicanism and of a thorough discussion of the Third Republic is 
surprising. Their symbols are central elements among Krotz's key historical reference 
points, such as the 'indivisible model republic' (2015, 71). While republicanism has 
arguably been fused in/with Gaullism there is a public debate on it (Chabal 2015).  
Fourth, Krotz speaks of dominant interpretations of history, ignoring the advances in 
French historiography and the debates in France that new historical research on de 
Gaulle and republicanism offers. The debates on the largely contested colonial legacy are 
a particular omission since that legacy links back to the Third Republic, on which much 
of today's republican tradition draws on. And it is this tradition that Krotz derives the 
master role's central vocabulary from, mirroring French colonial expansion at its peak. 
These historical debates spill over into politics, for example through historic political 
apologies for the past, such as for the crimes of the Vichy regime or colonialism. Such 
debates can have ramifications for identity construction and role interpretations.   
History, undoubtedly, matters to national role conceptions and interpretations. Krotz's 
approach runs the risk of simplifying the complex discussions and negotiations that take 
place (nationally and, not without national impact, internationally) on national histories. 
Paraphrasing Rathbun (2004): while all parties may agree on the historical sources of 
national roles and key vocabulary associated with a national role, they may not interpret 
these roots and words in the same way. Aggestam (1999) stresses this point when she 
defines national role conceptions as categories that allow for a 'certain flexibility of 
interpretation'. Krotz's treatment of the Gaullist consensus, of history and identity, as 
largely agreed upon is not unique to him or role theory studies of French foreign policy. 
The point is that different actors draw different lessons and priorities for foreign policy 
and France's role from the same reference points, including de Gaulle and the Republic. 
Koenig's (2016) multilevel role contestation analysis is the only role theory study on the 
2011 Libya intervention decision. She provides insights into why the EU did not act 
decisively and member states failed to find a common stance and course of action. 
According to her, foreign policy elites in the three key states (France, Germany and UK) 
contested the role of the EU and held diverging conceptions of it. For reasons of focus, 
 




Koenig does not explore domestic level disagreement and role contestation further than 
noting that 'France's military leadership was largely uncontested internally in France.' 
She claims that '[…] the elite consensually backed the military intervention'. (2016, 165) 
In her account, only the public disagreed by changing tack on the issue from support to 
rejection. This framing of an elite consensus depends on who one includes in the elite(s) 
and whether one factor in differences in process, in addition to foreign policy goals 
(stopping mass murder) and tools (military intervention). The inclusion of other parties 
than the governing and the main opposition party, for example, would not have allowed 
the conclusion that the elite consented on military intervention as the appropriate tool 
or on how French leadership in the case of Libya should have manifested itself.    
1.2. Foreign policy analysis of France and the 2011 intervention in Libya 
Studies of France's decision-making on the Libya intervention concentrate on the state 
or elite-level and the president. Many explanations for the decision are founded on realist 
premises, focusing on geopolitical strategy, national interests, and strategic 
reorientation towards NATO and the US. They emphasise the French desire to balance 
Germany's rise and its ascension to European leadership since the 1990s and during the 
2008-2009 economic crisis, and since the US’ weakening process following the 2003 Iraq 
Invasion (Simón 2013). French decision-making in 2011 is seen as about France's 
position and intra-European rivalry. It aimed at a realignment to counter the European 
hegemon. Other explanations are based on culturalist assumptions arguing that national 
history and identity played a major role. France is characterised as acting value-based 
and as seeking to spread its values (Belkin 2011). Some scholars combine the two 
explanations: the decision was based on national principles deemed universal and on 
material interests, in North Africa, including the desire to contain refugee movements as 
consequences if Libya lost control over maritime borders (Davidson 2013; Tertrais 
2013).  
Sarkozy’s personality and personal ambitions are other explanations, often combined 
with analysis on the elite or state-level. The reasoning is based on the strength of the 
president in general and the character and style of Sarkozy in particular. His pro-active 
or even 'hyperactive' personality and aggressive foreign policy style are referenced 
alongside his political incentives. A possible aim was to compensate for his government's 
handling of the situation in Tunisia where his foreign minister offered help to the 
besieged president (Le Monde 2011a; The Guardian 2011a). He also needed to boost his 
 




presidential image as his popularity was plummeting ahead of the presidential elections 
in 2012 and, last but not least, he allegedly desired to cover up Gaddafi’s funding his 2007 
presidential campaign. The individual level reasoning explains the style or process by 
which the case was handled and some motivations. Yet, they do not explain why Sarkozy 
and his government chose to pursue their argumentation line (Ostermann 2016).  
The existing studies of French foreign policy and Libya 2011 only capture part of the 
picture. There were controversy and differences between the parties on the decision. 
Ostermann's (2016) analysis of MPs' discursive construction of the intervention 
substantiates this. Some explanations underestimate the political ideas shaping interests 
and decisions. Others are too deterministic, overstressing the influence of culture, 
history and identity. This thesis proposes that assumptions of a strong national identity 
based on consensus on national history and symbols do not correspond to the complexity 
of French political and public debate. There may be a common set of historical 
references, but different parties interpret it differently, drawing different lessons from 
the same past (Rathbun 2004).  
The overview of role research on French foreign policy shows that, on the whole, there 
is recognition of partisan differences and contestation of foreign policy and that some 
scholars even note domestic debate and dispute on national roles (Thumerelle and Le 
Prestre 1997; Hagan 2016). The most extensive and/or contemporary studies, however, 
black-box the state or elites, and argue the existence of a national role consensus. Yet, 
intellectual and political history of French politics suggests that this is a deterministic 
reliance on a common history, culture and notion of identity. The review of the literature 
on the French decision on Libya shows that parties are the great absentee in the analyses, 
despite evidence of contestation and differences between parties. The next part delves 
into two central parliamentary debates on Libya. Part 2 traces parties' foreign policy 
narratives and part 3 identifies the national roles and role conceptions they selected 
within their stories on the 2011 uprisings, the Libya conflict and intervention. 
2. French parties’ narratives and agreement on the national role 
Parties agreed on role elements in the context of the Libya intervention decision-making. 
There was consensus on the need for international legality and cooperation, on the 
condemnation of the Libyan regime's violence, and on France's leader role. Part 2 traces 
these foreign policy narratives of the uprisings and the Libyan conflict.  
 




There was also a French leader role consensus. The UMP, PS and PCF agreed that a leader 
role performance was expected, pointing to perceived alter-role prescriptions as part of 
the national role conception and selection. The parties recognised that it was within 
France's capacities and shared the view that the role would enhance France's reputation. 
The UMP, PS and PCF agreed on the importance of international law and cooperation. 
France ought to stay within the international legal framework and refrain from acting 
alone (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1880; Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883). This pointed to a consensus 
on a good international citizen role (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012). The parties recognised 
that France's credibility as a leader was dependent on respecting international rules and 
collective decisions.  One PS MP noted:  
This resolution provided in effect an incontestable legal framework to the allied 
intervention in Libya. A legal framework that was necessary as well as the 
multilateral framework that guarantees optimal political leadership of the 
operation. (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225) 
This chapter traces the parties' narratives to locate national role statements as part of 
the reasoning on the Arab uprisings and the conflict in Libya and to make sense of 
differences between parties. The narratives showed that parties agreed on some 
elements, such as the removal of Gaddafi from power but also that there was 
disagreement on the process and tools. The major differences were on appearance, 
damage to France's reputation, and on what and why it ought to lead. Parties expressed 
different interpretations of the leader role. These leader roles were in part incompatible 
with each other. This role interpretation variation can improve our understanding of the 
differences in policy preferences and the opposition's criticism of the government. It also 
represented domestic role contestation. 
2.1. The governing party's uprising, conflict and intervention narratives 
The UMP viewed the Arab uprisings as aspirations to liberty, democracy and dignity 
(Juppé (UMP) 2011b, 5235; Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1882; Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 5219). The 
party's ministers and MPs reasoned that North Africans and Arabs, including Libyans, 
were protesting for liberty and democracy. The party held these values to be universal 
and the Arab uprisings in the name of these values as proof for their universality.  The 
prime minister noted: 'Since the beginning of 2011, the wind of democracy and liberty 
blows in the Arab World.' On Libya, he continued:  
[...] unfortunately, the Gaddafi regime decided to drown in blood the revolt that 
threatened him. Within two weeks, the hopes of the Libyan people were 
 




transformed into a nightmare. Last Thursday, Benghazi was the last refuge of 
liberty in Libya, risking to fall into the hands of the troops loyal to Gaddafi. The 
revolution seemed to live its last hours. Two days later, in Benghazi, hope was 
reborn. The French flag was waved, the flag of another Libya was waved, carried 
by dreams of democracy and modernity. (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1877) 
The narrative put a stress on the support of what was viewed as reform, progress, and 
modernity leading to a new era. The prime minister stated that: '[...] France aspires to 
pacifism, solidarity and progress in Mediterranean region.' (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1879) 
The UMP reasoned that the conflict in Libya began when Libyans called for liberty, 
democracy and dignity and the regime met the protests and demands with violence. The 
conflict narrative was essentially based on the reasoning that progress was met with the 
violent reaction of a regime. Where self-criticism figured in the narratives, it was muted 
by a focus on EU failures in its neighbourhood policies and Mediterranean initiatives not 
going far enough. Some criticism also concerned France's past relations and support of 
dictators in its sphere of influence in Africa and the Middle East, and the prioritisation of 
stability over human rights and democracy. 
UMP's MPs asserted that the use of force in response to the regime's violent reaction and 
threats followed careful risk and consequence analysis, and the exhaustion of non-
violent means. UMP ministers and MP stressed that France and its allies did not want to 
impose on Libyans. The intervention was the precondition, preparing for a diplomatic 
solution and for Libyans to make their own decisions. This intervention narrative 
showed a belief in the prospect of a political solution after taking a side in what several 
in the party recognised to be a civil war in a divided and tribal society. (Fillon (UMP) 
2011a, 1877, 2011b, 5218; Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883; Teissier (UMP) 2011b, 5232) 
2.2. The PS' narratives on North Africa and Libya 
The PS' Arab uprising narrative was similar. It also viewed the protests as about liberty, 
democracy and dignity. Equally, it viewed France's role performance as in defence of the 
liberty that was spreading in the world at this moment (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1880). One 
MP stressed that '[...] through the uprisings in the Arab World, the Arab peoples 
expressed a legitimate aspiration to liberty and democracy.' (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 
5225) Similarly, and more explicitly than the UMP, the PS drew comparisons to French 
history and, in particular, the French Revolution (1789) (confirmed in interviews with 
PS officials, May 2017). The party viewed France as a model, leading by example (Ayrault 
(PS) 2011, 1882). In the two parties' uprising narrative, the construction of a democratic-
 




self mirroring the protests in North Africa and Libya came through (Ostermann 2016). 
The protests reinforced beliefs in progress and universal will to liberty and democracy.  
The PS also agreed with the UMP that the conflict in Libya was caused by a dictator 
reacting to legitimate calls for liberty and democracy of Libya's oppressed people. It was 
a reaction to peaceful protest for liberty and democracy ( Lequiller (UMP) 2011a, 1739; 
Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1881; Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 5217). Within this context, France's role 
was carved out. The PS shared the view that this role was to be a leader and Universal-
French values defender. This role implied elements of liberator, saviour or protector that 
the party explicitly rejected (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1880).  
Like the UMP, the PS MPs argued that France was creating the conditions for Libyans to 
liberate themselves. It agreed that military intervention was a precondition for a political 
solution. It welcomed the intervention and the UN mandate (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 
5225). The party had called multiple times for a no-fly zone since February 2011 (Ayrault 
(PS) 2011, 1880; Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225). The party's MPs implied that the PS would 
have liked France take the initiative earlier. The parliamentary group leader and the later 
foreign minister under President Hollande noted that France had nearly acted too late. 
He argued that it was important to weaken Gaddafi militarily and diplomatically isolate 
him to force a political process. (Ayrault (PS) 2011) Another MP, a later prime minister 
under Hollande, noted in July that the operation could not be the end in itself. He claimed 
that the conditions for a political solution that ends the operation needed to be created 
to allow Libya to become a state based on law, democracy, justice and liberties, through 
negotiations. The PS recognised that the political exit needed to be defined, arrived at 
within a multilateral frame and in cooperation with the African Union, Arab League and 
EU (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5226–27). Implied and sometimes explicit was a criticism of 
the government, asking for political priorities clarification and diplomatic and political 
progress acceleration (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1881; Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225).  
2.3. The PCF's narratives on Arab uprisings and the conflict in Libya  
Lastly, the PCF agreed on the leader role selection. It welcomed UNSC resolution 1973. 
However, it stressed its non-violent measures. (Muzeau (PCF) 2011) Its narrative of the 
intervention was different from the other two parties. It rejected the use of force. The 
PCF did not view military force as a precondition for a political solution. It called the 
intervention a 'war' and stressed the escalation risks and the likelihood of a prolonged 
engagement. One MP quoted Algerian poet Boualem Sansal: 'war of good against evil has 
 




only ever benefited evil' and paraphrased Rony Brauman, president of médécins sans 
frontiers (1982-1994): 'never have bombardments allowed the instalment of democracy 
or pacified a country.' (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1885) MPs argued that violence produces 
more violence. Its MPs stressed that conflict resolution required a political solution:  
To really protect civilians – and that has to be our common goal – we have to find 
a political solution. Only the diplomatic solution can bring about a lasting and just 
end to the conflict that allows the Libyan people to live in security and to freely 
choose its future while respecting territorial integrity. (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 
5229) 
The PCF contended that civilians could not be protected through the use of force. One MP 
stated: 'A bombing campaign cannot serve to protect civilians.' (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 
5226) The party further noted that Arab League criticism soon after the operation began. 
The organisation had expressed fear of Western imperialism and noted that the mission 
was already going beyond its mandate. (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1884) The PCF sided with 
the intervention's critics, including Brazil and Germany who had expressed fears of 
increased tensions at the expense of civilians. One MP noted:  
It suffices to remind ourselves of the position of global powers such as India, China 
or Russia who refuse to support a military offensive. But the attitude of other 
countries is even more significant. First, there is Germany [...]. In this Germany 
joins Brazil [...]. [...] Importantly, this military offensive troubles the people of the 
region who reject Gaddafi but also refuse all Western imperialism. The head of the 
Arab League of Nations [...] criticised the Western bombing of Libya [...]. (Muzeau 
(PCF) 2011, 1883–84) 
The party also feared consequences in the region and stressed the potential harm the 
intervention's repercussions would do to the Arab uprisings' prospects of success.  
This narrative was informed by the PCF's reasoning about the Arab uprisings. It viewed 
them as a struggle for liberation but also a rejection of authoritarian regimes and of neo-
imperialism. The party's MP noted: 'This debate is another occasion to express our 
solidarity with the Arab peoples' struggle and, more precisely, with the Libyan people, 
moved by the wind of liberation, as deep as legitimate.' (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1883)  
This part noted the role consensus and the variation in parties' narratives about events. 
There was some agreement on the causes of the uprisings but also disagreement on the 
events in Libya and how to address conflict once it arises. The chapter now unpacks the 
apparent role consensus. This becomes in part necessary because parties disagreed on 
the need to intervene (PCF) and criticised the government on the process, timing and 
style (PS). This suggests that role consensus claims miss nuances. 
 




3. French parties’ national role interpretations and contestation 
There was a clear leader role consensus within the above narratives. This part describes 
the French leader role as opposition parties criticised the government's role enactment 
and disagreed on policy tools, process and style. This part unpacks the role consensus, 
identifying role elements and hierarchies. Thereby, it notes parties' role contestation. It 
proposes that the French leader role is a relatively empty shell, more pronounced on 
procedure than content. It qualifies the role, proposing that the UMP defined the leader 
role as an activist while the PS stressed it as independent and European. The two parties 
then agreed to fill the leader role with the Universal-French values defender role content 
and purpose. By contrast, the PCF proposed a conflict resolution-mediator, and UN 
defender and reformer French leader role. This part closes on the role contestation these 
variations in interpretation represented. It was focused on the process (PS) and on the 
means (PCF) of role performance, and on the content/purpose of the leader role. 
3.1. The UMP's activist leader role interpretation  
The UMP argued that France had performed the leader role since the start of the violence 
in Libya. Government officials and MPs noted that France was the initiator of the UN and 
military action. It was the first state to recognise the National Transitional Council (NTC) 
as legitimate Libyan government and lead efforts to protect civilians and find a solution 
to the conflict (e.g. Lequiller (UMP) 2011a, 1739). The foreign minister noted that not 
only had France led the initiative on the intervention, it would also lead to organise peace 
in Libya (Juppé (UMP) 2011a, 1891).  
The UMP made multiple references to R2P. This was indirectly about France's leader 
role. MP's noted the pioneering nature of UNSC resolution 1973 invoking R2P (Jacob 
(UMP) 2011a, 1882). The president of the foreign policy committee argued that the 
resolution vote was a major turning point in global governance (Muselier (UMP) 2011, 
1888). The UMP's R2P narrative further added a pioneer-leader dimension to the 
initiator-leader role. 
France was not only leading; it was enacting an activist leader role, according to the UMP. 
MPs and ministers used words to the effect that France was taking the initiative, fighting, 
persevering, convincing, influencing and shaping. This conveyed the impression of 
persistence. The prime minister (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1877) noted:  
 




[...] France fought relentlessly to convince within international frameworks [...]. 
France refused this fatality [the threatened mass murder]. The president chose to 
act. He and the foreign minister, whose determination I applaud, convinced the 
UNSC to refuse the unacceptable. 
The parliamentary group leader (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883) argued that France was not 
giving up and continuing efforts to organise and lead a firm response to the situation and 
events in Libya:  
[t]his intervention [...] is the fruit of long diplomatic persuasion work. France for 
more than 10 days is at the head of the Libyan dossier [...] With perseverance 
France pursues its diplomatic work at all levels [...]. 
MPs and ministers argued that France was cooperating with international and European 
partners. One MP noted that it was leading its partners (Lequiller (UMP) 2011b, 2200). 
France was convincing partners and working ‘[...] with all its Western, Arab and African 
partners, in the UNSC [...].’ (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1877 but also 1878) The UMP 
highlighted the multilateral framework that they argued was increasing France's actions’ 
legitimacy and its credibility (e.g. Fort (UMP) 2011, 2206). The party argued that the UN 
mandate and international legal framework enhanced France's credibility (Jacob (UMP) 
2011a, 1882, 1883, 2011b, 5223, 5224, 5238; Muselier (UMP) 2011, 1888; Teissier 
(UMP) 2011a, 1890; Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1878). These emphases on partners, legitimacy 
and credibility suggested the relevance of alter-role perceptions in UMP statements, as 
credibility is about how others/partners view state actions. 
This leader role interpretation and enactment were adding to France's respect and voice. 
One MP noted: '[...] the positive image they [the president and the foreign minister] have 
given France in the eyes of the international community.' (Teissier (UMP) 2011a, 1889). 
Another MP stressed that the president '[...] shows us that the voice of France is listened 
to and respected in the world. He shows us that our country can convince and lead other 
nations, in the service of human rights and the respect for international law.'(Jacob 
(UMP) 2011a, 1882) Finally, the prime minister emphasised the reception of these 
efforts in Libya: 'In Benghazi, the tricolour flag has been lifted and this gesture reminds 
us of our duties.' (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1880) Thus, France's role enactment had been 
well-received by the international partners and Libyans, and this was taken as evidence 
for its reputation and alter-role expectations toward the state and its duties in the world. 
The party also showed an awareness of domestic leader-role expectations and for the 
potential of contestation of its role interpretation and enactment. Traditionally, the 
leader role includes a European element and a distancing from US and NATO. France's 
 




leader role performance is made possible through a regional leader role assertion. In the 
case of Libya, France failed to unite European partners. Sarkozy was accused of 
consternating them through lack of communication and cooperation. Instead, his 
government accepted NATO leadership of the operation from 31 March 2011. UMP MPs 
and minister expressed regret over the failure to convince European partners and 
downplayed the extent of NATO involvement. This showed the relevance of domestic 
audiences and political opponents' perceptions and criticism in national role statements.  
The PS and PCF criticised the government's leader role performance. They thereby 
contested its leader role interpretation and revealed their leader role interpretations.  
3.2. The PS' independent and European leader role interpretation 
The PS agreed on the leader role. It focused its criticism on the process, alter-role 
perceptions of the performance and the European dimension of the leader role. The 
party's leader role interpretation was revealed in its UMP's role performance criticism. 
The PS stressed that France's decision-making had been inconsistent, incoherent and 
erratic from the start of the Arab uprisings. The leader of the PS group (Ayrault (PS) 
2011, 1880) noted:  
Three long weeks passed before the adoption of UNSC resolution 1973. At the time, 
the regime’s opponents were at the doors of Tripoli. [...] we have not been easy on 
the government, I have contested firmly with my friends in our parliamentary 
group the ambiguous position of the president. We have deplored the silences, the 
complacency and misinterpretations of Mrs Alliot-Marie [the then foreign 
minister] when the Arab world was – and still is – at a historical moment. We have 
denounced France’s loss of credibility [...]. 
The PS criticised the government's misjudged reaction regarding Tunisia and its slow 
response on Libya. The UMP had misinterpreted the situation and the historic moment. 
The PS claimed that it had recognised the significance of the uprisings, expressed support 
for the revolts from the start and called for a no-fly zone in Libya as soon as violence 
erupted (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225). Through the claim that France had lost credibility 
and that the PS had recognised the historical nature of the events, the PS showed an 
awareness of the relevance of others' for France's role recognition as a leader, and the 
PS' own claim to government responsibility. In short, it showed a recognition of the social 
nature of national roles. The PS considered France's successful leader role performance 
not only as based on capabilities and a perception of activism but also on credibility in 
motives, evidenced in policy coherence and action consistency.  
 




The party noted that consistency and credibility were harmed when France overstepped 
the UN mandate, as the party had feared (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1881; Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 
5227). For the PS, France's leader role was conditioned on the good international citizen 
role performance. The party considered the breach of UN sanctions mandates through 
the delivery of arms of rebel groups and the possible expansion of the mission beyond 
the mandate as damaging France's reputation and, by extension, the potential for its 
recognition as a leader. This damage was viewed as especially dangerous, because of the 
fragility of public support for the intervention in Arab and Western states.  
In addition to the perception- and recognition-based criticism, the PS disapproval of the 
government's role performance, also revealed its stress of the EU and NATO dimension. 
The party noted that France had failed to lead and unite its European partners. Franco-
British cooperation and the unilateral recognition of the NTC had been done without 
communicating with EU partners. This failure had damaged Franco-German relations 
and harmed France's ability to lead. One MP noted that Libya was evidence for the state 
of Europe of defence and in particular the Franco-German relations (Boucheron 2011, 
5239). Another MP noted that the 2009 NATO command reintegration had been justified 
as appeasing EU partners who had considered French aloofness from this organisation 
as an obstacle for a common European security and defence policy. At the time, the 
government had argued that this step would breathe new life into EU foreign policy and 
that it would also improve Franco-American relations, making the two states more equal 
partners. The PS observed that Libya had made the failure of this dual strategy obvious. 
The EU was the great absentee and EU diplomacy lacking:  
[...] we miss a Europe of defence, a European diplomacy. One cannot but notice that 
the EU is the great absent in this operation: it has no visibility, it does not manifest 
a coherent European vision, by contrast to what [the government] promised, when 
it reintegrated NATO command. (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5226) 
The MP argued that Franco-American relations remained unequal and the Libyan case 
had shown that the US was not interested in renewing these transatlantic ties. More, 
NATO involvement risked weakening France's position and uniqueness:  
'[...] following systematically the more powerful of its allies, France risks losing its 
uniqueness that so often led it, in grave crises, to hold discourses that the peoples 
of the world learned to love about it.' (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225) 
In sum, France had failed to credibly enact a European or even European leader role, 
once considered a cornerstone of its global leader role. At the same time, it had sacrificed 
uniqueness for unreciprocated closeness to the US. (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5226) The 
 




proposal of a European and independent from the global hegemon leader role was a form 
of intra-role contestation. The PS contested the government on its activist leader role 
performance and the UMP on this role interpretation. 
3.3. Why lead? Role consensus on the Universal-French value defender  
Despite the variation in role interpretation and the role contestation, the UMP and PS 
agreed on the reasoning for and purpose of the leader role. It was France's mission to 
lead. The two parties viewed this mission as a Universal human rights defender role. It 
was based on an essential belief in the place and role of France in the world because it is 
France. The UMP's parliamentary group leader argued that France's role enactment was 
France's leader role: 'France was keeping its rank and enacting its leader role.’ (Jacob 
(UMP) 2011b, 5223) As part of this, the two parties referred to honour and pride. The 
foreign minister expressed pride in France's leader role (Juppé (UMP) 2011b, 5235). One 
MP spoke of France's honour in relation to the values-based role. He argued: 'When our 
soldiers are engaged in the defence of our values of democracy and liberty [...] it is the 
honour of France that is at stake.' (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1882) He further noted: 'We want 
to express our pride in seeing France assume its values of liberty and democracy, its 
values of dignity and respect.' (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883) While the PS' emphasis on 
pride and honour was less pronounced, one MP indirectly referred to the honourable 
goals of French leadership: 'the defence of France's message in the world, of its values, 
of its rank as power has a painful counter-party: the sacrifice of our soldiers abroad who 
perish for peace and security to progress in the world.' (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225) 
A second reasoning for this role conception is linked and explicitly about values traced 
to a particular history and what France is perceived to represent in the world. France is 
a leader because it is France and its unique and special history. It is France's destiny to 
support and defend its values derived from it. The two parties stressed that these values 
are universal and quintessentially French. The Arab uprisings in the name of these values 
were further proof for universality. The prime minister noted that the president had 
acted loyal to the values that founded the nation. He continued by noting the historic 
nature of the events and the universality of the ideas invoked: 
The entire region is undergoing a powerful democratic shock wave. Its scope is 
historic. Even if all are unique, these movements are based on the power of 
universal ideals, these humanist ideals too often mocked, too often accused of 
being the privilege of our old democracies. But no, these ideas are present in the 
 




hearts of all peoples and they can rise and change history. (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 
1877) 
The prime minister observed the relevance to universal values motivating the military 
intervention: 'It is in these cities [the military intervention had helped protect] that a 
part of the future of the universal values that have long been ours is played out. It is in 
these cities that the perceived binary choice between authoritarianism and Islamism will 
play out.' (Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 5219) 
The PS stressed that the military intervention was supporting Libyan's aspirations to 
universal values of liberty and democracy, and protecting and saving lives. The party 
drew a link between France's past and values and what Libyans were demanding:  
We are the country of liberty. We believe we wrote everything. Other people 
rewrite in their language in their alphabet the formidable energy that inspires us 
since 1789. It was our responsibility that it did not stop at Benghazi so that the 
Arab Peoples can write their history. Our pride is to accompany them without 
preceding them nor abandoning them. For us today, the struggle for liberty has a 
name: Libya. (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1882) 
The PS also argued that this role led it to support and would accompany the democratic 
transition and developments in the region as part of the defence of liberty:  
[...] the idea of liberty is gaining new grounds. Our strategic vision has to lead us to 
accompany the Arab World in the implementation of principles that we believe to 
be universal. Today, this is happening through the protection of populations who 
without international intervention would have been promised to barbary. 
Tomorrow, this will happen through the support of all liberated people to 
consolidate democracy, favouring economic development, and assuring 
cooperation with partners who no longer want to be treated as simple 
demanders/obligated [obligés]. We have to support a process that can allow the 
emergence of the rule of law while preserving the liberty of conscience and the 
separation of state and religion [le temporal du spirituel]. (Interruption) 
Democracy, liberty and economic development are the best barriers to fanaticism 
and terrorism. (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1881–82) 
Consequently, the demands and aspirations for liberty and democracy, and the perceived 
analogy between France's revolutionary history and the events in the North of Africa, the 
two parties viewed France's value-based role called for and even expected of France. This 
also showed the strong perceived alter-role expectation of this national role conception. 
Despite the two parties' disagreement on the leader role interpretation and enactment, 
they agreed that France was performing its Universal-French values defender role: '[...] 
we had a few days to assume our responsibility. And we assumed it. Our country was at 
 




the rendezvous with its values.' (Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 5220) PS group leader (in the 
citation above) appeared to agree that France had enacted the role. 
This agreement on this role's enactment suggests that it is was or is independent of the 
leader role and that it can be enacted, even if the leader role is not performed well. For 
this role, the stress was on the realisation of the military intervention, rather than the 
decision-making process, who it was realised with, the credibility of motives and 
consistency of decisions and behaviour. Yet, one PS MP noted that the government's 
initial hesitations had tarnished the robust message France should have sent:  
[...] we wanted to deliver the message to a youth moved by justice and liberty that 
we would support them and that we would not arm those repressing the protests. 
However, your government at first went through a period of U-turns. [...]. Some of 
your ministers behaved as if the Arab revolutions were aimed at creating chaos 
and would spread Islamism. We would have preferred France deliver a different 
message to the youth of Tunisia, to the youth of Benghazi, to the youth of Egypt, 
that there is no antinomy to the respect of human rights and the universal values 
that we have always carried within us [...]. (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225)  
This echoed the noted importance of sending a signal to other dictators (Ayrault (PS) 
2011, 1881–82) and the implications of France's decision/compulsion to perform this 
role (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1878). It was indicative of France's role enactment on Libya 
being about more than the immediate need to protect and save Libyan civilians. 
3.4. The PCF's conflict resolution-mediator, UN defence and reform leader 
While the PCF agreed on the leader role selection. It contested the role interpretation 
and performance of the other two parties. It proposed that France ought to lead on 
negotiating a peaceful solution and transition. Beyond that, the party argued that France 
ought to lead in the defence and reform of the UN.  
The PCF filled the leader role with content/purpose arguing that France should lead to 
mediate a political solution to the conflict. This was part of the party's narrative on the 
use of force and its prospect for sustainable peace and conflict resolution. It viewed 
violence as engendering violence and intervention as an act of war.  
Not unlike the PS, the PCF emphasised the European dimension. However, it argued that 
France ought to cooperate with EU partners in order for diplomacy and negotiations to 
succeed. One MP noted that such an approach had been rejected from the start and: 
We propose that France takes the initiative with the EU to call for an international 
conference at the highest level under the UN framework or solicits a special session 
 




of the UN General Assembly. The Libyan protagonists will be called upon to 
participate with the support of the Arab League of Nations and the African Union. 
We will need new international power relations for a non-ambiguous resolution, 
clearly delimited and under the aegis of the UN and not NATO. (Candelier (PCF) 
2011, 5229) 
This leader role was congruent with PCF calls on France, as a UNSC member, to lead in 
the defence of the UN, through guaranteeing and defending international law:  
France ought to be – given its role at the heart of the UNSC – the guarantor of the 
fundamental pillar of the UN charter, especially article 2, paragraph 4 that forbids 
all state the use of force or the threat of the use of force. In favouring UNSC 
resolution 1973, France failed in its international obligations and participated in 
the instalment of the new global governance of the law of the strongest. Thereby, 
it contributed to the challenging of international peace and security. There can be 
no international legality in the destruction of a UN member state. Such a goal is 
counter-productive [...]. (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5229) 
The PCF argued that France had not enacted its leader role. France's actions had harmed 
its credibility. The decision to intervene in Libya was part of a pattern of selective 
military operations. Selectivity was framed as inconsistency. More, the party argued that 
France's foreign policy was contradictory because it was supporting some authoritarian 
regimes while seeking to overthrow others (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1883, 1884). One MP 
described this pattern: 'Unfortunately, this is not an isolated case: it summarises France's 
relations with the dictators of this world. [...]' (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5228) Instead of a 
Universal-French values defender role France had enacted a neo-colonial or imperialist 
role. The people in the region had cautioned against new expressions of Western 
imperialism and viewed this intervention as nothing else than interference by the former 
colonisers. (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1884)  
The PCF raised the involvement public intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy (BHL) in the NTC 
recognition, while the French foreign minister was meeting European homologues to 
discuss a common approach to Libya, as illustrating France's incoherent foreign policy, 
the party argued, was the announcement, by, of France's NTC recognition as legitimate. 
Similarly, the party raised Gaddafi's invitation to Paris by Sarkozy in 2007 when arms 
deals were concluded, as part of a pattern of inconsistent and contradictory foreign 
policy. The selectivity of France's Middle East policy, intervening in some cases of human 
rights abuses and staying aloof in others, damaged its credibility and thereby respect for 
its leadership. (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1884–1885; Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5228) The 
raising of these points showed that likely alter-role perceptions of France's decisions and 
actions mattered to how the PCF viewed its role performance and recognition. This was 
 




also evident in the PCF's criticism of France's perceived closeness to the US. It accused 
the government of pretending to play a leader role while the US was leading from behind. 
Thus, France was performing a leader role, fulfilling a cover function to the US. 
Beyond the case of Libya, the PCF argued that France ought to lead in the defence and 
reform of global governance, including the UN. One MP noted:  
[...] based on a renewed doctrine of multilateralism, let’s realise friendship 
between nations within the framework of a democratised UN that will no longer 
be the tributary of some few. To find a respectable and respected voice again, 
France has to call for the reform of global governance that today serves the 
interests of a close circle of great powers. The decision-making organs of the UN, 
the IMF and the World Bank need to be democratised urgently. (Candelier (PCF) 
2011, 5229) 
In sum, the PCF contested the leader role interpretation of the two other parties. This 
was not evident in the proposal of an alternative leader role and criticism of the 
government's actual role enactment. Yet, the PCF's role selection stayed within the 
master-role, showing the strength of this national role conception and consensus on it.  
Having traced the narratives, identified and qualified the national role interpretations 
and contestation, the chapter now turns to the potential sources for variation and 
disagreement on the leader role and the roles that give it purpose and direction.  
4. Why lead: sources of role interpretations and contestation 
The final part of the chapter traces the plausible sources for role selection, interpretation 
and contestation after this chapter identified national role statements, interpretations 
and contestation. It begins with the Gaullist role consensus and the role elements found 
in parties' role statements. It shows the relevance of international norms in parties' 
filling the leader role with meaning and purpose. The chapter ends with a look at the 
consensus on the Universal-French values defender role via a focus on ideology. It argues 
that this role consensus is evidence for role decontestation. 
4.1. Foreign policy tradition in the leader role consensus 
The first discernible foreign policy tradition was the Gaullist leader role that still informs 
parties' view that France ought to perform a leader role in international relations. It 
forms part of de Gaulle's vision of France's role by which France had to act as if it was a 
great power in order to be recognised as great power, even in the absence of the material 
resources to be one (Hoffmann 1974). The chapter's identification of this role conception 
 




reinforces claims that it is deeply rooted in culture and history (e.g. Krotz 2015). It 
strengthens assertions that elites – and the public – are socialised into this role, and 
expect and view it as expected of France. In particular, the PCF agreeing on the leader 
role seemed to substantiate this. Thus, at first, this chapter confirmed the consensus on 
France as: '[…] active and independent regional leader with ambitions of global scale and 
presence […]' (Krotz 2015, 66). Parties agreed that France's inherent and/or capability-
based role was a leader role.  
The different leader role interpretations and intra-role contestation raised questions 
over the sources of such variance, the possibility of inter-role conflict on role elements 
and ensuing dilemma solution, and the validity of claims of leader role consensus. 
The Gaullist tradition and the UMP's leader role interpretation 
Activism is an element of the Gaullist foreign policy tradition. It corresponded to 
Sarkozy's personality described as hyperactive (Rémond 2007; Cole 2012) and to his 
domestic need to portray himself as an activist statesman ahead of the 2012 presidential 
elections. Koenig (2016) suggests that this was a plausible reason for his stress on and 
performance of the leader role. Using foreign policy as a way of improving domestic 
approval ratings had worked in the 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict when Sarkozy took the 
initiative to mediate between the conflict parties. The emphasis on this role element was 
also in line with Sarkozy's 2007 electoral campaign in which he had promised a break 
with his predecessors' foreign policy that he had described as fatalist and failing to 
actively shape the forces of globalisation (Le Monde 2007; Rémond 2007). In his activism, 
Sarkozy deviated from a widespread defeatist attitude, concerned with domestic crisis 
and declining status (Hazareesingh 2015; Chabal 2015; Maclean and Szarka 2008; 
Sonntag 2008). He expressed the desire to show that France was a contender for a global 
leader role, able to shape and not suffer the consequences of globalisation. This wish was 
reinforced by the perceived side-lining of France in the management of the Eurozone 
crisis. France's activist leader role definition under Sarkozy and the UMP can be seen as 
a contemporary attempt to act as if to be recognised as state its leaders want it to be.  
The 2011 activist leader role enactment can be viewed, similarly to the 2009 decision to 
reintegrate NATO military command, as an 'update' of the Gaullist tradition. While this 
step corresponded to Sarkozy's reported pro-Americanism and admiration for the US 
(Lepri 2010) it also followed from the waxing and waning relationship between France 
and NATO since de Gaulle's retreat from this command in 1966 (Vaïsse 2009). It was an 
 




attempt to mend relations with the US strained since the 2003 fallout over the French 
decision not to participate in and to criticise the Iraq invasion (Bozo 2016). Thus, the 
activist leader role interpretation, and choice of the UK and the US as preferred partners, 
can be rationalised as a continuation of a Gaullist foreign policy tradition. 
The UMP contested a traditional definition of the leader role. The weakening of the EU in 
France's leader role was a shift in the traditional leader role-enactment (Koenig 2016). 
It was a break from role conceptions as allied but not aligned to the US. (Krotz and 
Sperling 2011 refer to former foreign minister under Chirac Hubert Védrine, in 
particular). By the time France reintegrated into NATO military command, it was clear 
that NATO had not disintegrated after the Cold War as some expected. It had found new 
tasks, with new, loyal alliance partners in East Central Europe and it was there to stay. 
De Gaulle had used the EU as stepping stone and means to balance against the US global 
power and NATO in Europe, to assert France's rank and carve out a global role. With the 
rise of Germany, not least during the Eurozone crisis, the permanence of NATO on 
European soil and the weakening US in a multipolar world, the need to balance against 
the US decreased while the need to contain Germany increased. The 2009 decision was 
a change of tactic that consisted of attempting, in this new context, what de Gaulle had 
failed to achieve: shaping NATO from within. Steps toward this had already begun under 
President Chirac (Vaïsse 2009; Bozo 2016). Thus, the 2009 decision was not a rupture 
with the independent foreign policy tradition not a radical change from past Franco-
NATO relations. Previous presidents had already worked on improving cooperation. 
Chirac reframed NATO relations for a new context and as part of Europeanisation and 
the professionalization of French armed forces. He saw the alliance as part of France 
reasserting its rank.  (Bozo 2016; Charillon 2013) Within this context, Sarkozy reached 
for the opportunity, in 2011, to perform the activist leader role that suited him together 
with NATO partners, without viewing it as non-compliance with French independence.  
This reasoning on NATO was not shared by all. The 2009 decision was hotly debated and 
contested at the time (Assemblée Nationale 2009). In 2011, France's closeness to the US 
and NATO were points of contention between parties. The opposition parties prioritised 
independence over activism and stressed the European leader dimension of the role, 
suggesting inter-role conflict and dilemma over these role elements and prioritisation as 
a consequence. This also pointed to the UMP contesting past leader role interpretations.  
Foreign policy tradition in the PS' leader role interpretation 
 




The PS role element priorities and criticism of the government's leader role performance 
were also based on Gaullist foreign policy tradition. De Gaulle's key objective had been 
an independent role for France. Independence reasoning in the leader role was founded 
on his desire not to be dominated by the US but equal to it. To conduct an active and 
independent foreign policy, France had to emancipate itself from the US. As the country 
lacked other capabilities, the means to achieving independence was diversifying 
relations, never becoming dependent on one other actor, avoiding cooperation that could 
not be undone and acting as if France were a great power. It has to project grandeur. 
Moreover, in the 1960s, the means to this effect was nuclear power status, a precondition 
for the retreat from NATO and distance to the US. The PS' criticism of NATO involvement 
as harming France's uniqueness can thus be traced to the same foreign policy tradition 
as the government's activist leader role interpretation. French credibility was linked to 
its independence as the basis for its influence in the world (Interview with PS, May 2017). 
The European dimension is also based on Gaullist tradition, i.e. his conceptualisation of 
Europe as a tool for France's leader role, as a stepping stone for its global leader role 
(Aggestam 1999). European integration and the Franco-German alliance were also tools 
to emancipate France and reshape trans-Atlantic relations (Hoffmann 1974; Cerny 1980; 
Krotz 2015; Gordon 1993; Bozo 2016). 
In 2011, the PS argued that perceptions of closeness to the US and the weakening, 
through bypassing, of the EU as a global actor, had diminished France's leader role. It 
contested the successful enactment of the activist leader role without credible 
independence from US/NATO and focus on the European dimension. France's role ought 
to have been that of an ally rather than aligned as it would necessarily be perceived in 
the case of NATO involvement in Libya (Interview with PS, May 2017), echoing former 
PS foreign minister Hubert Védrine (1997-2002) (Krotz and Sperling 2011). The failure 
was dual: the EU's influence, and by extension, France's were reduced by NATO's 
command. This also harmed France's credibility as independent, in particular in the Arab 
World where support was crucial for the legitimacy of the military mission.  
The PCF's twist on the Gaullist foreign policy tradition  
The PCF also prioritised independence in its leader role interpretation. Arguably the 
party also source its leader role from the Gaullist foreign policy tradition. This suggests 
that de Gaulle's foreign policy reasoning had a lasting impact on foreign policy thinking 
(also confirmed in an interview with a former PCF official, May 2017). The relevance of 
 




Gaullist foreign policy tradition rather than a different source for the leader role 
conception, was evident in the assertion that France could regain a respectable and 
respected voice, implying that it once had one and lost it. (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5229)  
The PCF paired the independent leader role with a negotiator-mediator role. It asserted 
that only if France was perceived to be free from outside influence and from bias, via 
association with the US and NATO, can it enact a bridge role between conflict parties.  
The republican tradition underpinning the Universal-French values defender role 
One source of the Universal-French values defender role was the republican political 
tradition. This showed that role was distinct from the leader role, even if compatible. 
This tradition has experienced a revival since the 1970s. In his analysis of neo-
republicanism, Chabal (2015) notes two distinct, overlapping narratives. Transformative 
republicanism focuses on values from the French Revolution and their transformative 
power. Institutional republicanism is focused on the institutions associated with the 
Third Republic. The former is clearest in the values-based role expressions of the two 
parties. Remarkable is that the UMP and PS' role statements were near-interchangeable. 
Chabal proposes that the neo-republican revival has seen republican symbols become 
ubiquitous and consensual, merging in parts with the other times' rival Gaullist tradition. 
4.2. International norms in French parties' role interpretations 
Parties not only agreed on the leader role. There was also a consensus on the good 
international citizen role. Like the negotiator-mediator and Universal-French values 
defender roles, it complemented and lend the leader role credibility and respect. 
References to this role showed the importance of others recognising France as acting 
legitimately and an awareness that France's leader role acceptance by others hinged on 
this recognition. The presence of this role suggested that international norms and rules 
of behaviour were important in parties' role selection. It reinforced that such norms 
socialise domestic foreign policymakers into national roles and shape role conceptions. 
Expectations as to role performance exercise pressure on all states and, in particular, on 
those with the capabilities and seeking a leader role recognition. The socialising effects 
of international norms are felt through pressures to comply to general behaviour 
requirements for respected members of the international society and to special action of 
those aspiring and capable of leader role enactment. It is within this context that the need 
for legality (international law and UN mandate) and legitimacy (multilateral decision-
 




making and action) and the socialising effect of norms as specified (other actors) and 
unspecified (general rules) was discernible. The UMP anticipated criticism of 
government leader role performance when it stressed that France was not acting as part 
of ‘a disorganised and individual initiative.’ (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883) The good 
international citizen role, and in particular multilateral cooperation, also illustrate the 
importance of France's relations and position in the international system.  
Yet, there were also notable differences in international norms. Positions on such norms 
influenced the proposal of the national roles filling the leader role with purpose. The PCF 
proposed a negotiator-mediator role, as seen above. It did not support R2P, in particular, 
its third pillar. It rejected the other parties' humanitarian rhetoric advocating the use of 
force. It stressed norms of multilateralism and international law but viewed France as 
failing in its obligations, by supporting a global governance based on the law of the 
strongest and violating international law.  
The UMP and PS viewed the capacity and willingness to intervene militarily as part of 
the leader role. They were proponents of the Universal-French values defender role. The 
UMP repeatedly mentioned R2P. These references made the distinction between R2P 
and humanitarian intervention [ingérence humanitaire] and intervention [ingérence tout 
court] clear (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883). The PS only indirectly referenced it, mentioning 
2005 UNGA resolution 60/1 paragraph 138 (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225) R2P had not 
played a part in the party's deliberations, because R2P corresponded to the default 
French position and was part of France's UNSC membership duties (Interview with PS 
official, May 2017). The UMP and PS showed an acceptance or adherence to international 
norms that propose to intervene militarily to protect and save civilians. Such norms are 
widely shared in the international community and create an expectation toward states 
with the capacity to act to comply with them. This revealed the influence of international 
expectations whereby states with the capacity to act ought to take steps to achieve 
security and order.  The UMP and PS, aspiring for France to be recognised as a leader, 
came to accept, the need to comply with the expectations such norms create. It was 
within this normative context that the two parties stressed multilateralism as providing 
legitimacy and the UN mandate as the basis of the legality which military intervention 
necessitates to avoid accusations of self-interested actions. 
The two positions on the use of force reflect old tensions in political debate and a more 
recent shift. This re-connects the international norms influence on national roles to 
 




domestic political traditions. From the 1980s onward, devoir d'ingèrence (duty to 
interfere/intervene) or droit d'ingèrence (right to interfere/intervene), were topics of 
debate. A mixture of field practitioners and legal scholars, mostly associated with the left, 
initiated the debate and (re)-launched the concept in the 1980s (Bettati and Kouchner 
1987; Bettati 1991, 1996). It was conceptualised as an answer to the twentieth-century 
genocides and the ongoing of human rights violations, an emotional call to do something. 
When R2P was launched in 2005, initiators and proponents of the French concept argued 
that R2P was the successor of the French version which they viewed as the same as the 
Anglophone 'humanitarian intervention'. (Kouchner 2005; Bettati 2007)  
For the longest time, such ideas and an ethical foreign policy rhetoric did not have a 
major impact on French foreign policy decision-makers. This changed during Sarkozy's 
presidency. He appointed Bernard Kouchner, founder of Médécins sans Frontières and 
'co-inventor', as foreign minister. This appointment allegedly corresponded to Sarkozy's 
own beliefs, his closeness to US-neo-conservatism and his announced break with his 
predecessors' 'pragmatism' in relations with dictators and lack of activism.  
The PS and UMP concurring on the Universal-French values defender role suggest that 
the concept launched more than two decades ago has finally had an effect on the leader 
role, perhaps through its maturation into R2P in 2005. However, ethical foreign policy 
declarations raise questions about domestic politics. The next section turns to the 
ideologies underlying French national role conceptions and interpretations.  
4.3. Ideologies: common ground and difference between parties  
The final layer of ideas identified as relevant in the theoretical framework is ideologies. 
The narratives indicated that there were similarities and differences. Complicating the 
analysis, the three parties referenced similar political concepts: liberty and democracy. 
Even so, this chapter proposes that ideologies influence which tradition is drawn on, and 
which elements are prioritised, but also how parties engage with international norms. 
The Universal-French value defender role: making sense of consensus 
As noted the Universal-French value defender role can be traced to republican tradition. 
Yet, the consensus between the two mainstream parties was remarkable, despite this 
clear source, especially because the two parties contested the meaning of the leader role. 
Libya can be seen as ethical foreign policy – and as noted above R2P –arriving in decision-
making circles. Its narratives are based on claims of policies without alternatives and 
 




moral duty to 'save strangers' (Wheeler 2002). The idea that one/international 
community cannot stand had come to challenge and replace earlier norms of non-
interference and reframed sovereignty. The idea resonated with evolving frames about 
humanity (Finnemore 1996). In his analysis of ethical foreign policy, Chandler (2003) 
adds a domestic political dimension to the argument. He proposes that it became 
attractive, because, unlike domestic policy, its success or failure could not as easily be 
subject to scrutiny at domestic ballot boxes. He argues it is a symptom of political crisis, 
especially of ideas for domestic politics and of centre-left parties, that marked the end of 
communism and the 1990s. In this vacuum, seemingly apolitical ideas of care for a shared 
humanity and to do something that resonates emotionally made sense. Yet, these ideas 
were not apolitical. They emerged during the consolidation of a liberal consensus and 
that was only apolitical in the sense that it spread across the political spectrum and found 
adherents on the conservative right as well as the centre-left. 
How to make sense of this in the French context and in light of the late arrival of such 
narratives in decision-making circles? Chabal (2015) points out that neo-republicanism 
masks the understated, reviled, yet ubiquitous, liberalism in French political thinking. He 
suggests that the constant talk of crisis and reform, that lives along grand-standing, 
republican references, is liberalism. Chabal and Chandler on otherwise different points 
and contexts mirror each other. They both point to the ideology on which the values-
based role was based as likely being liberalism.  
This suggest that the role consensus needs to be interrogated. Does the difficulty to 
differentiate between the two parties on this point in this case suggest a form of role 
decontestation? Moreover, does it mask a deeper political crisis, and lack of ideas, at least 
of the two main parties of the time? With the benefits of hindsight, the difficulties these 
parties encountered in 2017 presidential and legislative elections, and the rise of a 
movement more aligned with liberal political ideas could confirm this.  
The PCF: solidarity, peace and reform of global governance 
The PCF's detailed and complex narrative of France's complicity in creating and 
escalating the situation in Libya through the roles it performed and that the PCF rejected 
revealed its worldview. It is based on an understanding of the world as interdependent. 
PCF prioritised the concept of solidarity (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1883). The solidarity 
sentiment was reiterated: 'The solidarity with the Libyan people demands the greatest 
determination for the bombing to end, for the NATO forces to retreat and for calling for 
 




an immediate multilateral ceasefire.' (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5229) The core concept of 
solidarity was paired with adjacent concepts such as cooperation, democracy, popular 
sovereignty, peace and liberation rather than liberty. These concepts showed a traditional 
left-wing, socialist ideology. Solidarity and cooperation point to an understanding of 
human nature as constituted and constitutive of human relations and equality between 
peoples. The belief in popular sovereignty and democracy derives from a conviction 
about an essential equality between human beings. (Freeden 2008; Heywood 2003) This 
worldview also linked back to the party's priorities and traditional interpretations of 
international law and norms of state sovereignty and non-interference. It lay beneath an 
analysis of the current international system and organisations as contributing to global 
inequalities, poverty in the Global South profiting the North, including France.  
The ideology in its analysis led to the PCF's proposal that France, given its capacities and 
continued respect in many countries (Interview May 2017), should enact its leader role 
to reform the global governance system, basing it on equality and solidarity. It also 
underpinned the PCF's proposal of non-intervention for fear of escalating the violence 
and suggestion of a French negotiator-mediator role. This was based on the reasoning 
that France had caused or aggravated the conflict via weapons' export, and on the belief 
that conflict is not solved by siding with one party but by creating negotiation channels.  
The PCF's ideology shown through its elected concepts in its narrative mattered to which 
international norms the party preferred and how it defined them. Ideology also mattered 
to the party's interpretation of the leader role. The PCF defined the role around the 
concept of solidarity with the Global South and peoples rather than the West and alliance 
partners. France had to be seen as acting and leading independently from the hegemon. 
Ideology was relevant to how the party viewed France's current role. In its analysis of 
actual role performance and in role interpretation, the PCF exhibited anti-Americanism. 
Linking ideology back to tradition; it proposed that the US is imposing a world order and 
its value system on others. Often framed as anti-imperialism; it was also apparent in the 
PCF's rejection of what it perceives to be France's current neo-colonial role performance.  
Conclusion 
This chapter traced French parties' foreign policy narratives and national role 
statements within. It established the causal reasoning of the parties on the events in 
North Africa and Libya and their thinking about how to address and resolve conflict. It 
noted a role consensus on the good international citizen and leader role. At the same 
 




time, the opposition parties' criticism of the government and rejection of intervention 
suggested that there was disagreement on the leader role performance and domestic 
role contestation. The chapter then proceeded to take a closer look at parties' leader role 
interpretations. It qualified them. The UMP proposed and argued France had enacted an 
activist leader role. The PS preferred an independent, European leader role while the PCF 
proposed a mediator-negotiator and UN reformer leader role. The chapter ended with the 
tracing of plausible sources for the role selection and role interpretations. This suggested 
that a Gaullist tradition underpinned the three parties' leader role choice. However, the 
election of different role elements also points to the possibility that these components 
are seen by some as in conflict with each other and posing dilemmas solved through 
prioritisation. The source analysis also showed parties' engagement with international 
norms and the relevance of ideologies in role selection and interpretation.  
The chapter contributed to foreign policy analysis of France a closer look at the assumed 
role consensus. It showed that the same foreign policy tradition can lead to variation in 
role interpretation. It pointed to the relevance of ideology and international norms for 
role socialisation and how the leader role is filled with purpose. The role consensus on 
the Universal-French values defender role and its foundation in republican political 
tradition and liberal ideology also led to the proposition that this role was decontested 
between the two major parties at the time, showing its (momentary) pervasiveness, but 
also pointing to its political nature and essential contestability.  
Finally, the differences between the parties, the opposition's criticism of the government 
in style, process and instruments may simply be opposition at work. However, the 
differences went beyond who was in government. It can be speculated that a PS- 
president and led government would have performed the leader role differently. It is 
likely that the PS would have put more stress on and an effort in finding a common 
European position and strategy. Such a government may have tried to work with 
Germany, at the expense of the Anglo-Saxons. Thus, while France would have plausibly 
still led the drafting of a UNSC resolution and perhaps even the military mission, it may 
have done so without being seen as non-cooperating and, thereby, harming the EU (and 
its own pretension to European leadership). Given the PS' criticism of the decision to 
deliver arms in breach of UNSC resolutions, it may also have refrained from such actions, 
as they were seen, as harming France's a good international citizen and leader credibility. 
 
 




Chapter 5: German parties’ national role conceptions 
This chapter adds to existing role theory studies of the German decision-making on Libya 
(e.g. Harnisch 2015; Beneš and Harnisch 2015; Koenig 2016; Oppermann 2012; 
Brummer and Oppermann 2017). It focuses on the controversies surrounding the dual 
decision not to participate and to abstain on the UNSC resolution 1973 vote. It also builds 
on the existing research that considers domestic and international contextual pressures 
on German foreign policy decision-making, in particular regarding military intervention. 
It adds an exploration of a domestic controversy, and of the ideas invoked and underlying 
it. As such, it is a study of German parties and their foreign policy. It draws out differences 
between parties on foreign policy by analysing parties' national role statements. 
This chapter finds that the parties disagreed on Germany's role, despite near consensus 
on the alliance partner role between the government and main opposition parties. 
German parties were divided over the dual decision regarding the UNSC resolution. The 
coalition parties were against participation and, in their view consequently, for 
abstention. Die Linke welcomed the decision, on different grounds. The SPD and Green 
Party criticised the decision to abstain, however, they remained internally divided over 
participation. This chapter shows that while parties largely agreed on Germany's role, 
confirming the strength of the alliance partner role, parties disagreed on national role 
interpretation. This suggests that role consensuses need closer scrutiny. 
The parties contested each other on the meaning of the alliance partner role in practice. 
There was intra-role contestation over this role, pointing to potential inter-role conflicts 
and dilemmas. The chapter qualifies the role to make sense of the differences. There was 
also inter-role contestation, as one party proposed the selection of an alternative role. 
The chapter aim was to uncover ideas underlying parties’ national role conceptions. The 
analysis of the sources of role interpretations suggested that there were differences in 
role socialisation and that foreign policy traditions were drawn from party-particular 
histories, and that ideology and international norms also mattered. 
Part 1 reviews existing role research on Germany with a focus on parties and military 
intervention, and the case of Libya. Part 2 traces narratives and part 3 identifies parties' 
national role statements. It qualifies national roles conceptions, proposing that parties 
interpreted them differently. It points to role contestation. Part 4 analyses the findings 
using the layered ideational theoretical framework. 
 




1. Role research in foreign policy analysis of Germany 
There is an abundance of role theory studies of German foreign policy. Until recently, 
role theorists focused on the state or elite level and stressed an elite consensus on the 
Germany national role, despite its considerable evolution since the end of the Cold War 
(e.g. Maull 1990, 2000b; Krotz 2001, 2015). More recent studies note that there is not 
necessarily a consensus and that German national roles can be contested and different 
actors select different national roles or rank their priority differently, often case by case 
(e.g. Oppermann 2012). The following literature review describes the commonly 
referenced German national role and role theory studies of the 2011 decisions on Libya.  
1.1. Civilian power role and evolving stances on military interventions  
Maull (1990) developed the concept of civilian power to describe Germany's evolution in 
the second half of the twentieth century. He argued that historical experiences restrained 
the state's use of military force, and led it to thrive for more international cooperation, 
interdependencies and legal rules. Maull (1990, 92–93) describes civilian power role as:  
[…] a) acceptance of necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of 
international objectives; b) the concentration of non-military, primarily economic, 
means to secure national goals, with military power left as residual instrument 
serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and c) a 
willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of 
international management. 
This national role conception was shaped in contrast to Germany's recent history of 
aggressive behaviour, and the pursuit of power and territory, since the second half of the 
nineteenth century. History is central to this role conception. It is a construct and product 
of a learning process (e.g. Maull 1990; Krotz 2015). The role conception and the alleged 
consensus 'culture of restraint' underlying it, explain why Germany did not return to its 
old pattern of goals and behaviour after regaining full sovereignty in the 1990s.  
Role theory's contribution to explaining German foreign policy is that neither the role 
selection of civilian power nor its continuity after reunification can be understood 
without a consideration of its relations and interactions without other states. The 
national role was selected in part due to the awareness of past roles and relations toward 
significant other states (Harnisch 2014; Beneš and Harnisch 2015). Létourneau and 
Räkel (1997) also stress the role of economic and political interdependencies Germany 
has entered as part of the European integration process and international institutions. 
 




They argue that this focus was part of avoiding the perception of isolation and to reassure 
neighbouring states of German intentions by cultivating relations and building trust.  
The civilian power role also has an international dimension. Létourneau and Räkel 
(1997) propose that the role focuses on solving global problems and addressing 
collective security challenges. This led to dilemmas after reunification. The 1990s shifts 
on participation in military interventions challenged elements of the civilian power role. 
While such military missions still required a legal basis in international law and a 
multilateral cooperation framework, i.e. Germany would not act alone, some argued that 
they are contrary to the civilian power role and the stress on other, non-military means 
of foreign policy behaviour. Every case of German real or possible participation 
engenders legal debates and raises the usual questions of whether Germany finally 
'normalising' and whether it is still a civilian power.  
To be sure, decisions to use of military force without UN mandate raise serious questions. 
Addressing this essential question, Maull (2000a, 2000b) concluded that after the 1999 
watershed Kosovo decision to participate in an intervention Germany was still a civilian 
power. He argued that the role conception allowed for such a shift to forceful behaviour, 
so long as the embeddedness in international law and multilateralism role elements 
remained intact. Others concurred that Germany's master role remains civilian power 
and that there still is widespread consensus on it. Krotz (2015, 62–63) recently wrote:  
Central domestically anchored German role components include (1) the notion of 
"never on our own"; (2) promotion of an increasingly precise legal framing of 
international relations and support for broadening the legitimacy of the 
international order; and (3) a generally restrictive attitude toward the use of 
military force, particularly by individual states. 
The civilian power role conception builds on culturalist assumptions and the claim that 
the past shapes a widely shared culture on which there is a consensus. The room for 
inclusion of essentially contrasting positions on the central issue of the use of military 
force, raises the question of the analytical usefulness of the concept. If the civilian power 
role can accommodate these disparate policy practices, is it surprising that analysist note 
a domestic consensus on this national role? The 2011 case of Libya and the controversies 
over German decision-making promise to cast new light on this.   
1.2. Role theory and the 2011 case of Libya 
Studies of German foreign decision-making surrounding the 2011 Libya intervention do 
not spare the domestic level. Explanations focus on the foreign minister, domestic 
 




motivations and the last-minute-timing of Germany's partners' decision-making, and the 
constraints this posed to German foreign policy-making. The foreign minister had 
incentives, given the public's scepticism toward German participation in military 
interventions, immanent regional elections and poor polling results for his party. He had 
reason to believe that his stance and decisions would be well received by the public. Such 
explanations substantiate claims that German foreign policy is becoming politicised, with 
domestic matters taking precedence over accommodating or managing the pressures of 
alliance partners (Oppermann 2012). Explanations focused on timing suggest that the 
timeline and information-sharing were crucial to the decision to abstain. The German 
government was taken aback by the speed by which France and the UK came up with the 
UNSC resolution and Germany was informed too late of the US decision not to veto it. 
This meant that there was not enough time to debate the issue of German participation 
in parliament (Brockmeier 2013; Harnisch 2015).  
There are many state-level analyses. They explain the dual decision by reference to 
culture or identity and try to assess whether it was a political failure or the legal decision 
or to establish the impact on German reputation (e.g. Katsioulis 2011; Rühl 2011; Stahl 
2012; Pradetto 2014). A number of other analyses focus on the domestic level. Such 
studies provide important insights into the plurality of audiences (domestic and 
international) and issues to consider (other than foreign policy) and the relevance of a 
mandatory parliamentary process on decision-making rapidity and autonomy of the 
government. Moreover, the question is raised if decision-making on Libya constituted 
continuity or whether it signalled change and was an out-of-the-ordinary case, given 
Germany's non-alignment with allies. Some stress that the decisions followed a pattern 
(Daase and Junk 2012). Thus, like every decision on the use of force since the 1990s, it 
raised the questions: was this change toward 'normalisation' or was it continuity?  
Role theory studies of the 2011 Libya case note a lack of elite role consensus. Koenig 
(2016) observes role contestation over whether Germany ought to have voted in favour 
as part of its commitment to multilateralism and whether such a decision would have 
permitted a choice on participation. She notes criticism and debate over whether the 
decision was right that went beyond party and bureaucratic lines. She argues that the 
decision can be explained via domestic political needs and incentives, given the low 
approval rates of the foreign minister, the chancellor’s party division and her lack of firm 
positioning. Koenig further suggests that the US’ late volte-face explains the coalition’s 
decision-making and role performance, despite these parties' traditional Atlanticism.  
 




Koenig's study provides insights into the domestic political environment and incentives 
in 2011. However, she overestimates the incentives and fails to take into account the 
FPD’s consistent positioning on the use of force. Harnisch (2015) reasons that the 
electoral incentives arguments do not hold. Chancellor Merkel had guaranteed alliance 
partners that Germany would vote in favour of the resolution, should its passing depend 
on the German vote. Moreover, public attention was on the Eurozone crisis and the 
nuclear catastrophe in Japan, and, thus, little advantage could be expected from an anti-
interventionist stance in this case. Hansel and Oppermann’s (2014) counterfactual 
analysis further proposes that the electoral interests of the FDP are not sufficient to 
explain the decisions to abstain and not to participate. They argue that the foreign 
minister and his party’s position was consistent with their position on the Arab Spring 
more broadly. Moreover, the party's scepticism regarding outside intervention can be 
traced to other cases. It mirrors a long-standing position on the use of force. The foreign 
minister's restraint was founded on his declared personal convictions and the party's 
foreign policy tradition. Hansel and Oppermann suggest that intra-party and coalition 
politics did not matter to the outcome and conclude that the decision was not taken out 
of immediate electoral incentives. Finally, Oppermann (2012) argues that the decision-
making on Libya was part of a trend. German foreign policy is normalising and 
politicising. The traditional national role is gradually eroding and no new master role has 
yet emerged. Oppermann notes that parties proposed different national roles and that 
the coalition enacted a normal alliance partner role (Brummer and Oppermann 2017).  
The existing role theory studies of the dual Libya decision-making show that domestic 
factors and actors were relevant in the national role selection, and that role contestation 
took place. Thus, this chapter starts from the expectation of difference between parties, 
within a possible consensus on the civilian power master role, given its breadth and 
malleability. It adds to these studies an assessment of national role consensus and the 
role contestation between parties. It explores variation within the civilian power master-
role and the alliance partner role expected in a case calling for military intervention. 
While most role theorists observing these roles describe party differences on military 
intervention policy means and practice, and a gradual evolution on the issue, they do not 
look at parties and, in particular, opposition parties' role selection nor at what parties 
mean when they express the same role. 
 




2. German parties' narratives and agreement on the national role 
Parties agreed over role elements in the context of the decision-making on Libya. They 
consented on the need for international legality and cooperation. This indicated the 
continued relevance of the civilian power role and its elements or at least vocabulary. 
Part 2 traces the foreign policy narratives on the uprisings and the Libyan conflict.  
There was an agreement between all parties that Germany needs to act within the 
framework of international law and in cooperation with other states. They all stressed 
the centrality of multilateralism and cooperating with European and other partners. 
The foreign minister stated: 'We stand on the side of international law.' (Westerwelle 
(FDP) 2011, 11137) The coalition parties noted that the UNSC resolution provided the 
necessary legality for Germany to even debate the issue. (Stinner (FDP) 2011c, 11148; 
Polenz (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11142–43) The agreement on these civilian power role 
elements suggests that there was an agreement on a good international citizen role, as 
Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) describe it.  
There was also consensus between CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD and Green Party that Germany 
ought to perform the alliance partner role. They agreed that this role performance was 
expected of Germany by its alliance partners. Die Linke did not agree on this role and 
rejected such role expectations. The difference on which national role to select and, 
within the same role selection, how to interpret it and enact it led to role contestation 
within one role (intra-role) and between different roles (inter-role).  
To identify the national role statements as part of reasoning on the situation and events 
in Libya, this chapter traces the foreign policy narratives. These revealed that parties 
agreed on the situation and on the need to condemn the Libyan regime's violent 
reaction. They also agreed that Gaddafi had to go but disagreed on how and under what 
conditions. (Ströbele (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 10478; Gloser (SPD) 2011a, 
10484; Hoff (FDP) 2011, 11477; Stinner (FDP) 2011d, 11477)  
The major differences were about the conclusions on how to react. Yet, there were also 
subtle differences in how the parties reasoned about the uprisings and the conflict. In 
these narratives, parties expressed different interpretations of the alliance partner role 
or proposed alternative national roles. This role interpretation variation can help to 
understand the differences in policy preference and the criticism directed at the 
coalition government. It also represented domestic role contestation.  
 




2.1. The governing parties' foreign policy narratives 
FDP and CDU/CSU agreed that the Arab uprisings were a positive development and a 
historic moment. The foreign minister and colleagues drew parallels to Germany. The 
foreign minister (2011, 10814) noted:  
North Africa and the Arab World are going through a historic break. The freedom 
movement that began as jasmine revolution in Tunisia has reached many other 
states. As democrats, we stand on the side of democrats. We Germans had the luck 
of a peaceful revolution in our own country that led to reunification and the 
unification of Europe. Our country is built on the values of liberty. It is these 
values that now millions of people in North Africa and the Arab World demand. 
As the German Federal Republic, we will support these peoples. The longing for 
liberty is not limited to one culture, one region or even one religion. It is wrong 
belief that there are cultures in which human beings can be unfree indefinitely. 
There is no culture of non-liberty. 
The two parties agreed that these uprisings were demands for liberty and democratic 
transformation and participation, about dignity and justice (Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 
2011c, 10821; Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10815). 
The CDU/CSU was also cautious about the uprisings bringing only positive change. 
Some MPs noted that the question had also to be whose liberty and more attention 
ought to be paid to the identity and demands of the protesters. In particular religious' 
freedoms, women's rights and the threat of radicalisation were concerns the party 
expressed as part of its uprising narrative. (Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 10821; 
Mißfelder (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10826) 
Democratic transformation support and partner, and trade partner roles 
The coalition parties proposed and selected a democratic transformation support and 
partner role and trade partner role to the North African states (Westerwelle, (FDP) 
2011, 10816). They suggested that Germany had already started enacting them. One 
CDU/CSU MP noted:  
[...] the leading role the government has taken to support the historic 
transformation in the Arab World in the last weeks. The transformation 
partnership with Tunisia and Egypt initiative successfully by Germany is an 
example for cooperation with other states [...]. (Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 
10821) 
The democratic support and trade partner roles were not about the decisions on Libya. 
Yet, they provided insights into the alternative national roles these parties advocated. 
They revealed how these parties understood the causes of the uprisings which they 
 




viewed as escalated into violent conflict in Libya, and how to best support them. Finally, 
they showed how the coalition parties viewed Germany's role in a future Libya. The 
democratic transition and support role was premised on the recognition of democracy 
building is anchored in civil society and takes time. The parties stressed that Germany 
was taking the initiative and leading on proposals of a new EU neighbourhood policy that 
needed to be conditioned on progress on democratisation, human rights, the rule of law 
and combating corruption. The uprisings were framed as a new start for relations with 
North African partners. German support was listed be political, economic, financial and 
humanitarian. While the parties stressed that this was a common EU role, they also 
argued that Germany ought to perform a leader role, not to leave the EU's North Africa 
policy to former colonial powers. The parties stressed that Germany could play a positive 
role in bringing about peace and prosperity via support with institutional and 
constitutional reforms, and supporting self-help and agency in these states rather than 
dictated changes. The parties also recognised that mistakes had been made in the past 
and Germany's role performance had been lacking. It had prioritised stability and 
authoritarian regimes' support in combating violent extremism and terrorism over 
people's welfare. (Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10816; Hoyer (secretary of state, foreign 
ministry, FDP)) 2011, 10469; Selle (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10483; Fischer (CDU/CSU) 2011, 
10486; Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011a, 10477, 2011c, 10821; Mißfelder (CDU/CSU) 
2011, 10826, 10827; Götzer (CDU/CSU) 2011a, 10480, 2011b, 10831) 
The two parties identified the German political foundations10 as key to enacting this role. 
These institutions are linked to the main parties. The coalition parties suggested that 
they could provide support to expand civil society and democratic structures, for 
example, help prepare elections and build party structures. Already present in these 
states, the foundations already have contacts and networks. (Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 
10816; Schuster (FDP) 2011, 10830; Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 10821; Fischer 
(CDU/CSU) 2011, 10486; Götzer (CDU/CSU) 2011b, 10831) 
The coalition parties coupled a trade partner role with this democracy support/partner 
role. This role reflected the reasoning in the two parties' narratives that the uprisings 
were not only calling for liberty, democracy, and dignity but caused by economic 
insecurity. Indeed, this understanding of the uprising was shared across parties (Schmidt 
                                                          
10 CDU/CSU's Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, SPD's Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, FDP's Friedrich Nauman 
Stiftung, Die Linke's Rosa Luxemburg, and the Green Party's Heinrich Böll Stiftung.  
 




(Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 10825–26). From the government parties' perspective, 
the EU had to open its markets for trade and economic cooperation to help create 
employment in these states. This was framed as a chance for North Africa and for 
Germany. A belief in mutual benefits of free trade underpinned this national role 
proposal and interpretation. It meant that the role was in line with a value and interest-
based foreign policy, these parties advocate. (Kopp (FDP) 2011, 10483–84; Schuster 
(FDP) 2011, 10830; Hoyer (secretary of state, foreign ministry, FDP)) 2011, 10469) The 
foreign minister noted:  
This is also a chance for Germany. If these societies develop in freedom all their 
creativity and talent, the new middle classes of North Africa can become our 
partner, our economic partners. In return, we can improve the economic chances 
of these people through investments and trade. (Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10816) 
The coalition parties' conflict and intervention narratives 
The democratic support and trade partner roles could not immediately be enacted able 
vis-à-vis Libya. The coalition parties' narratives on Libya differed from that on the Arab 
uprisings. Yet, the viewed the conflict as the escalation of an uprising that had been 
caused by similar demands as in other North African/Arab states. The government 
parties raised risks and uncertainty of success as the reasons for their restraint and the 
decision not to participate in a military intervention. MPs referred to the conflict as a 
civil war and the result of Gaddafi's violent reaction to the uprising. He warned that a 
no-fly zone was not as harmless as it sounded: 'Its implementation means a military 
operation and the first step toward a probable extended military engagement. The 
implication into the Libyan civil war would almost certainly be the consequence.' 
(Stinner (FDP) 2011b, 10823) The risk of loss of civilian lives as a result of military 
intervention was also raised. Lessons from past interventions were noted as part of the 
decision-making process (Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11138). In sum, the FDP backed the 
assessment of the foreign minister that the risks outweighed the benefits.  
The CDU/CSU's narratives resembled that of the FDP. A difference lay in its support for 
the military intervention, despite the noted risks and uncertainties. The party was less 
against the intervention as such and was more concerned with German participation, 
conditioning it on regional support for and participation in it. This showed that, unlike 
its coalition partner, the CDU/CSU viewed intervention as a possible precursor for a 
political solution and settlement as part of a declared, common goal, marking a central 
difference to the FDP's approach to the situation and events in Libya. 
 




The coalition parties' narratives and the reasoning they expressed formed part of these 
parties' alliance partner role interpretation, as will be discussed further in this chapter. 
2.2. SPD and Green Party narratives on the uprisings and Libya 
Like the coalition parties, the SPD and Green Party viewed the uprisings as based on 
calls for liberty, justice and democratic participation. The historic moment symbolised 
progress. One SPD MP stated that the uprisings were the Middle East's people's 'pursuit 
of liberty, justice, but also social progress. […] perhaps unusual and surprising, they are 
also fighting for universal human rights.' (Gloser (SPD) 2011b, 10827) Like the 
government parties, SPD and Green Party MPs expressed support for the changes. One 
Green Party MP noted: 'We are witnesses to historic change. Millions of people in the 
Arab World are standing up against oppression and against corrupt leaders. These 
people fight at the risk of their lives for liberty and democracy. We owe them all our 
respect and solidarity.' (Schmidt (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 10824)  
The two parties agreed with the government that it was Germany's role to support these 
transformations and that help should be offered for self-help. They also identified the 
central role political foundations could play in building civic and political institutions. 
Some key terms were international community unity and cooperation. These parties 
also identified key issues underlying the uprisings, other than the nature of the regimes, 
as being lack of economic growth, unemployment and trade conditions. The SPD and 
Green Party, like the coalition government, also addressed past mistakes in Germany's 
and EU relations with these states such as trade conditions and support for dictators for 
stability. They went further in criticising EU policy as a contributing factor to poverty 
and unemployment in the region in upheaval but also suggested that new relations 
would be mutually beneficial. Yet, this criticism did not make a direct link between the 
economic and social conditions in the region, and the uprisings. The demand for 
democratic participation and liberty were seen as the key motivator. 
The Libyan conflict and intervention narratives echoed the uprising narrative of the 
SPD. One MP noted that the priority was a civilian and peaceful solution to the conflict 
and, as part of this, that it was important for the international community to remain 
united. He argued that unity was an instrument to exert influence. He contested the 
foreign minister's rejection of the no-fly-zone tool, arguing that as part of remaining 
united as an international community, all UN Charter sanctioned instruments should 
stay on the table. (Mützenich (SPD) 2011a, 10819) When prompted to provide a clear 
 




position on the dual decision Germany had faced, the SPD's MPs avoided answers by 
pointing to divisions on the issue in other parties and the difficult nature of decisions 
on military intervention. One MP argued that voting in favour of UNSC resolution 1973 
could have led to change in the behaviour of the Libyan regime, thus, prevented the 
eventual use of force (Mützenich (SPD) 2011b, 11139–41). Another MP explicitly 
supported the resolution and the intervention (Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) 2011, 11145). 
These positions showed some support for the use of force and Germany's participation 
in the military intervention. They suggested that the use of force was seen by some as a 
precondition for finding a civilian solution to the violent conflict, i.e. that it would force 
the regime to surrender or to the negotiating table. Yet, these statements were also 
indicative of intra-party division on the issue of intervention in Libya. This mirrors a 
history of party division and unease over Germany's use of force, but potentially also an 
awareness of public opinion's reluctance and restraint on German use of force. Yet, it 
was in this reasoning, the SPD's alliance partner role interpretation became apparent. 
The Green Party's conflict narrative also echoed its view of the causes of the uprisings. 
The noted difference was the violent reaction of Gaddafi's regime to peaceful protests. 
The party supported non-violent measures to stop the conflict. However, it accepted 
that there needed to be a discussion on legitimate uses of force as an instrument to stop 
the violent reaction of the regime. Thus, the intervention narrative proposed that while 
non-violent tools of intervention were to be preferred. It was possible to end the conflict 
using force from outside. One MP noted that a discussion about a no-fly-zone was right, 
especially because the Arab League had called for it, despite scepticism over the actual 
implementation and its effects on the ground (Schmidt (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 
10825). After UNSC resolution 1973 passed, another MP lent Green Party support for it 
and recalled the dilemma between risks of military intervention and not intervening, 
when a dictator threatens to murder civilian populations (Künast (Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen) 2011). Aside from revealing reasoning about the causes of the uprisings and 
the conflict, the narratives showed a recognition of the dilemma posed by the use of 
force. The initially tentative positioning on intervention was also indicative of internal 
divisions and inner-personal struggles over the contested issue. Yet, the timing of some 
statements also suggested the importance of others' decisions and behaviour in the 
party's positioning. It was indicative of its alliance partner role interpretation. 
 




2.3. Die Linke's narratives on the Arab uprisings and the Libyan conflict 
Die Linke also viewed the Arab uprisings as calls for freedom and democracy, but for 
social justice too. One MP stressed Germany's negative role in the region and argued 
that Germany was partly responsible for the oppressive regimes because it had backed, 
supported and made deals with them (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011b, 10821). The MP also 
noted that German policies contributed to the food price rises that meant that many 
people could no longer afford food and that as part of Germany's future role enactment, 
this had to change, alongside internal transformations of the Arab countries (Gehrcke 
(Die Linke) 2011b, 10823). There was a clearer link made between German and EU 
policies and the causes of the uprisings. The ability to make such links could have been 
indicative of the party's absence from federal coalitions rather than other parties' lack 
of recognition of such links, to be explored later in this chapter.  
Die Linke's conflict narrative built on different reasoning on the causes of the uprisings. 
The party argued that Germany was already responsible for escalating the conflict 
because it had supported the regime through arms trade deals, as recent as the last 
legislative period under the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition. The party's intervention narrative 
also went further than the other opposition parties'. Mirroring in parts some FDP MPs, 
Die Linke representatives called the intervention a 'war'. The parliamentary group 
deputy leader clarified what a no-fly-zone meant and would lead to: 'This war 
engagement is wrong. It will lead to more bloodshed and bring more suffering and 
destruction to Libya.' (Van Aken (Die Linke) 2011, 11145) Through these narratives, 
Die Linke revealed its conception of Germany's past role. It rejected any form of the use 
of force as complicity for civilian death. The tracing of the narratives and identification 
of national role statements further exposed the party's alternative role proposal to the 
alliance partner. The chapter now turns to the parties' role statements within these 
narratives.  
3. German parties’ national role interpretations and contestation 
Within the above narratives, there was a near consensus on the alliance partner role. 
This part describes and qualifies this national role conception. It unpacks the apparent 
role consensus and notes role contestation. It identifies role elements and hierarchies. 
Rather than qualify the role parties selected as the normal alliance partner, it proposes 
that the coalition parties defined a responsible alliance partner while the SPD and Green 
Party stressed a unity and loyal alliance partner. As noted above, the coalition parties 
 




complemented the alliance partner role with a trade and democratic transition partner 
role. These parties' role statements were about the region rather than focused on Libya. 
The FDP added a negotiator role to address the situation in Libya. Finally, Die Linke 
proposed a negotiator-mediator role as an alternative to the alliance partner role. This 
part ends on the forms of role contestation identified.  
3.1. The coalition's responsible and supportive alliance partner role  
The coalition parties agreed that Germany was enacting the alliance partner role and 
even a leader role. The two parties stressed that Germany was quick to support the 
uprisings and to initiate clear positions as an EU and UNSC member. Sanctions were 
noted as a Germany success. ‘We took action in our hands and were not influenced by 
member states with their own agenda.’ (Schuster (FDP) 2011, 10829; similar lines of 
reasoning Stinner (FDP) 2011a, 10482; Hoyer (secretary of state, foreign ministry, 
FDP)) 2011, 10469; Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10815)  
The two parties' role statements further suggest that they interpreted the alliance 
partner role as an independent, responsible, and supportive alliance partner.  They 
stressed that Germany had to take independent decisions. One CDU/CSU MP remarked:  
Alliance does not mean that German has to participate in all NATO missions. Else 
we would not need a parliamentary vote on this matter and could say: NATO in 
Brussels decides all this and we will participate. (Polenz (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11145) 
Independent decisions were viewed as essential for a sovereign/self-determined state.  
Moreover, Germany had to act responsibly. The government parties emphasised the 
lack of information and clarity on the situation in Libya. They expressed concern over 
the success of any military intervention limited to a no-fly zone. Their assessment was 
based on past experience and lesson learning. (Götzer (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 11151; Polenz 
(CDU/CSU) 2011, 11142–43, 11145; Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011b, 10476) The two 
parties, thus, concluded that restraint was the responsible decision.  
Key elements of this role interpretation were consistency or coherence and credibility. 
They were indicative of others' perceptions and possible role expectations. The FDP and 
the CDU/CSU argued that German credibility relied on not being perceived as selective 
and acting on self-interest, referring to the natural resources in Libya. (Westerwelle 
(FDP) 2011, 11138; Polenz (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11142–43) A CDU/CSU MP noted that 
Germany's interests in the region were not met via participation in military 
intervention, while the foreign minister was concerned with how Germany would be 
 




viewed if it changed position last-minute. Rather than increase the image of reliability 
as an alliance partner, it would diminish it, as Germany would be perceived as a follower 
(Interview with former FDP MP, June 2017). Equally, the coalition parties were 
concerned with consistency and coherence of argumentation on the UNSC resolution. 
They argued that if Germany was not participating in the intervention, it was 
consequential not to vote in favour. They recognised the legality of the operation but 
argued that it was not befitting of Germany's status to vote in favour and not participate. 
(Stinner (FDP) 2011c, 11147,11148; CDU/CSU-Fraktion 2011) 
The two parties were not against military intervention. In part, their positioning can be 
read as an attempt not to criticise Germany's alliance partners. However, it was also 
consistent with these parties' principled support of military operations under certain 
conditions. The CDU/CSU was most willing to participate and kept the option open, the 
chancellor allegedly open to German participation in the later stages of the operations 
(Harnisch 2015). The party welcomed the operation. Its main precondition for any 
German action was for Arab and African states to first take responsibility for a conflict 
situation in their region. (Polenz (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11144) Equally, the foreign minister 
made regional support for and participation in the intervention a condition. Yet, the FDP 
was more sceptical of the potential for success of the operation and less inclined to 
agree to German participation. MPs kept stressing the risks and impact on the Arab 
World. (Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11138) 
The two parties struggled for Germany not to be perceived as moving away from alliance 
partnership. They stressed that the abstention vote was not a vote against Germany's 
partners: ‘[t]he abstention was not a turn away from the goals of the West [...]. Germany 
stands in solidarity with its alliance partners, who are fulfilling the mandate [...].' 
(CDU/CSU-Fraktion 2011) One FDP MP stressed Germany’s loyalty (Bündnistreue), given 
the German soldiers active every year in the world. (Hoff (FDP) 2011, 11478) Equally, 
the parties stressed the legality of UNSC resolution 1973 and the military operation. They 
noted that the government shared the goals and expressed respect for the alliance 
partners who had come to different conclusions in their assessments of the situation. 
Further suggesting the relevance of significant other alter-role perceptions in the parties' 
statements, they also noted that the alliance partners had expressed understanding and 
respect for Germany's decisions. (Stinner (FDP) 2011c, 11147–49; Merkel (CDU/CSU) 
2011, 11251; Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11138)  
 




Complementing this role interpretation, the coalition parties viewed Germany's role 
enactment as supportive the alliance partner. The parties stressed that the abstention 
vote was not ‘neutrality’ or inaction. Germany was assuming its responsibilities. The 
government was communicating with and providing support for allies. It reinforced its 
presence in Afghanistan to allow EU and NATO partners more flexibility for the mission 
in Libya. (CDU/CSU-Fraktion 2011; but also Götzer (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 11152; 
Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11138–39; Stinner (FDP) 2011c, 11147–49; Djir-Sarai (FDP) 
2011, 11488) At the same time, Germany was providing non-military support, allowing 
partners to use German bases and not voting against the operation within NATO. 
(Bundesregierung 2011a, 2011b; Stinner (FDP) 2011c, 11149) 
3.2. The SPD and Green Party's united and loyal alliance partner and the 
human rights defender 
The SPD and the Green Party expressed early support for the government's decision and 
its initial role enactment. In February, one SPD MP noted that the events were an 
opportunity for Germany to play a stabilising role in the region (Mützenich (SPD) 2011a, 
10821). The party largely shared the government’s assessment and restraint, given the 
lack of information. It long argued for a peaceful solution without rejecting other options  
(Mützenich (SPD) 2011a, 10819). Like the coalition parties, it viewed the responsibility 
for addressing the situation with the regional organisations and states. (Interview with 
former SPD MP, June 2017) Likewise, the Green Party welcomed the government's 
efforts to perform a leader role on sanctions and the implication of the International 
Court of Justice. It stressed the risk of escalation and of a no-fly zone. (Ströbele (Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen) 2011, 10479; Trittin 2011b, 2011a; Koenigs 2011)  
The SPD alliance partner role statements suggested that it viewed the role as a united 
alliance partner. The party remained unclear on whether it favoured Germany 
participation, admitting intra-party division (a point stressed during an interview with a 
former MP, June 2017). EU and international community determination and unity were 
important to the party, noting that unity was a policy tool for influence on global events 
(Gloser (SPD) 2011b, 10828; Mützenich (SPD) 2011a, 10819) The contentious point 
regarding the UNSC resolution vote was the deviation from a united position. Germany 
ought to have voted in favour, because there was no legal automatism to participate 
thereafter (interview in June 2017: note as the opinion of senior diplomats), to show 
 




unity. The SPD also criticised the lack of EU unity. The party argued that the abstention 
was the basis for the lack of a common EU position. One SPD MP asked:  
On which side do you want to stand in the UNSC? Do you want to be on the side 
of the ten states including three Europeans, three Africans and one Arab who 
voted in favour? I think you should have pointed to this dilemma [...] He 
[Westerwelle] said: we cannot intervene everywhere. But he did not answer why 
the government did not want to draw a conclusion (interruption) to want to be 
on the side of the majority in the UNSC. [...] Our problem, the problem of Germany, 
is that there is no common European position any more. (Interruption) We did 
not manage to keep all European states together. [...] The question of national 
sovereignty does not follow from how we perhaps decide on different questions 
in the UNSC (Interruption). National sovereignty follows from how we justify 
having diverged from our European partners. (Interruption) [...]  (Mützenich 
(SPD) 2011b, 11140–41) 
The concern with unity and being perceived to be united with alliance partners and EU 
members were indicative of the importance of others perceptions of German role play. 
Further, it showed that the SPD viewed Germany as responsible for EU unity, despite 
others also defecting from the Franco-British position. This was indicative of an 
underlying European unifier or unity, and perhaps a regional leader role conception. The 
abstention vote was not compatible with the SPD's alliance partner role interpretation. 
The party directly contested the role enactment and interpretation of the coalition. 
The Green Party's alliance role interpretation was similar. However, it appeared to 
prioritise solidarity and loyalty over unity. Thus, the party proposed a loyal alliance 
partner role. It was a nuanced, marked difference to the SPD. The Green Party was clearer 
in its support for the military intervention and in its criticism of non-participation. While 
it was initially hesitant, once UNSC resolution 1973 passed, it criticised the abstention as 
not standing on the 'right side' and risking Germany be perceived as not standing up for 
human rights. The party viewed the absence of European unity as de-solidarisation 
(Entsolidarisierung) and as an example of German exceptionalism (Sonderweg) 
(interview, June 2017). In the Green Party's alliance partner interpretation, the relevance 
of others' perceptions of German decision-making and actions was clear. It suggested 
that Germany's role enactment had damaged its reputation as a reliable alliance partner. 
The party defined this as acting alongside key partners, on the 'right side'. Thus, the 
Green Party contested the alliance partner role play and interpretation of the coalition. 
The SPD and Green Party complemented their alliance partner role interpretations with 
a human rights defender role. While the coalition parties expressed support for human 
rights and showed care for the safety of civilians in their narratives and role statements, 
 




they did not explicitly define Germany's role as human rights defender in this case. As 
mentioned, they stressed transformation supporter and trade partner roles instead. The 
two opposition parties, however, expressed a more muscular support for human rights. 
One Green Party MP asked early on asked whether the Libyan regime's violence 
constituted mass murder or genocide (Nouripouri (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 
10358). The two parties kept all options on the table, despite risk recognition. After UNSC 
resolution 1973 passed, the two parties' support for an intervention increased. MPs from 
the two parties referenced R2P in their statements. The expressed support was again 
indicative of the significance of others' perceptions of Germany, as being part of a value-
based community. The two parties' MPs expressed surprise and shame. The Green Party 
co-leader noted that the foreign minister ought to be seen to fight for human rights. 
(Künast (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 11149–50) One SPD MP argued that abstaining 
implied accepting human rights violations and that Germany had failed to perform 
credibly a human rights defender/supporter role. (Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) 2011, 11146; 
Wieczorek-Zeul 2011) Like the united and loyal alliance partner role interpretations 
challenged the coalition parties' role interpretation, the proposal of the human rights 
defender role was an additional contestation of the governments' role performance.  
3.3. The FDP and Die Linke's negotiator and mediator role proposals 
The FDP and Die Linke also expressed a negotiator-mediator role. This role conception 
differentiated the FDP from its coalition partner. The CDU/CSU was open to intervention 
and one MP had indicated that one could not negotiate with the Libyan regime (Selle 
(CDU/CSU) 2011, 10483). FDP MPs consistently stressed a non-violent role for Germany. 
This spanned from the democratic transition supporter and trade partner roles to 
actively pursuing dialogue with states in conflict, to advocate ‘national dialogue, to find 
national solutions and through foreign troops.’ (Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11138) MPs 
noted that Germany was enacting a leader role to de-escalate violence and find a peaceful 
solution in Libya (Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10815; Schuster (FDP) 2011, 10829). 
Likewise, Die Linke proposed a similar alternative national role for Germany. Like other 
parties, it noted the negative past roles Germany had performed. It stressed that double-
standards had damaged Germany's reputation and credibility. (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 
2011a, 10477–78) One MP argued that ‘[...] we are responsible for these regimes [...] we 
held their hands, we made deals with them.’ (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011b, 10822) Instead, 
the party argued that Germany ought to perform a negotiator and mediator role:  
 




We have to think what the alternative to military and war could be [...] 
negotiating, mediating between the civil war parties [...]. That is not easy but that 
could be a role for Germany to get this through in the UNSC. Mediation is in such 
a situation better than have people shoot at each other. Those who really want to 
save people need to plead for mediation. (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011b, 10822) 
The party further suggested that Germany ought to become a leader in these roles. It '‘[...] 
should take the initiative to find a negotiated solution in Libya.’ (Gehrcke 2011) Die 
Linke, thus, paired its negotiator-mediator role proposal for Germany with a leader role. 
While its role selection was consistent with Germany's master civilian power role, it was 
not compatible with the alliance partner role. The party contested this role selection and 
its performance, as part of its principled rejection of military intervention as a foreign 
policy tool. Die Linke criticised the coalition for its continued cooperation with NATO and 
the permission to use German bases for the Libyan mission. (Van Aken (Die Linke) 2011, 
11146) Thus, the party contested the form and type of Germany’s alliance partnerships 
(interview June 2017 with one Die Linke MP).  
In sum, part 3 showed that parties' role statements remained within the framework of 
the civilian power master role. However, their role selection and interpretations within 
differed considerably, adding to suggestions that this role's analytical use is debatable. 
Moreover, the variation in interpretation of the alliance partner role and the intra-role 
contestation of its meaning in practice further suggest that alleged role consensus needs 
to be unpacked. Finally, proposed alternative roles that can contest (Die Linke) or appear 
to be compatible (FDP) with the alliance partner role suggests the occurrence of inter-
role contestation. The consensus between Die Linke, who lacks federal government 
decision experience, and FDP on an alternative role suggests that it is a viable option. 
4. Source of the variation of role interpretations and contestation 
The final part of this chapter explores the foundations for parties' role selection, 
interpretation and contestation. It begins with the foreign policy traditions evident in the 
role selections and variation in role interpretation. It shows the importance and use of 
international norms in parties' role conceptions and contestation. It ends on the 
relevance of the ideological dimension. 
4.1. Foreign policy tradition in the selected German roles  
The first notable tradition was that of the civilian power master role that still prescribes 
the use of force restraint, respect of international law and multilateral cooperation, and 
 




is concomitant with the good international citizen role in other states. This tradition was 
the basis of all parties' role statements. The consensus on this master role was indicative 
of the depth of role socialisation of German political elites (and the public) and the scope 
of the acceptable for German foreign policy today via reference to a shared vocabulary. 
This was also evident in the need to portray decisions as consistent, credibility and in the 
relevance of alter-role expectations and perceptions in parties' national role statements. 
The prevalence of the alliance partner role further suggested this role conception's 
strength. The majority of the parties viewed being perceived to act alongside key 
partners as part of enacting Germany's role. Two such partners had initiated the UNSC 
resolution, the US had voted in favour and many regional organisations had called for a 
no-fly-zone and African and Arab states had supported it. This put pressure on Germany 
to perform the alliance partner role, and not to be perceived to contradict its partners. 
This was evident in the role expressions of the four parties' who supported the alliance 
partner role selection. Their statements pointed to the importance of domestic and 
international role expectations and perceptions, and the relevance of international 
recognition (image and reputation) for role compliance, and of domestic rewards 
(votes), despite the coalition's refutations of electoral motives and research challenging 
the impact of such motives on role selection and performance.  
The different alliance partner role interpretations and intra-role contestation raised the 
question of the sources of such variance.  
The impact of foreign policy tradition on the coalition parties' role interpretation 
The civilian power role and, in particular, the alliance partner roles are founded on post-
WWII relations and, in particular, the Atlanticist tradition. The CDU/CSU's responsible 
alliance partner role statements revealed a pragmatist approach to this tradition. The 
party had no strong opinion on how to act in this case. MPs expressed a willingness to 
join the operations, should its conditions be met. It was reported that the chancellor 
moderated the foreign minister's stance and was at the basis of the decision to abstain 
on rather than vote against UNSC resolution 1973. She had signalled to allies that should 
the passing hinge on one vote, Germany would vote for it. (Harnisch 2015) 
Atlanticism is a key foreign policy tradition for the CDU/CSU. Former chancellor Helmut 
Kohl (1982-1998) and Merkel are key proponents of it. The party was the source of 
greater involvement in NATO from the 1990s on. The party's stance toward this tradition 
 




can be described as pragmatic, as it served its needs in 2011. In opposition, it had been 
critical of the decision not to join Germany's allies in the 2003 Iraq invasion, precisely 
for the same reasons as the opposition was now stressing. It had damaged Germany's 
reputation and credibility as an alliance partner. In 2011, Germany was chiefly 
concerned with Eurozone crisis management. Scholars have speculated that this was a 
reason for the CDU/CSU's lack of concern for Germany's alliance partner credibility. This 
argument is in line with claims that decision-makers are no longer prioritising alliance 
partnership over other role performances and arguments of normalisation or the 
politicisation of foreign policy. (Oppermann 2012) This can also explain why European 
unity and a common European position were of little relevance. Consequently, in 2011, 
the CDU/CSU paid lip-service to Atlanticist tradition but saw more urgency in addressing 
a European crisis, thereby also revealing European unity on Libya as a secondary issue. 
While thus contesting its own past and opposition parties' alliance partner role 
interpretations, the CDU/CSU's role interpretation and selective, pragmatic use of 
Atlanticist tradition also showed its role conception for the EU as a more normative, 
civilian power, mirroring the German civilian power role, rather than the more 
militarised European role that France was conceiving.  
The FDP bases its foreign policy tradition on its former foreign ministers of which 
Westerwelle viewed himself as heir: Klaus Kinkel (1992-1998) and, in particular, Hans-
Dietrich Genscher (1982-1992) (Heumann 2015). Based on these men and their foreign 
policy conduct, the FDP's traditions can also be described as Atlanticist and Europeanist. 
Genscher's aim was to attain independent decision-making (Handlungsspielraum), 
despite Germany's position in the international system between the two great powers. 
He and his colleagues sought relations with the Soviet bloc, yet remained committed to 
the West and multilateralism as a means to an end, but not the end in itself. Instead of 
consensus and unity, their stress was on interaction, shared rules and trust-building, to 
increase Germany's image of a reliable partner. (Schieder 2015) This tradition provided 
a role-script for the FDP in 2011. It was echoed in the foreign minister and his MPs' stress 
on communication with and support of alliance partners, and their continued trust and 
respect for independent German decisions. Both coalition parties also argued that only 
an independent, sovereign state could act responsibly and, thus, be held accountable for 
its actions. In an interview with a former FDP MP, he confirmed that Germany had shown 
more sovereignty than usual in its role performance and had, thereby, not followed a 
traditional role script. The country had shown emancipation. He speculated that maybe 
 




it had gone its own way in the context of Libya, in part, because it was performing a leader 
role in Europe at the same time. (June 2017) Moreover, in the trade partner role, and in 
a subsequently published government strategy, the focus on relations with other states, 
and rising powers suggested that the FDP and its coalition partner were diversifying 
Germany's partners (Bundesregierung 2012). In line with Genscherist tradition, this was 
room for manoeuvre and a move from overreliance on one alliance/partner. During the 
Cold War this was a necessity to achieve independence; in 2011, Germany's sovereignty, 
economic power and the increasingly multipolar world aided such a strategy.  
Another foreign policy tradition apparent in the FDP's alliance partner interpretation 
and enactment and, in particular, negotiator-mediator role proposal was that of restraint. 
It forms part of the civilian power role. In turn, this corresponds to the liberal political 
tradition of the primacy of politics (Primat der Politik, referred to during an interview 
with a former FDP MP, June 2017). The foreign minister had a preference for non-violent 
means of policy-making, building on his FDP predecessors and the general German 
foreign policy tradition to prioritise civilian means (Heumann 2015).  
Die Linke's mediator-negotiator role foundations 
As the FDP's traditions show, Die Linke's mediator-negotiator role selection was based 
on foreign policy tradition and, thus, its potential enactment was plausible. During the 
Cold War, Germany played an East-West bridge role (Die Linke MP interviews, June 
2017). SPD foreign minister (1966-1969) and chancellor (1969-1974) Willy Brandt and 
his minister for special affairs and economic cooperation (1972-1976) Egon Bahr and 
their foreign policy conduct form the basis for this tradition. They shaped Ostpolitik to 
relax relations with the Soviet Union and reduce the security threat it posed to Germany. 
This policy was aimed at securing peace and security through a gradual approach, 
consensus-seeking and communication with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Brandt 
also viewed good relations with the US as the precondition, despite tensions in his 
relations and view of the US, based on domestic considerations, personal socialisation, 
and ideology (Rother 2014). A similar bridge role was notable in Die Linke's role 
statements on Libya. A precondition for its enactment was that Germany stopped selling 
arms and using military force, undermining international law and UN authority. Then, 
it could perform a mediator-negotiator role and be respected for it by its alliance 
partners. According to interviewees, Germany could play a role akin to Ostpolitik again. 
SPD's potential for intra-role conflict: contradictory foreign policy traditions? 
 




The SPD has several foreign policy traditions to draw on and role enactments to 
consider for role script. The plurality of traditions may have been the source of lack of 
clarity on SPD's position and its stress of unity and consensus instead. The first tradition 
was outlined in the foreign policy tradition underlying Die Linke's role statements. The 
second tradition is based on former chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005). His SPD-
Green Party coalition had taken the 1999 landmark decision to participate in the 
military operation in Kosovo. It pledged solidarity to the US after 9/11 and joined allies 
in 2001 in the intervention in Afghanistan. The differences between the traditions are 
stark. One leans toward cooperation, solidarity, dialogue and restraint, the other toward 
cooperation, solidarity, unity and the use of force. Thus, they provide contradictory, 
potentially contradictory role scripts in a context that has evolved since the early 2000s. 
These diverging foreign policy traditions plausibly underlay the SPD's stronger focus 
on form and perceptions (unity through a vote with partners) rather than the content 
of the decision (intervention and participation). There was no consistent and united 
position. This suggested that there were inter-party differences. It is possible to infer 
that these role scripts, related continuing inter-party divergences since the 1990s shifts 
towards a more interventionist stance, and the lack of early clear US position led to this 
incoherence. It further suggests that the party was reliant on others to guide its stances. 
The focus instead on international, alliance and, in particular, European unity pointed 
to the Atlanticist and, especially the Europeanist tradition in the party. European unity 
was a means to an end (influence). Its MPs stressed the division of Europe and the harm 
this had caused to the EU's capacity to act and shape events in North Africa. The lack of 
unity had damaged Europe's reputation. (SPD 2011; Gloser (SPD) 2011b, 10828) At the 
same time, European unity was seen as the end. The European unity dimension showed 
a national role conception linked to Europe and Germany's European identity and role. 
Germany sovereignty is conditioned on Europe, consistent with the SPD's perception 
that in the ‘first global century’, Germany can and should act only as part of Europe (SPD 
2009, 14). This was in line with a general social democratic tendency to tone down 
national sovereignty/identity in favour of a European federal state/identity. 
The stress of unity revealed the different interpretation of the alliance partner role. The 
SPD defined alliance and cooperation as unity and consensus. This implied that 
diverging situational assessments and decision-making stand in the way of finding a 
common solution and achieving a common goal. It appears to transport the notion of 
 




explicit domestic consensus as a source of strength to the supra-national level. It is a 
harmony-seeking approach to foreign policy that revealed the SPD's interpretation of 
sovereignty and independence as contrary to that of the coalition parties. The united 
alliance partner becomes a follower role. Puzzlingly, this role stands in contrast with 
the European leader role some in the party allude to: ‘We did not manage to keep all 
European states together.’ (Mützenich (SPD) 2011b, 11140–41) This implied an EU 
uniting, leader or manager role. This role, others have argued, is precisely the one the 
coalition was taking on in the Eurozone crisis management (Oppermann 2012). 
The Green Party's foreign policy traditions 
The Green Party's human rights defender role and nuancedly different alliance partner 
role interpretation were plausibly based on the foreign policy tradition drawn from its 
former foreign minister Joschka Fischer (1998-2005). Fischer advocated intervention in 
the Balkan Wars, in a radical turn-around on the party's principled rejection of the use 
of force. It went from 'never again war' to ‘never again Auschwitz' (Rathbun 2004, 
2006).11 Yet, the party remains internally divided on intervention (Green Party MPs 
interviews, June 2017). Shifting stances and variation in position for intervention and/or 
on the abstention vote substantiate this. The co-leader whose debate statements were 
clearly favouring intervention, given R2P and in condemning the German decision to 
abstain on the UNSC resolution vote, changed to this position (Spiegel Online 2011d).  
Another source in the party's role statements was a solidarity/loyalty and a Europeanist 
tradition. This was clear in the stress of acting with partners, and an awareness of 
history, German isolation via exceptionalism, and alter-perception of unreliability and 
threat if Germany acts alone and not according to shared rules. At the same time, the 
party was concerned with how European disunity would be perceived. In sum, the Green 
Party came to a different conclusion on how coherence, consistency, credibility, 
predictability and reliability can be persuasively enacted. 
4. 2. International norms and German parties' role conceptions 
International norms were evidenced in the role elements of the civilian power role. They 
also transpired in the other role statements. The SPD, the Green Party and Die Linke 
                                                          
11 One Die Linke interviewee noted that It went from never again German army on the soil where the 
Wehrmacht Nazi forces had been to a notion of German responsibility to react especially where the 
German army had fought during WWII 
 




referred to and supported R2P. Die Linke rejected R2P. The coalition parties indirectly 
engaged with R2P and sovereignty norms.  
The human rights defender role's basis in international norms 
The Green Party and the SPD referred to conditional sovereignty and R2P. The two 
parties most clearly adopted R2P and engaged with it in this case. The Green Party spent 
the most time and effort on R2P. Yet, the party also remains divided. Its representatives 
often clearly state R2P endorsement and the notion that state sovereignty is conditional.  
The SPD was more reserved. During the debates, there was a division of labour between 
MPs: one criticising the government on procedure and motives without a clear statement 
of the party's position and another raising R2P as a matter of image suggested that it was 
not so much about R2P than about alignment with partners. In an interview for this 
thesis, a former MP noted that R2P is not international law, but that it creates an 
obligation for which there is a majority in the party, despite continued scepticism as to 
its practice. Many in the party consider R2P to be a pretext. Yet, there is a majority 
position in favour of Germany no longer being able to stand apart all the time. The SPD 
views Germany's role as beyond Europe. It has to prevent and negotiate first, and views 
military solutions as ultima ratio, stressing it was never pacifist. (Interview, June 2017)  
Despite hesitations over risks and consequences, intra-party divisions and personal 
dilemmas, the two centre-left parties had the strongest affinity toward an ethical foreign 
policy definition of the civilian power role. This showed the influence of international 
norms and the normative context in shaping the two parties' views on foreign policy and 
how Germany ought to act to be perceived as performing the expected national role. 
Alter-role perceptions and perceived prescriptions were important in showing the 
international norms' socialisation effect. The two parties in support of R2P and a 
muscular human rights defender role were openly concerned with how Germany was 
being perceived for not acting with others and for not intervening to protect civilians. 
This was also evidenced by the references to shame for being seen to not act. 
Rejection of and an indirect engagement with R2P as part of role interpretations 
Die Linke rejected R2P in principle as not replacing international law and the UN Charter, 
and on its own terms in the case of Libya. One MP argued that R2P is first preventive then 
non-military. It is also based on clear criteria that the Libya case did not meet. Thus, even 
if one was to accept R2P as a norm governing international behaviour, this case did not 
 




meet its criteria. The party also argued that consequence of applying R2P to every case 
of human rights violation would be many wars (Liebich (Die Linke) 2011, 11150–51). 
Die Linke's R2P reference and explicit rejection showed the inescapability of the norm. 
While the party may have had to refer to it in this case, because of UNSC resolution 1973, 
it is likely that without the resolution's basis, other parties may have still referenced it, 
given the conflict and the calls for military intervention similar situations engender. 
The coalition parties did not mention R2P during the two parliamentary debate or in 
press releases on the UNSC resolution vote, despite one MP asking in an earlier debate 
whether Libya was an R2P case (Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011a, 10356). The parties 
may have not mentioned R2P, because they supported it in principle and, thus, wanted 
to avoid having to position for or against it in this case. However, R2P was implicit in the 
coalition parties' role statements. The engagement with R2P was discernible in the 
framing of Arab responsibilities. The two parties challenged a traditional understanding 
of R2P defining the responsibility to protect as that of a state and the international 
community. They added a regional or kin-group responsibility, detailed in chapter 6.  
4.3. Ideologies: common ground and difference between parties 
The last layer of ideas in the theoretical framework are ideologies. Reasoning about 
human nature and society, and about the world and international relations was evident 
in German parties' national role interpretations. This chapter suggests that they 
influence which tradition is followed and how it is understood and adapted, and if and 
how parties engage with international norms, as they also form bases of norms. 
 The coalition parties' role interpretation sources: liberalism and conservatism 
The first ideology underpinning the responsible alliance partner role interpretation (and 
the trade partner and democratic transition supporter) was liberalism. The coalition 
parties also described independent decision-making as underlying the possibility of 
responsible behaviour. The core concepts the role interpretation was liberty and, in 
particular, individual liberty. This was also evident in the two parties' narratives on the 
uprisings and the demands that had caused the unrests. Moreover, it was discernible in 
the parties' reframing of R2P, as an Arab responsibility or regional or kin-responsibility. 
In this R2P framing, they referred to an individual responsibility (Selbstverantwortung). 
Such a notion was consistent with the frequently mentioned concept of individual 
responsibility in the two parties' 2009 election manifestos, cross-cutting all policy areas 
 




(CDU/CSU 2009; FDP 2009). This corresponds to a long-standing FDP vision of society 
in which responsibility is individual and not nationalised/collective:  
The greater freedom; the greater responsibility. It is the ethical foundation of the 
free citizen society [freie Bürgergesellschaft]. The principle of “freedom through 
responsibility” founds this society, in self-organisation and solidarity 
[Mitmenschlichkeit] [...] The liberal citizen society demands and supports the 
taking of responsibility of the individual [...]. Liberalism is freedom to 
responsibility instead of freedom from responsibility. Freedom is not egoism. 
Freedom is responsibility. (FDP 1997, 5)  
In 2009, the two parties also stressed that foreign policy ought to keep a balance between 
national, economic interests and international responsibilities (CDU/CSU 2009, 57; FDP 
2009, 67, 69–70). Translated to the Libyan conflict, a focus on individual capacity to self-
help, self-improvement and emancipation would postulate that Arab states as individual 
actors and together should take charge of addressing the Libyan crisis.  
The complementary trade partner and democratic transition supporter roles were also 
based on liberal ideology and the notion the democracy and interdependence through 
trade would lead to prosperity and social and regional peace. These roles were also 
compatible with foreign policy as being mutually beneficial. 
Liberalism was not the only ideology underpinning the coalition's alliance partner role 
interpretation and its pinning of responsibility to act on others. Conservativism was also 
discernible in how the parties framed R2P. Conservative ideology accepts inequality as a 
state of nature and builds on hierarchical/order understandings of society. They tend to 
define community narrowly. Allegiance is first to family, kin-group, nation and region 
before a global community can become relevant. In the Libyan case, the two parties' 
stress on Arab responsibility can therefore not only be understood as a liberal approach 
but also a conservative view. 
These R2P frames freed the parties from pressures to enact a more interventionist role. 
In the CDU/CSU case this and the role played in Europe helps to understand why the 
party rejected an alliance partner role definition that would have seen Germany enact 
another role in Libya. The FDP combined the reframing of R2P with a restraint foreign 
policy tradition to reject the use of force as an instrument for ending the violence.     
The left's ideological sources for national role conceptions and interpretations 
The SPD and Green Party's human rights defender role was the proposal of an ethical 
foreign policy. Such policy has been linked to liberal interventionism and, thus, shows 
 




that a different variant of liberalism underlay the two parties' role selection and logic. 
Such foreign policy can point to a domestic and ideational crisis (Chandler 2003). The 
intra-party divisions and, more significantly, the shifts and lack of common position on 
the decision to intervene also point to a form of crisis and soul-searching on this issue. 
While it is certainly the case that the decision to intervene is and ought to be difficult, the 
two parties struggled more than others to find a stance and clear role statement on it. 
The proposed roles and role interpretations were largely about appearing to be on the 
right side, by being on the same side as partners, rather than making an independent 
judgement about which position and decision to represent. Complicating such judgement 
is the absence of principled rejection of intervention because it makes case-to-case 
assessment necessary. Yet, the coalition parties did not appear struggle over this.  
Further substantiating the suggestion that a variant of liberalism underpinned the two 
parties' roles was the centrality of the liberty concept in their narratives. The SPD and 
Green Party additionally stressed a value-based society, human rights and use of force as 
last resort in recent election manifestos (Bündnis 90 Die Grünen 2009b, 204–5, 2011–
2212; SPD 2009, 81–85). The SPD also emphasised social progress and justice pointing 
to a left-leaning, social democratic liberalism based on Enlightenment advances. Equally, 
the stress of compromise and unity, pitted against confrontation can be understood as 
the difference between (reform) social democracy and (revolutionary) socialism.  
Die Linke challenged the conservative and the various liberal reasonings. The party's key 
concepts were also liberty, democracy, social justice and, in particular like the Green 
Party, solidarity. Yet, the party's analysis of the socio-economic causes of the uprisings 
(confirmed in interviews, June 2017) suggested in particular socialism based around 
concepts of equality, social justice and solidarity with the uprising people. One MP noted 
that Germans could learn from the courage these people showed in challenging regimes. 
The party viewed violence as reinforcing inequality in the international system. It 
stressed that Germany ought to perform a role that showed solidarity with oppressed 
people and states. In its non-violent solidarity, the party drew on left-wing pacifism.  
Finally, Die Linke's principled position was not a neglect of the dilemma between the 
concern for other peoples' welfare and human rights, and the rejection of force (Rathbun 
2004). The party's analysis of complex causes of conflict and the proposal of a plausible, 
if currently unlikely, alternative national role, suggests that the party understood the 
dilemma but that its perspective was both looking back and looking forward long term. 
 




The party focused on interdependencies between states and different policy areas (such 
as trade and economic policy, interview, June 2017). This showed a sophisticated 
understanding of complexity.  The party considered Germany's past trade partner roles 
(including but not reduced to arms) as part of the causes of violence and conflict. 
Conclusion 
This chapter traced German parties' foreign policy narratives and national role 
statements within. It explored the causal reasoning of the parties on the events in North 
Africa and Libya. It noted a role consensus on the civilian power master role and a near 
consensus on the alliance partner role. At the same time, the opposition parties' criticism 
of the government and Die Linke's rejection of intervention suggested that there was 
disagreement on role performance and intra- and inter-role contestation. The chapter 
then proceeded to take a closer look at parties' alliance partner role interpretations, 
additional and alternative role proposals. It qualified the alliance partner. The coalition 
parties proposed and argued Germany had enacted a responsible and supportive alliance 
partner role. The SPD and Green Party preferred a unity and loyal alliance partner. While 
the Die Linke – along with the FDP – proposed the alternative negotiator-mediator role. 
The chapter then traced plausible sources for the role selection and role interpretations. 
It suggested that the civilian power role tradition is strong but flexible. Moreover, 
Atlanticism, Europeanism and traditions drawn from past Cold War and 1990s foreign 
ministers were discernible. The chapter noted in particular that the CDU/CSU was 
pragmatic in its approach to its traditions and role elements to stress. It stressed that in 
particular the SPD and Green Party struggled and that this in part can be traced to shifts 
and contrasting foreign policy traditions as part of these parties' histories. The source 
analysis also showed the socialising influence of international norms through active 
engagement with them, and adoption, adaption and rejection of them. Finally, the 
chapter ended on a closer look at traces of ideologies concluding that variants of 
liberalism are pervasive and Die Linke showing a closer affinity to alternative ideologies. 
The role interpretation variation finding adds to the recent literature on German national 
roles that detect and discusses a shift in international-domestic priorities. This thesis 
remains agnostic on whether domestic issues trumping international pressures. In this 
case, a discussion of the interpretations and contestation and of the ideational sources 
can also inform about the direction the role shifts may go in the future. The coalition's 
more confident German role selection and performance, and its contestation of previous 
 




role enactment suggests that Germany may, yet, challenge conceptions of how it ought 
to act. While Germany has special constraints to return to a more assertive role, and may, 
thus, be or pretend to be reluctant, its uniqueness creates tensions regarding the 
enactment of prescribed/expected roles, between being 'normal' and never normal 
again. This poses dilemmas to German foreign policy decision-makers and parties to 
grapple with and come to ever new conclusions on.  
Finally, the differences between parties, opposition criticism of the government may 
simply be opposition politics. However, it is possible that a SPD-led government would 
have taken different decisions, given ideological affinities with France, UK and the US at 
the time and to meet perceived alter-role expectations, be perceived as united alliance 
partner and maintain an image for Germany. Yet, it is difficult to ascertain this given the 
variety of foreign policy traditions and past role performance of this major party.  
 










Chapter 6: National roles and responsibility 
Emmanuel Macron’s assertion that colonisation was a ‘crime against humanity’ caused 
considerable controversy during the 2017 presidential campaign. He made the remark 
in an interview with an Algerian television network after stressing the elements of 
civilisation and barbarism of colonisation in a 2016 interview (Le Monde 2017; 
Libération 2017). Attacked by his opponents, the then presidential candidate retracted 
again to stress once more the positive side of colonisation, such as ‘modernity’, 
teachers, doctors and farmers (Huffington Post 2017). His remarks about France’s 
colonial past implied a coloniser role, and his qualification of colonisation as crime 
(against humanity) implied a notion of responsibility as culpability.   
German federal president Joachim Gauck’s talk at the 2014 50th Munich Security 
Conference was aptly entitled Germany’s role in the world: Reflections on responsibility, 
norms and alliances. In this speech, he noted that Germany was a ‘[...] reliable partner 
in Europe and the world: an equal partner with equal responsibilities.’ (Gauck 2014) In 
his comments, he overtly anticipated the interpretation of responsibility as the mere 
sharing of burden and costs. This pointed to domestic differences over how to view 
Germany’s roles and over the notion of responsibility.   
These two examples are not extraordinary. They stand in as illustrations of the implicit 
and sometimes explicitly made link between roles and responsibility. The French 
controversy and the German anticipation of different meanings cast light on domestic 
debate and the contestation of the concept of responsibility linked to national roles.  
The present chapter builds on the previous two empirical chapters. It is an exploration 
of a recurring concept in national role statements in parties' foreign policy narratives. 
The previous chapters traced narratives, identified parties’ national role statements, 
interpretations and contestation. The chapters demonstrated that parties interpreted 
master roles differently. Some parties proposed alternative roles. The tracing of role 
sources showed that some of these were viable, plausible alternatives.  
The content analysis brought recurring themes to the fore. Responsibility was most 
prominent. It also figures in the literature on French and German foreign policy and 
national roles. Its apparent ubiquity is the basis for this chapter. It identifies 
responsibility, derived and similar words in national role expressions and narratives. 
It seeks to unpack its many meanings through in parties' statements.  
 




The chapter makes a conceptual contribution to role theory. It engages with a 
frequently used concept and proposed that each notion of responsibility gives rise to a 
range of possible decisions and actions. References to responsibility assume that there 
is an agreement on its meaning. The chapter argues that responsibility is central to 
national roles per se and to understanding variation in role interpretations and role 
contestation. At the same time, responsibility becomes more tangible through 
reference to national roles. It is in national role conceptions that ideas about 
responsibility are translated into practice and policy tools for its implementation 
become apparent. Responsibility is important for understanding national roles, role 
interpretation and domestic contestation.  
I define responsibility as open to the invoking actors' own interpretations rather than 
assumed and defined by the most powerful actors in the international system. The rise 
of new powers suggests that the powerful actor club is in the process of gaining new 
members. These powers have potentially different conceptions of responsibility and 
engage with and challenge existing conceptions of responsibility. The prospect of a new 
era of multi-polar order, thus, raises questions about the future of dominant meanings 
of responsibility. Will new great powers adapt and be socialised into accepting the 
definition? How far will they redefine it to address domestic and regional, political or 
cultural needs? Or will these states and their clubbing together while on the ascent 
allow them to withhold pressures to conform and be socialised into dominant meanings 
of the power role and its responsibility? The scope of this thesis and chapter does not 
allow to answer these questions. However, they invite an engagement with alternative 
responsibility meanings to better understand potential future debates, controversies 
and developments. This focus is further called for given the thesis looks at two middle 
power states with varying claims to great power status. It is also timely, given the rise 
of new political parties that challenge status quo conceptions of foreign policy and 
definitions of responsibility. 
Part 1 of this chapter reviews responsibility and roles in IR theories, IR responsibility 
and role theory. Establishing a connection between responsibility and roles is one of 
the contributions of this thesis. Part 2 and 3 illustrate this link. They identify types of 
responsibility in the parties' narratives and show their connection to the national roles, 
role interpretations and role contestation discussed in previous chapters. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the key findings and arguments. 
 




1. Responsibility in IR and role theory scholarship 
Responsibility is ubiquitous. The word is often combined with adjectives such as 
corporate, social, individual or collective etc. Responsibility can be forward looking, 
planning and anticipating for the future and coming generations. It can also be 
understood as accountability for past events and damages. Its use criss-crosses all 
policy areas. Politicians frequently speak of 'responsibility' and 'responsible' decision-
making, responsible as they claim to be for the delivery of policy programmes in 
government or toward their constituents. The scope of this thesis is not to review the 
wide use and variety of the responsibility. The aim is to focus on the use and meanings 
of responsibility in international relations.  
1.1. The concept of responsibility in IR 
IR theorists mention or imply state responsibilities in and for the international system. 
They base such responsibility on different sources and vary in reasoning for such 
claims. The concept frequently figures in studies of states described as great, rising or 
regional powers, such as in recent years Brazil, China or India (e.g. Kenkel and Martins 
2016; Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006; Narlikar 2011; Loke 2016). Some scholars 
unpack, map and problematise the concept of great power responsibilities (Loke 2016) 
and special responsibilities (Bukovansky et al. 2012). They note an absence of 
conceptual IR scholarship on responsibility. This is surprising, given its frequent use 
and ubiquity in policy narratives.  
This chapter does not have the space for a discussion of all the different literatures. The 
focus is on responsibility associated with states, the reasoning for it and possible links 
and combinations with national roles. The attention is on moral responsibility, because 
the legality of the military intervention, at least of the initial mission, was not disputed.  
The review of responsibility in IR theories is limited. It is focused on key authors, rather 
than intra-theory debates and nuances. This sketch bears the risk of caricature. 
However, the point is to give an overview of explicit and implicit responsibility notions.  
Responsibility in IR realist theory: instrumental and political 
Realists understand responsibility as political as well as instrumental. A basic premise 
of realism is that the ultimate goal of states is survival in an anarchical state system. 
This goal shapes all states' national interests. Thus, realism assumes state interests in 
 




the system and in any given situation. There is an assumption that it is in the interest 
of states to maintain the status quo of the l system and to perform actions, even at the 
detriment of state interests, for the long term goal of safeguarding the system that 
serves state needs. In particular, great powers with the capacities to maintain the state 
system have this self-interested responsibility. Structural or neo-realists, like Kenneth 
Waltz, view such responsibility as independent of states. Waltz (1993, 55) notes:  
Some countries may strive to become great powers; others may wish to avoid 
doing so. The choice, however, is a constrained one. Because of the extent of their 
interests, larger units existing in a contentious arena tend to take on system-wide 
tasks. As the largest powers in the system, the United States and the Soviet Union 
found that they had global tasks to perform and global interests in mind.  
Responsibility is thus instrumental, meeting states' intrinsic power interests and needs 
for security in an anarchical system. States who come to the position of powers in this 
international system are self-interested to maintain the status quo and participate in 
any institution that provides for this maintenance.  
Classical realists, like Hans Morgenthau, agree on the ultimate state goal of power in an 
international system characterised by balance of power politics. In such a system, 
states with the capacities must accept limits to power and must sometimes restrain 
themselves. Morgenthau (1963, 228) notes:  
Superior power gives no right, either moral or legal, to do with that power all that 
it is physically capable of doing. Power is subject to limitations, in the interest of 
society as a whole and in the interest of its individual members, which are not the 
result of mechanics of the struggle for power but are superimposed upon that 
struggle in the form of norms or rules of conduct by the will of the members of 
the society themselves.  
Even in a system in which responsibility is instrumental for the maintenance of the 
system, states have a political responsibility to consider the consequences of their 
actions. Morgenthau (1963, 10) argues:   
There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without 
consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, 
then considers prudence – the weighing of the consequences of alternative 
political actions – to be the supreme virtue in politics.  
In sum, IR realism accepts state responsibilities on a spectrum from instrumental for 
meeting state interests to political or moral responsibility for the consequences of state 
actions. Thus, for realists, state responsibility has at least two meanings: political for 
the consequences of action and instrumental for the maintenance of the system.  
 




Responsibility in English School's concept of international society 
English School theorists, such as Hedley Bull, also view the international system's state 
of nature as one of anarchy. However, they consider it essentially as a society. The 
maintenance of order in an international society is, thus, as relational, social enterprise. 
Like realists, responsibility assumptions for system order are instrumental. Yet, they 
are premised on a common, rather than individual state interest. Bull (1995, 63) notes:  
Within international society […] as in other societies, order is the consequence 
[…] of a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life; rules 
prescribing behaviour that sustains these goals; and institutions that help to 
make these rules effective. 
He recognises that states' interests vary, but argues that the common interest is to 
maintain the social life between them. States as the primary members will create rules 
for interaction to function. Bull argues that three rules are essential. The first identifies 
states as the members of international society and recognises the social nature of their 
relations (Bull 1995, 65). The consequence of this rule is that states are the bearers of 
rights and duties under international law. A second rule concerns coexistence and 
restricts violence and war, defining the causes for which sovereign states can wage war. 
Implicit in such a rule is the respect for state sovereignty and equality between states. 
Bull's third rule regulates relations between members of the international society for 
cooperation. He suggests that these rules provide a more precise notion of how states 
should conduct themselves in society. He notes that states are: '[…] chiefly responsible 
for performing the functions of helping to make the rules effective; they do so in the 
absence of either a supreme government […].' (Bull 1995, 68) Thus, the instrumental 
responsibility of states is to spread the rules and enforce them.  
Within this international society states differ in qualities and capacities, despite 
nominal equality. This inequality of power is where Bull derives great power 
responsibility from. Defining them, Bull (1995, 196) asserts:  
[…] great powers are powers recognised by others to have, and conceived by 
their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties. Great 
powers, for example, assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in 
determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system 
as a whole. They accept the duty, and are thought by others to have the duty, of 
modifying their policies in light of the managerial responsibilities they bear.  
 




English School theorists and realists concur that great powers have special 
responsibilities to maintain order (whether in what is conceived of as international 
society or system) and that it is attributed to them by virtue of their capacities.  
Roles in the English School's responsibility conception  
The English School's account comes close to the social, relational dimension of role 
theory. A state with the capacities is not immediately a great power. It needs the 
recognition of others as such. With this recognition come expectations toward it on how 
to act as part of a collective, common goal.  In a segment in The Anarchical Society aptly 
titled 'The role of great powers', Bull (1995, 200–201) notes of great powers: '  
[…] they may play a role in the promotion of international order by pursuing 
policies that work for it rather than against it. Great powers contribute to 
international order in two main ways: by managing their relations with one 
another; and by exploiting their preponderance in such a way as to impart a 
degree of central direction to the affairs of international society as a whole. […] It 
is […] a statement of the roles they can, and sometimes do, play to sustain 
international order.  
As part of this horizontal (between themselves) and vertical (within the entire society) 
relations management responsibility, great powers have a number of concrete tasks. 
Bull includes the preservation of general balance, avoidance and control of crises, 
limitations of war, the attribution of regions or spheres of influence to great powers 
and management of order in these regions and the possibility of a concert between the 
great powers. In these tasks, some of Holsti's (1970) roles discernible. The regional 
leader or protector corresponds to the attribution of spheres of influence, in which 
great powers have interests and responsibilities to sustain order as part of regional 
leader roles. All tasks that imply the avoidance of the outbreak of violence, friction 
between great powers and other states also suggests the regional protector role.  
In sum, English School theorists suggest that the politics of great power should be one 
of responsibility politics. The School's institutional international society view suggests 
that status assigned to great power states entails material and social responsibilities. 
This means that responsibilities are attributed to such states because the social nature 
of society and that the conditions of the international state of nature can be altered and 
actors are socialised into roles. 
 




Responsibility in liberal and constructivist IR theories 
Liberal IR theory proposes that cooperation, institutions and trust-building can 
overcome anarchy between states. A feature of IR liberalism is the value placed on 
individualism and liberty and a conviction that the rule of law can check unconstrained 
power, constituting progress toward an ideal society (e.g. Doyle 2016).  
Inherent in liberal theory is also the belief in the capacity of democratically governed 
states and of free trade between states to lead to prosperity – and a stake in maintaining 
the thus created order – and world peace. Doyle (1983, 1986) suggests liberalism is by 
no means peaceful and liberal states are even prone to wage war against non-liberal 
ones. This proneness and the premises of liberal peace imply a responsibility for 
democracies to democratise others for world peace. In practice, domestic constraints 
on armed force deployment limit such a responsibility in democratically rules states.  
International rules of behaviour, i.e. laws and norms, form part of liberal institutions. 
Robert O. Keohane (2012) notes an increase in legalisation and moralisation in the 
decades since the end of the Cold War. The legalisation of international relations 
includes many legal institutions that are about human rights or the punishment of their 
violation. The moralisation, in turn, covers international norms, such as R2P.  
Social constructivism's premise is that meaning is socially constructed, mutually 
reinforced through practice. Alexander Wendt (1992) famously argued that anarchy is 
what states make of it. States do not only react to other states' material capacities. They 
also consider ideational factors. On responsibility, Wendt (1992, 400) writes:  
Competitive and individualistic systems are both "self-help" forms of anarchy in 
the sense that states do not positively identify the security of self with that of 
others but instead treat security as the individual responsibility of each. […] This 
contrasts with the "cooperative" security system, in which states identify 
positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the 
responsibility of all. This is not a self-help in any interesting sense, since the "self" 
in terms of which interests are defined is the community; national interests are 
international interests. 
Responsibility suggests the notion of an international society in which the interests of 
each states, most of the time, becomes the security of all, from which a responsibility 
derives. Wendt's theory is a social theory (1999) about state's relations with and 
perceptions of each. Constructivism is concerned with how states as the actors of 
international relations are socialised into behaviour. Like the theories outlined above, 
 




it presumes that institutions require the recognition of actors in the system in question, 
in which meanings of institutions are intersubjective or widely shared.  
In liberal and constructivist theories there is are large body of scholarship on 
international norms that shape meaning and understanding of situations and events. 
R2P is an explicit forward-looking responsibility. It includes a prevention that entails 
means to minimise the risk of four crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity) occurring. The use force is the last resort and requires UNSC 
authorisation. R2P builds on international law and the UN Charter provisions for peace, 
security, human rights and state sovereignty. To recall, it consists of three-steps: (1) it 
is each state's responsibility to protect its populations, building on the state 
sovereignty norm. (2) It is each state's responsibility to ask for help to fulfil the first 
responsibility should it not be able to otherwise do so. (3) The international 
community's responsibility to take action to protect kicks in when the state in question 
fails to assume its responsibilities.  
R2P reframes the international legal norm of state sovereignty and freedom from 
interference, as was outlined in chapter 2. State sovereignty becomes conditioned on 
responsibility to protect. Yet, R2P is not law. It is a moral responsibility, building on 
humanitarian rationale. Unlike its predecessors, R2P is more complex with its 
preventive and reconstruction elements.  
R2P creates expectations toward the international community and able and willing 
states to take action. The pressure to act is toward great, regional and rising powers. As 
such, R2P is in principle a general but in practice a special responsibility, given that not 
all states can perform such an R2P enforcer role, even as part of multilateral coalitions.  
This review of IR literature shows that state responsibility is an important concept. 
Sometimes explicit, often implied are roles state responsibility expectations give rise 
to. The next section looks at the references to responsibility in role theory.  
1.2. Responsibility in role theory 
Kal J. Holsti (1970) refers to responsibility, its derivatives and related terms such as 
duty or obligation more than a dozen times. Regional leader, regional protector, anti-
imperialist agent, liberation supporter, defender of the faith, mediator-integrator and 
the protectee role include a responsibility element. Holsti also notes that some states 
 




have rights, duties and special responsibilities, established by the UN and NATO 
Charters and based on material capacity, history and virtue. 
Responsibilities create role-expectations 
Such duties and responsibilities, most clearly of the permanent members of the UNSC, 
but also powerful non-members with the practical capacities, create expectations 
toward such states to perform certain roles. Cronin (2001) describes the position in 
which some states find themselves (as hegemons) as creating pressures due to the 
expectations to meet obligations toward the international community. This means that 
states in this position are alter-socialised into leader roles and endowed with a greater 
influence on the system. At the same time, they are expected by institutional precedent 
and their own capacity to provide collective goods and offer leadership. This constrains 
even the most powerful states:  
[…]  a hegemon's authority is derived from its role in the international society of 
states […] Accompanying this authority is increased obligation. While its 
economic and military strength provide a wider range of options for pursuing its 
foreign policies than that afforded to other states, it also faces greater constraints. 
This tension between greater opportunities and greater constraints is the 
paradox of hegemony. (Cronin 2001, 111) 
Cronin suggests that responsibility, perceived to be that of such states, and leader role 
obligations toward the international system constrain these states' role performance: 
'Within this context of a hegemonic system, great power also means great 
responsibility.' (2001, 112) 
Holsti and Cronin's account of special responsibilities of some states mirrors some of 
the discussion of responsibility in IR. They too link some roles with some states' 
responsibilities toward the international collective or system.  
Recent theory studies also quote responsibility in their role descriptions and analysis. 
Wehner (2015) suggests that Chile sees peacekeeping missions not as Brazil's the sole 
responsibility as the regional leader. Instead, it considers such missions a UN initiative 
in which Chile and Brazil share leadership and responsibility for peacekeeping 
missions. Thies (2014) proposes that president Hugo Chávez of Venezuela’s role 
statements include a regional leader role that includes special responsibilities and a 
developer role with duties or obligations to assist other states’ development. Shi (2012) 
remarks that there are external expectations toward China based on its capacity and 
pressure on China to conform to such capability-based responsibility. As China aims to 
 




project the image of a responsible power, it is confronted with these responsibility 
expectations and what they entail in practice. (See also Harnisch 2012)  
These examples of the link between roles and responsibility in role theory studies 
mirror the proposition that some states are expected to assume greater responsibilities 
and perform predetermined roles to maintain the international system. This does not 
suggest that other states reference responsibility less in national roles statements. 
However, the observation that the assumption of special responsibilities appears 
associated with states of greater material capacities suffice here, because the focus in 
this thesis is on two regional and/or aspiring global powers.   
Role socialisation into responsibility? 
The discussion of the observed existence of special responsibilities attached to certain 
states that are expected to perform specific roles raises the questions: how do states 
know which roles to enact and based on what or which responsibility? In his discussion 
of role socialisation, Thies (2012) notes that great power states have the responsibility 
to socialise regional powers and other less powerful states into the international 
system, and of regional powers to do the same in their regional system. Cronin (2001) 
argues that role prescriptions emerge through common practice and custom that 
reflect the conditions that lead the establishment of such institutions as rules and 
practices. The presence of powerful states is not different, as like other states in the 
system, powerful states rely on the recognition of their position by others. Obligations 
and responsibilities are attached to powerful states through institutions:  
Often role prescriptions emerge through common practice or custom, both of 
which reflect the initial conditions that led to the creation of the institution. 
Practices that are established during the early period of an institution's 
development can set precedents and create widespread expectations of future 
behaviour. Once established, however, institutional norms and roles can become 
"sticky" thereby generating and constraining future behavior. (Cronin 2001, 110) 
The historic rise of responsibility created an understanding enshrined in institutions, 
law and, in particular, contemporary organisations like the UN. A regional or global 
power state today is confronted with such institutions. Its recognition and capacity to 
act as a power is in part dependent on its own adherence to institutions and their rules 
and the assumption of the responsibilities as attached to states of its capacity.  
Via the institutionalisation of responsibility and roles in this manner, responsibility and 
power roles are not only about material capabilities or capacity to perform such roles. 
 




They are also normative (Thies 2012, 2013) and value-based (Thies 2014). 
Responsibility as part of the immaterial concerns that drive actors in learning and 
taking up new roles (Harnisch 2012). Thus, responsibility beyond the material capacity 
is also a role selection and learning process. 
This section showed the centrality of responsibility for (at least some) role conceptions. 
It also pointed to the socialising effects of dominant meanings of responsibility that link 
back to the discussion of responsibility in IR. Much of the responsibility implied or 
explicit in national roles is instrumental to maintaining the international system or 
society. Yet, responsibility is at the same time also normative and values-based. The 
next section looks at IR literature focused on the concept of responsibility. 
1.3. IR responsibility scholarship  
Bukovansky et al (2012) provide the historical context on great power special 
responsibilities. Such responsibilities first emerged explicitly in 1814-1815, in the 
context of the Vienna Congress after the Napoleonic Wars, along with great power 
rights. At that time, the responsibility for the maintenance and management of peaceful 
relations between great powers and between other states in the system was noted. 
Special responsibilities were gradually institutionalised and written into international 
law. In the second half of the twentieth century, such rights and responsibilities became 
recognised in UNSC permanent membership. The relatively novelty of enshrined great 
power responsibilities i.e. obligation to maintain and manage the international state 
system in return for recognition and rights, suggests that its meaning is not set in stone.  
Debates on the possibility and assignment of responsibility in international state 
conduct suggest that the issue is complex. Erskine (2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2008) argues 
that moral agency and responsibility are central questions of international relations. 
She develops a model for institutional moral agency at which's core is the question of 
who or what can even be held responsible. Can non-individuals have moral agency? 
Included in the range of institutions are states. Erskine proposes that a focus on moral 
agency allows for more attention paid to identifying who is capable to responding to 
calls to action. Erskine (2003b, 4) notes: 
[…] divorcing questions of moral agency from assertions of responsibility means 
that blame can be carelessly, and often creatively, directed and apportioned. […] 
When one builds policies on assertions of either duty or blame, clarity requires 
[…] recognition of the relevant actors involved. 
 




Roles are implied in this moral agency and responsibility. Erskine notes that moral 
agency means expectations toward a moral agent prescribing or evaluating action. 
They form part of what actors' behaviour amounts to: role performance.  
Moral responsibility is problematic. While the states 'acts' in the world, individuals 
(alone or collectively in governments) take decisions on the state's behalf and to a 
varying degree of responsibility for the state's actions. Thus, there is a difficulty to 
identify who exactly is to take the responsibility for state action and whether or not 
there is collective responsibility, e.g. of governments or citizens (e.g. Runciman 2003; 
Harbour 2003; Parrish 2009).  
There are also other issues with moral responsibility. Ainley (2011) discerns a shift 
from state responsibility to holding individuals accountable for inherently collective 
actions. She notes a reliance on law to address political questions of the culpability of 
collective actors. She suggests to focus attention on political responsibility which would 
include actors that individual criminal accountability does not include. Similarly, 
Hoover (2012) observes the proliferation of moral responsibility and the establishment 
of legal institutions to address it. However, he suggests that there are serious problems, 
not least the focus on individuals in practice. Hoover (2012, 234) notes:  
[…] emerging understanding of responsibility in world politics have been too 
focused on the action of individuals, leading to the neglect of structural causes of 
mass violence and more indirect lines of responsibility revealed by attending to 
the wider social context. 
He continues that this neglect is the political dimension of responsibility. The focus on 
individual failures to uphold state obligations covers 'power inequalities and particular 
interests that are served by focusing on individual actors over enabling conditions and 
social structures.' He suggests that the difficulty in finding peaceful resolution of 
conflicts illustrate the troubling down-side of the emerging moral responsibility in 
international politics. He asks: what purpose does holding actors accountable serve. 
Hoover (2012, 236)  argues:   
[…] the national and autonomous agent presumed in practices of responsibility 
in world politics is inadequate in its inattention to the socially embedded nature 
of responsibility and for that reason obscures that these practices affirm 
particular political ends and limit the critical reach of our attempts to pursue 
responsibility. […] the responsible agent is a socially constructed agent and the 
act of holding responsible is a coercive and creative political act. [italic in the 
original] […] Holding an agent responsible moulds her agency in a particular way, 
and when this process is not consciously acknowledged the ideals, institutions 
 




and social structures that form our understanding of moral agency are withheld 
from scrutiny and tacitly reinforced.  
This political account of responsibility adds a further functional dimension. It 
addresses questions about what underlies the occurrence of atrocity than individual 
and collective depravity. It raises questions about types of responsibility. Lu (2011) 
looks at historical responsibility for colonial injustice and how it should be addressed 
in the contemporary world. She argues that beyond the attribution of responsibility of 
individuals and states, this injustice was reliant on structure that enabled and 
encouraged wrong-doing. This is relevant as it points to the historical, structural 
dimension of responsibility for conditions that may lead to situations in which violence 
erupts. This again raises the question of who is responsible for action and how to deal 
with such responsibility, especially if not regulated by law, like in the case of R2P. 
The responsibility in IR research also addresses great power's special responsibilities 
(e.g. Lee and Thompson 2017; Neack 2017; Loke 2016; Morris 2013; Bukovansky et al. 
2012; Claude 1986). This literature frequently mentions 'roles' great power states have 
(e.g. Bukovansky et al. 2012, 9; Loke 2016, 6). The great power status itself encases a 
notion of great power role. While this literature begins to unpack a concept, it suffers 
from a dual weakness. The first is a focus on the international system structure, state 
capacities and its influence on responsibility notions. The meaning of responsibility 
should not be seen as immediate and implied. The second, related weakness is a 
normative assumption of what great power responsibility behaviour ought to look like. 
Yet, expectations toward 'responsible states' changed since the responsibility language 
emerged, 200 years ago. A shared understanding of responsibility understanding 
across time and space does not seem to exist.  
This review showed that responsibility is an important concept for understanding and 
explaining state relations and behaviour. The survey also implied that responsibility 
often appears to be a guide to action. Foreign policymakers are likely to consider 
responsibilities when taking decisions and acting on behalf of the state. Chapters 4 and 
5 took note of role expectations toward France and Germany. In the two country-party 
cases responsibility was present in national role statements.  
This chapter proposes that national roles and role conceptions are bridges between 
preferred responsibility and actual behaviour. Even concrete responsibility, such as 
R2P, is operationalised through and materialises in national role statements. Thus, a 
role approach to responsibility contributes to understanding how responsibility is 
 




transformed into action. At the same time, a focus on responsibility helps to understand 
the underlying reasoning for role selection and interpretation.  
This chapter uses the same empirical data as the previous two to look at 'responsibility'. 
The above discussion created expectations of French and German responsibilities, 
given their positions alone in regional and international systems: (1) as European 
powers and (2) France primarily as UNSC permanent member and nuclear power and 
Germany as economic power. Part 2 and part 3 respectively begin with a review of the 
country-specific scholarship. The aim is to provide some background for the findings 
the debates and the differences in the conceptualisation of responsibility in roles.  
2. French parties and responsibility in national roles  
In role theory research on France, responsibility premised on position, status and 
values is notable. Thumerelle and LePrestre (1997) identify duties and obligations in 
relation to France’s regional leader role, its need to increase power and influence in line 
with its capabilities and as part of a protector of French culture role. Moreover, a value-
based responsibility is implied in the claims that foreign policy builds on an identity 
based on humanism and that French foreign policy is benefitting humanity rather than 
meeting interests (also in Krotz 2001, 2015). In studies of French foreign policy, 
responsibility is evidenced in on France's permanent membership of the UNSC and at 
the same time seen as building on it. This is due to an UN Charter derived responsibility 
to maintain international peace and security.  
In sum, in the literature on France, responsibility creates an obligation to fulfil in 
international relations. This responsibility is derived from material capabilities, status 
due to nuclear power and UNSC membership and a history of great power status in 
Europe and through nineteenth century colonialism in Africa and the Arab World (and 
Asia). This also creates alter-role prescriptions for France and, domestically, the 
perceptions of alter-role expectations. Therefore, French policymakers can be expected 
to perceive the assumption and taking of responsibility as part of France's role. Chapter 
4 suggests that these perceptions about France's responsibilities as part of the national 
role may have been reinforced through debates on humanitarian intervention and R2P.  
I identified two types of responsibility in the French parties' Libya narratives. It was 
France's responsibility is not to stay inactive, it had to act. This was part of the UMP and 
PS leader role interpretations and linked to the Universal-French values defender role. 
 




Related to it was responsibility as culpability. If France did not intervene, it would be 
moral responsible for the deaths of Libyans and other civilians oppressed by dictators. 
The notion of responsibility was also notable in the PCF narratives. The party viewed 
France as culpable for escalating through its past and current role performance. 
2.1. A French responsibility to do something 
The first responsibility was that France ought to do something. The reasoning for action 
was that something terrible was about to happen and that it was morally wrong to be 
inactive. This responsibility was part of the reasoning in UMP and PS' leader role. The 
responsibility was positive and morally justified. This was apparent in the description 
of its opposite: moral failure. Such failings were considered greater than the calculated 
risk to civilians through the military intervention. 
An analogy and link was drawn between Libyans' concrete plight and the French 
democratic self and history. This was part of 'discursive construction' of a mirror-image 
between Libyans and a democratic, history French self (Ostermann 2016). It formed 
part of the perceived legitimacy of the intervention: because Libyans asked for it, 
France had to intervene. The link was not only between Libyans and a French self. It 
referred to those yet to call for liberty and yet to liberate themselves from oppression: 
'Other people rewrite in their language in their alphabet the formidable energy that 
inspires us since 1789. It was our responsibility that it did not stop at Benghazi, so that 
the Arab Peoples can write their history.' (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1882) Equally, this French 
self was extended to Europe and its historic example: 'We need to exercise all our 
responsibility and never forget that Europe is itself a successful peace process. It is from 
this perspective that our duty is to give an example in this part of the world and on the 
basis of our common heritage.' (Ameline (UMP) 2011, 2210)  
These quotes revealed that this responsibility to do something was founded on values. 
Universal-French values and their implications in the protests that led to the conflict, 
legitimised the intervention and created responsibility. One PS MP noted that France 
was fighting '[...] in the name of universal rights.' (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1881–82) The 
prime minister argued:  
[...] we had a few days to assume our responsibility. And we assumed it. Our 
country was at rendezvous with its values. With the international community we 
have to stay mobilised to support the Libyan people, and to help them realise 
their dream, that is not unrealistic: a free Libya, a democratic Libya and a Libya 
ruled by law.’(Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 5220) 
 




This responsibility was, thus, linked to the value-based role that filled the leader role 
with purpose, described in chapter 4. It was based on France's capacity to intervene, 
perceived Libyan and international role expectations toward France as the beacon of 
universal values. This built on a self-image as democratic pioneer. It was a special, 
moral responsibility.  
2.2. France's responsibility as culpability 
The second responsibility was culpability or accountability. The UMP and the PS used 
it describe what the consequences of doing nothing would be. The PCF outlined the 
consequences of action prior to and while using military force.  
UMP and PS' responsibility as culpability 
The UMP and PS argued that not to assume responsibility was equal to doing nothing 
or inaction. They thereby defined 'something' as intervention and inaction as not to 
intervene. The flipside of the responsibility to do something was culpability. This was 
a negative responsibility. It was moral failure. One UMP MP stressed the responsibility 
to do something and also noted that failing to act (intervene) was morally wrong and 
would send the wrong signal to other dictators. Thus like the first responsibility the 
avoidance of culpability was about the bigger picture than Libya:  
We have no right to let a massacre happen in Libya that would hinder 
democratisation in other regions too [...] our responsibility is to stay vigilant and 
to not be inactive [...]. (Lequiller (UMP) 2011b, 2200)  
I admit that we cannot Intervene militarily everywhere, against all despotisms. 
However, they have to know that they cannot massacre their own populations 
without us reacting to it. (Lequiller (UMP) 2011b, 2202) 
Similarly, the prime minister argued:  
Not to intervene is giving carte blanche at the regime of Gaddafi and his sides. It 
means signalling to all those who want democracy and the respect for human 
rights that these uprisings were not to be successful. Not to intervene is to note 
that the wall of oppression is stronger than the wind of liberty. We could not 
accept this scenario. (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1878) 
The party's MPs viewed inaction as detrimental to the success of the Arab uprisings ‘[...] 
how could we have let a massacre of civilians take place in front of our eyes? [...] aside 
from the humanitarian drama, this would have meant the end of the Arab uprisings.' 
(Teissier (UMP) 2011a, 1889) 
 




Equally, the PS argued that there was no other alternative prevent mass murder in 
Benghazi than to intervene militarily, as one MP's quote on the duty  to make sure that 
the 1789 spirit was not stopped at Benghazi indicated (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1882). 
This responsibility as culpability was linked to the responsibility to do something. It 
was a future responsibility and accountability for what would happen if there was no 
intervention. It linked France's moral standing to performing a leader role in doing 
something. Thereby, this invocation of this responsibility revealed perceived role 
pressures toward France for having the capacity to intervene and the moral basis not 
to stand by. It was also a responsibility toward others who face a similar threat and 
whose regimes may be deterred in knowing that France will react to protect 'strangers'. 
The PCF's responsibility as culpability, complicity and accountability 
The PCF's responsibility as culpability was focused on past and present role 
performance that the party viewed as detrimental to peace. According to the PCF, 
violence leads to violence. Thus, to implement the no-fly zone was to cause harm:  
We remain convinced, with Algerian writer Boualem Sansal, that ‘war of good 
against evil has only ever profited evil’. For us, the decision to bomb Libya is 
immediately linked to the question of spiralling out of control violence and of the 
risk of a wider military confrontation, with all the disastrous consequences for 
the civilian populations. [...] If France puts the finger in the spiral [...] France will 
have to bear the responsibility of failure, in front of the Libyan people as well as 
the French. (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1885) 
Responsibility as culpability became complicity for the loss of civilian lives: ‘We are 
complicit in the death of on all sides: [...] the people who are rebelling against Gadaffi 
on one side, and those who die of NATO bombs on the other side.' (Candelier (PCF) 
2011, 5228) The complicity also included the escalation of violence because of what the 
academic literature describes as moral hazard, a known dilemma of military 
intervention (e.g. Kuperman 2008). The PCF argued that the France's actions led to 
rebels to retaliate with violence, provoking a spiral of violence and calls for outside 
intervention, as a consequence.  
The PCF also raised arms sales as a French responsibility for civilian deaths. Again, the 
meaning of responsibility is complicity through past role performances. In a 2011 
debate on the relations to and arms trade with the United Arabic Emirates, one PCF MP 
noted: 'When you see what happened in Libya where Sarkozy sold war materials to the 
 




tyrant Gaddafi - still there - with the dramatic consequences that we now know, we can 
only have worries with this short-sighted [...] policy.' (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 4148)  
Chapter 4 described the alternative national role that the PCF paired with the leader. It 
defined responsibility as culpability and complicity. An implication was France ought 
to be accountable for its decisions and role performance as arms trader and intervener 
and the harm caused by arms sold and bombs dropped. The party argued that France's 
responsibility was to lead on calls for an immediate ceasefire and a political solution 
(Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5227).  
In sum, focusing on the presence and meaning of responsibility in French national role 
statements helped clarify the reasoning or narratives on the conflict and intervention. 
The attention paid to responsibility and its various definitions helped understand the 
variation in alternative roles selected to fill the leader role with purpose. Responsibility 
formed part of parties' causal reasoning to make sense of the events. 
3. German parties and responsibility in national roles  
German responsibility and conceptions of responsibility are explicit in role theory 
studies of German foreign policy. Maull (2015a, 2015b) makes the (normative) case for 
a leader role based on responsibility. He draws this role conception from the:  
[...] material, moral and psychological impact of the catastrophe that National 
Socialism had brought over Germany and Europe. The notion of “German 
responsibility" has its roots in a sense of German collective guilt and projected 
desire to atone but also to regain political respectability and agency. (Maull 
2015b, 11–12)  
Maull (2014) also notes that German role responsibility is first toward Europe and 
Israel, and only then toward the wider world. The basis for this prioritisation in 
responsibility is its historic role as threat to neighbouring states and its Nazi past. As 
was seen in chapter 5, this type of responsibility to refrain from repeating history 
translates into the civilian power role. The dual responsibility for and based on the past 
is one of culpability and accountability. It has a moral dimension. It is linked to 
perceived alter-role expectations and the perception of others as threat and the need 
to be perceived as reliable partner. It required credible trust- and institution-building. 
This explains the need to avoid acting alone and isolation, in what is commonly referred 
to as German exceptionalism (Sonderweg).  
 




The German foreign policy and role theory literature also refers to a growing German 
responsibility. The scope of 'responsibility' expanded from the 1990s. Changing role 
expectations evidence this. Krotz (2015, 134) notes the evolution of Germany’s civilian 
power role that went ‘[...] hand in hand with subtle domestic reinterpretations of the 
meaning of “responsibility,” with the term now frequently coupled with the idea that 
Germany should have a greater say in international affairs.’ Harnisch (2001, 49) finds 
growing expectations toward Germany: ‘[...] a strong influence of alter-expectations can 
be identified in central terms such as ‘Germany’s (grown) responsibilities’ or ‘new 
German duties’ during the phase of unification.’ The roots of this German responsibility, 
not least for the domestic audience, are the violent recent past. Yet, the growing alter-
role expectations of Germany assuming responsibility draws on its economic strength 
and regional position, i.e. on material capabilities. Structural realist Waltz (1993) noted 
that Germany's rise to great power status was inevitable once it regained full 
sovereignty. Given Germany's capacities there are expectations toward it to assume a 
greater share or burden of the responsibility for the maintenance of international 
order, peace and security. In common understanding, this responsibility implies the 
willingness to finance and use military force when necessary, under certain conditions.  
I identified three types of responsibility in German parties' narratives as part of or 
linked to national role expressions. It was Germany's responsibility to do something. 
This was clearest in the Green Party's statements and also present in the SPD's, and 
linked to the human rights defender role that completed the parties' alliance partner 
role interpretation. Another German responsibility was culpability and complicity. This 
was central in Die Linke's reasoning about events in Libya and German role proposal 
as negotiator-mediator. Finally, the coalition parties' raised the responsibility of others. 
The responsibility to do something was pinned on other states as part of the CDU/CSU 
and FDP's interpretation of alliance partner role as responsible and supportive.  
3.1. A German responsibility to do something 
The Green Party and SPD argued that Germany ought to do something. One Green Party 
MP noted that 'we'-Germany had a responsibility to assume responsibility because 
Libyan people were asking for help, and the Arab League, African Union and regional 
states were supporting a no-fly zone. She used others in support of her argument that 
Germany had to assume its responsibility:  
 




It is necessary. The dilemma we all experienced: Gaddafi is shooting at his people 
instead of protecting them. [...] It is at this point, our responsibility to defend 
human rights und not only with words but also with UN-resolutions and other 
means. [...] need to be humble [...] and know of our responsibility [...] (Künast 
(Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 11149–50) 
In this quote 'our responsibility' suggests an inherently German responsibility, 
plausibly the responsibility for and based on the past to prevent the repeat of history 
(confirmed in interviews with former MPs, June 2017 and consistent with manifestos 
(Bündnis 90 Die Grünen 2002, 2009a)). It revealed a self-image based on German 
responsibility. It links past self and its crimes to present others and their fates. It is a 
form of reparation for the past for what can never be repaired or repaid. This 
responsibility linked to the human rights defender role. It was invoked along with R2P. 
This suggested that the party also viewed Germany's responsibility within the R2P 
framework and as part of the so-called international community and its norms.  
Yet, the party's notion of responsibility was about more than defending human rights 
and acting in accordance with international norms. The above quote continues:  
How can we avoid the perception that Germany does not care enough about 
human rights there? [...] We want to see the foreign minister fight for human 
rights. We want that Germany stands (Wir wollen, dass Deutschland steht) [...]. 
(Künast (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 11149–50) 
The reference to standing and fighting for human rights also links to a notion of German 
responsibility based on its capacity, status, image and alter-role expectations. Yet, it 
was about more than the capacity to intervene, it was also about being seen to care 
about and to fight for human rights. It was about others perceptions of Germany and 
standing on the right side, with Libyans but also with alliance and European partners. 
In part this was can be attributed to the desire to avoid isolation and exceptionalism 
(confirmed during interviews, June 2017). In other part, doing something to be seen as 
doing may be part of role performance role for oneself more and others rather than the 
people allegedly saved or protected (e.g. Fassin 2013).  
The SPD's responsibility to do something was less explicit. Like the Green Party there 
was a desire to be seen to do something and to be on the right side. One MP asked why 
Germany did not want to be part of a majority when it voted in the UNSC. He continued: 
what would the people in North Africa who had welcomed the foreign minister with 
cheers think now? He suggested that they now would have a different view of Germany, 
given it did not align with its European partners and did not dare vote against a dictator. 
 




(Mützenich (SPD) 2011b, 11140, 11141) The SPD and Green Party's stress on being 
seen to do something and being on the right side, i.e. the same as key partners linked 
the responsibility to do something back to the united and loyal alliance partner roles.  
One SPD MP mentioned R2P. A responsibility to act and do something when dictators 
attack peaceful civilians, was implied: '[...] I think it is a shame that the government as 
member of the UNSC abstained in such a situation. There is no abstention vis-à-vis 
despots on such a decision.' (Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) 2011, 11145) Finally, the 
expression of shame indicated a moral dimension to this responsibility notion. The 
Rwanda analogy (Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) 2011, 11145) pointed to past failures and the 
need to learn lessons from policy mistakes. Moreover, the party's self-reflection on 
mistakes such as supporting North African regimes for stability reasons implied a form 
of acceptance of responsibility. These notions to the conception of responsibility as 
complicity that will be reviewed next.  
3.2. German responsibility as culpability, complicity and accountability 
Responsibility as complicity and culpability was not only discernible in parties' 
references to Germany's past mistakes in relations with North African regimes. It was 
also integral part of Die Linke's understanding of Germany's role and responsibility.  
Key to understanding the party's responsibility was its description of Germany's past 
role performance as supporter of regimes like Libya and as arms trader. One MP noted:  
I also do not believe that Germany was involved positively in the uprisings. […] 
We share responsibility for all those regimes. We supported them, we 
strengthened them, we held their hand, and we made deals with them. That is 
also part of the truth. (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011b, 10822)   
In response to the SPD reference to R2P, another MP said:  
I have to tell SPD something. [...] when you speak of R2P, I want to remind you 
that it was when you were government minister that Germany exported weapons 
to Libya. (Applause) Under the grand-coalition, weapons worth 86 million Euro 
were exported to Libya which are now being used against the insurgents. That is 
the responsibility of the SPD. If you are now saying, after we exported weapons: 
“then we will fight them with our armed forces” then that is – the word I want to 
use I am not allowed to – but that cannot be topped. (Applause) By the way, I am 
of the opinion that Germany should not export any weapons [...]. (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2011, 11146 Van Aken) 
In relation to the military intervention in Libya, MPs argued that it was irresponsible to 
send German soldiers to fight against the Libyan forces armed with German weapons.  
 




Another German responsibility concerned its economic policy and trade partner role. 
It was implicit in Die Linke's criticism of German domestic economic and export policy. 
It argued that these policies had led to the food prices rise that triggered the Tunisian 
uprising. (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011b, 10823) The party directly linked the Arab 
uprisings to German policy-making.  This notion of responsibility was consistent with 
Die Linke's 2009 manifesto and its worldview of interdependence and materialism that 
implied a link between the economy and other policy areas.  
Die Linke's German responsibility conception was clearly linked to past and present 
German roles and role performance. Responsibility was backward looking and a form 
of accountability for past decisions. Assuming responsibility would be to refrain from 
such decisions in the future. The party's alternative role proposal was also a challenge 
to the dominant view that assuming responsibility necessarily means using force in 
international relations (interview with a Die Linke MP, June 2017). Underlying the 
party's role contestation through the proposal of the negotiator-mediator role was a 
contestation of dominant definitions of responsibility and resistance against the role 
socialisation coming from international norms and other states that expect Germany to 
assume such responsibility and play more forceful roles in the future.  
3.3. Others' responsibility 
The coalition parties agreed with the SPD and the Green Party on the responsibility to 
do something but viewed it as the primary responsibility of the Arab and regional states. 
Recognising Germany's responsibility as UNSC member, the foreign minister noted: 
As member of the UNSC Germany has special responsibility for international 
security in this difficult situation. We respect and welcome the resolution of the 
Arab League of last weekend. However, we see the responsibility for further 
action of the international community firstly with the states of the region. This 
will influence our positioning in New York. (Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10815) 
His Arab responsibility conceptualisation was echoed by party colleagues and the 
coalition partner (FDP 2011; Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10816; Stinner (FDP) 2011b, 
10824; Silberhorn (CDU/CSU) 2011; Mißfelder (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10826; Götzer 
(CDU/CSU) 2011b, 10830; Polenz (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11142–43).  
One CDU/CSU MP explained:  
 [The Arab League] has to be ready to implement a no fly zone. The Arab League 
requested UN mandate is a necessary first condition. Decisive, however, is the 
Arab self-responsibility to protect the civilian populations in Libya. […] If the 
 




Arab League’s expectations is solely toward NATO and the EU as a consequence 
of its declarations, then I must say: there is no such division of labour with us. 
The Arab League must, if it demands a no fly zone, not only politically but also 
military take responsibility for the implementation and its possible 
consequences. In particular, […] those who have the military capacities and 
modern air force need to step up. The Arab League spoke at its foundation of the 
unity of the Arab nation. Why are the Arab states that have overcome the colonial 
heritage not willing to come to the help of the threatened Libyans? That would 
be an Arab and not again an outside intervention. (Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 
2011c, 10820–21) 
Another MP noted that Germany assuming its responsibility was contingent on the 
Arab League first assuming its responsibilities. (Mißfelder (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10826)  
Chapter 5 argued that the coalition parties' engagement with R2P led to a reframing of 
the concept in the case of Libya. The two parties proposed a regional or kin/ethnic 
responsibility as an intermediary step between a state's and the international 
community's responsibility to protect. This reframing was a self-responsibility in line 
with these parties' view of German responsibility and the responsible alliance partner 
role interpretation. It was congruent with their individualistic and conservative views.  
It is a type of responsibility that is narrow on the self or the state and that then expands 
layer by layer: state-region-world. In this case this meant that it became others', i.e. an 
Arab, responsibility to do something about Libya before Germany would. This notion of 
responsibility was indicative of resistance against alter-role prescriptions based on 
Germany's material capacity to intervene, its status as a regional power and stated 
global ambitions. The coalition rejected the dominant meaning of responsibility for 
itself, casting it onto others. It justified this by reference to past interventions' failure, 
Arab public opinion and Arab's states need to take the actions they are calling for.  
Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter was an exploration of the concept of responsibility and its meanings in 
parties' national role statements. It showed that all French and German parties referred 
to responsibility in their narratives but disagreed on its meaning. This chapter suggests 
that there were similarities between the centre parties in France and Germany. They 
were focused on the responsibility to do something and of portraying non-intervention 
as inaction and morally irresponsible. The UMP, PS, SPD and Green Party shared this 
view. At the same time this responsibility had strong alter-role expectation and 
perceived role-performativity components. The parties wanted their states to be seen to 
act in a certain way. This type of responsibility was linked to two ostentatiously values-
 




based roles: Universal-French values defender and the human rights defender roles. In 
the two country-cases, these roles gave purpose or added meaning to the master-role. In 
the case of France this responsibility and its associated role also revealed a tension at the 
heart of French history. MPs portrayed the role enactment as an honour and filling them 
with pride (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883; Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1882). They spoke of the 
choices France had made: 'This is the choice of responsibility.’ (Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 
5219) At the same time, assuming responsibility and the use of force was described as 
duty and compulsion without alternative (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1878; Cazeneuve (PS) 
2011, 5227). While this tension may have been based on rhetoric and the political need 
to justify the decision, it may also reveal a tension at the heart of the responsibility to do 
something (and R2P) and raises the question of whether this poses role conflict or 
dilemmas.  
Interestingly, the CUD/CSU and FDP did not share this notion of responsibility entirely. 
They also rejected inaction but, like the PCF and Die Linke, argued that not intervening 
was not inaction. The coalition parties revealed a different definition of international 
responsibility challenging dominant views of whom and to whom responsibility is owed. 
This responsibility conceptualisation connected with their responsible alliance partner 
role interpretation and the contestation of this role as understood as follower. These 
parties' responsibility definition and the linked role raise questions about the future of 
German role performance and whether it will continue to contest dominant views of the 
meaning of international responsibility.  
Finally, the chapter found a second near consensus on the radical left. They argued that 
responsibility was not only to do something in the moment, but also to act in certain ways 
before and in the future. It was a responsibility understood as complicity, culpability and 
accountability for past decisions and actions. It called for restraint on role patterns. They 
also appeared to agree on national variants of the negotiator-mediator role. This points 
to the sharing of narratives on the causes of conflict and effects of intervention, similar 
engagement with international norms, like R2P, and the relevance of socialist ideology.  
In sum, this exploration of responsibility began to unravel the links between national 
roles and definitions of responsibility as part of foreign policy narratives and national 
role statements. It showed that taking a closer look at responsibility can help understand 
reasoning beneath national role socialisation, selection, interpretation and contestation. 
 
 




Chapter 7: Conclusions 
November 2011 marked hundred years of bombing from an airplane. In a coincidence 
of history, the first such air bomb was dropped in 1911 on an oasis in Libya from an 
Italian machine. It was the beginning of a new form of making war (OpenDemocracy 
2011). In March 2011, bombs on Libya marked another first in the use of force and 
modern warfare, albeit of a different type. R2P was invoked for the first time in a UNSC 
resolution to mandate a no fly zone to incapacitate a country's armed forces and 
authorising a military intervention in a state without its consent. Thus, nearly 100 
years apart, Libya was being bombed from the air by European states again. This near-
centenary bombing repetition was met with domestic controversy in a number of 
these states and some international and regional organisations, such as the African 
Union. Also, non-intervening states criticised the mission from the start or shortly 
after it appeared to expand its remits from protecting civilians to regime change.   
This thesis aimed to cast light on domestic controversies around foreign policy 
decision-making in France and Germany in the context of the 2011 Libya military 
intervention. Such domestic debates were conceptualised as instances of potential 
party disagreement over foreign policy and as moments in which parties are likely to 
express – and contest – national roles. The intention was to pay attention to parties, 
as an often overlooked political actor in foreign policy studies, as much as to domestic 
controversies as underrated moments, often overshadowed by decision-making itself 
and thrive for causal explanations for decisions.  
The thesis found that French and German parties did not always agree on the national 
role and sometimes also interpreted the same national role differently and, that they 
directly and indirectly contested the national role. The central argument was that this 
variation is based on ideas as much as on domestic political needs and international 
role socialisation pressures. The reasoning for this was that parties have to rationalise 
even political necessities in acceptable and compatible terms for themselves and for 
their various domestic and international audiences. Ideas underlying national roles in 
foreign policy narratives influence the selection and definition of these roles. Domestic 
role contestation can be part of the role location process. The pressures of role 
socialisation are felt unequally within a party system.  Ideologies and international 
norms and foreign policy traditions are ideas that underpin role socialisation, 
selection, interpretation and contestation. 
 




The thesis contributed to an increasing body of research on parties and foreign policy. 
Chapter 1 noted that FPA provides evidence for parties' indirect influence on foreign 
policy decision-making. Parties have opportunities to shape foreign policy decision-
making and incentives to express stances on foreign policy. Moreover, such positions 
also correspond to ideas about human nature, society and the international system. 
This thesis added to the existing scholarship on parties and military intervention. It 
took the opportunities of and political incentives for French and German parties as 
justifications for the country case selection. The thesis' focus on ideologies, norms and 
foreign policy traditions added a multi-level ideational dimension to existing parties 
and military intervention studies.  
The present study also made a contribution to role theory, developing and using a 
multi-level ideational role theoretical framework. The study filled a research gap by 
focusing on parties. It unpacked the state and national political elites. The empirical 
chapters carved out differences in national role socialisation and variation in role 
interpretations. They traced the differences to underlying ideas that shape parties' 
role selection and interpretations and can be the basis for domestic role contestation. 
This helped reveal parties' understandings of and frames for the conflict in Libya.  
The thesis illustrated that even in cases of apparent elite national role consensus, such 
as in France and Germany, as some would argue, a closer look at the details and the 
practical implications of proposed national roles revealed the existence of differences 
and domestic role contestation. The focus on international norms and ideologies 
proved valuable for identifying this variation, effects of role socialisation on different 
parties and the sources of parties' domestic role contestation. The inclusion of foreign 
policy traditions, as a form of past role script for parties to select and interpret in light 
of the new context, was suitable to better account for national differences. 
This final chapter draws conclusions from the thesis. Part 1 summarises the findings. 
Part 2 discusses the theoretical and conceptual contributions. Part 3 addresses the 
obstacles encountered during the research process and revisits the challenges and 
limitations presented in chapter 3. Part 4 closes this thesis with questions raised that 
the thesis' scope did not allow to address and proposes future research opportunities.  
 




1. Assessing findings and making arguments  
The key findings were that there was agreement on the national roles between parties. 
Sometimes parties proposed additional or alternative national roles. They did not 
interpret the national role in the same ways and contest each other on this. Ideas are 
a source of role selection, interpretation and contestation. Some conclusions can be 
drawn from studying French and German parties together. 
1.1. Party agreement on national roles in the context of Libya 
The first finding was that there was role consensus between most parties on the 
master role. The three French parties all stressed France's leader role. In Germany, all 
but one party defended agreed on the alliance partner role. This agreement was 
expected from role theory and foreign policy literature. Yet, this thesis started out 
questioning the likelihood of role consensus. The evidence suggests that national roles 
are deeply rooted, at least within the political elites. This points to the strength of path 
dependency and of culture and identity. Moreover, it is indicative of the importance of 
the perception of consistency and credibility in international relations as part of 
national role selection. Despite the prevalence and strength of French and German 
master roles, a closer look at additional and alternative roles some parties proposed 
suggests that there is disagreement within the apparent consensus. 
1.2. Parties' complementary roles and alternative roles  
A second finding was that, on the one hand, parties sometimes proposed roles which 
are complementary to the main national roles in the context of Libya, and on the other 
hand, some parties expressed alternative roles. In France, the PCF complemented the 
leader role with a UN reformer and mediator role that no other party explicitly shared. 
The PS emphasised a European role as part of the leader role. The UMP and the PS also 
expressed regional protector and defender of Universal-French values roles. In 
Germany, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition proposed an alliance supportive role and a 
trade partner and democratic transition supporter role, in addition to the alliance 
partner role. The SPD and Green Party, instead, stressed a human rights defender role, 
as part of the alliance partner role. Die Linke proposed an altogether different role, as 
one of negotiator and mediator, that the FDP also hinted at.  
This variation in national role proposals was expected as part of this thesis’ challenge 
to assumptions of elite role consensus. These differences suggested that parties have 
 




different role priorities and perceptions, even as they agree on the national role 
appropriate to perform in the specific 2011 context. The evidence of different 
combinations of roles, further, points to underlying differences in goals and means and 
to potential variations in role interpretations. Thus, it can be concluded that parties 
sometimes disagree on the national role to perform in a specific context. This was the 
first evidence of parties' national role contestation. 
1.3. Parties national role interpretations and contestation 
The third finding of this thesis was that parties sometimes interpreted the same 
national role differently, in the 2011 Libya case. In France, the UMP defined and 
defended an active leader role, downplaying traditional European elements and 
NATO's involvement in an attempt to counter anticipated domestic criticism. The PS 
and the PCF proposed a credible leader role. The two defined credibility as leader as 
acting independently. They differed on how this credibility played out practically. The 
PS conceptualised this role as European and consistent with the defender of Universal-
French values. The PCF also interpreted the role as acting consistently but its addition 
of a UN reformer and mediator role suggested that the party viewed the means of role 
performance different. In Germany, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition parties defined and 
justified a responsible alliance partner role, complementing it with alliance supporter, 
trade partner and democratic transition support roles. The FDP added a negotiator 
and mediator role similar to that of Die Linke. The SPD defined a united and the Green 
Party a loyal alliance partner role. The two parties viewed a human rights defender 
role as forming part of this national role.  
The qualification of the national roles the parties proposed helped identify the 
variation in interpretation of the same roles, as did attention paid to connected 
complementary roles. The evidence for this variation suggests that even on national 
roles which are nominally the same there can and was disagreement. The existence of 
these differences in national role interpretations between parties was the second 
evidence for domestic role contestation between parties. The findings further 
suggested that not only opposition parties contest national roles but also governing 
parties invest time and effort in justifying their role interpretations against expected 
contestation, i.e. claims that the state did not perform its rightful role, within 
anticipated criticism of foreign policy decision-making.  
 




The findings suggested that parties contested the national role. While the master roles 
(leader and civilian power) were agreed upon, all parties contested dominant and/or 
other parties' role interpretations and, if applicable, the governing parties' role 
performance. In other words, despite agreement on terminology and the master role 
to perform, parties disagreed on role priorities and how the role ought to be enacted.  
The role contestation took at least one of two ways. First, some parties selected and 
proposed alternative national roles to other parties. Die Linke contested the alliance 
partner role, despite appearing not to contest the civilian power role. Second, most 
parties contested each other from within the agreement on the role to perform in the 
case of Libya specifically. All other German parties agreed on the alliance partner role 
but contested each other within. The CDU/CSU and FDP coalition partners contested 
traditional role interpretation as follower, defining the role instead as independent, 
responsible alliance partner. The SPD and Green Party contested the governing parties 
on this. In France, all three parties agreed on the leader role but proposed varying 
degrees of different role priorities and interpretations of it.  
1.4. Ideologies, international norms and traditions 
The central argument of this thesis was that ideologies, an engagement with 
international norms and foreign policy traditions underlie parties' national role 
selection and the role interpretations based on which parties select the same national 
role. Parties engage with international norms from an ideological basis and select 
roles that correspond to their understanding of conflict and of the international 
system. Foreign policy traditions serve as past role enactment scripts but they are 
selected and also interpreted in light of the new context. Parties have a level of 
bounded agency to select national roles from a range of past roles and/or perceived 
role performances and to interpret them. This leads to a domestic role socialisation 
process that can shape variation in role proposals and interpretations.  
A second argument was that parties propose and interpret national roles, despite not 
having influence on actual decision-making in a specific case. This indicates that they 
do this as part of a process of foreign policy position finding and expression, 
automatically so-to speak. However, they are limited, in the range of roles they can 
thus propose, by the need to remain credible domestically (and internationally). 
Similarly, they could be signalling to other states their disagreement with government 
role performance in an attempt to soften the criticism of the state's decision-making 
 




or to maintain international networks and perceptions. However, this thesis argued 
that such domestic political needs and international role pressures from other states' 
expectations or system-wide ideas about how a state of a certain type ought to act are 
rationalised through ideas’ frameworks such as the one proposed in this thesis.  
1.5. Comparing French and German parties  
The case selection of France and Germany, French and German parties inevitably 
added a comparative element, despite the thesis not being a formal comparative study. 
Some general conclusions can be drawn from it. The least-likely of France, because 
parties have little to no influence on foreign policy decision-making outside of 
presidential and government tenure, showed that parties still interpret the national 
role differently as part of different foreign policy narratives and contest each other on 
roles. Thus, it is likely that parties in other states of similar status and with similarly 
weak parties also differ on national roles in the ways identified in this thesis. In both 
country cases, one recurring claim is the existence of a strong national consensus on 
foreign policy and on national roles. The varied role interpretations and role 
contestation identified in both cases suggest that consensus has to be questioned, even 
in cases in which it appears strong. This is particularly interesting to observe in states 
of the position, status and ambitions like France and Germany, and in phases in which 
such powers are challenged or consolidate, are on the descent or the ascent. It showed 
that in both cases, a central issue to international relations, like the use of military 
force, is. becomes or remains contested and political. Differences exist and persist, 
despite or because the stakes and expectations are so high in states with the capacity 
and sometimes the willingness to use force. The thesis, thus, can help formulate 
expectations toward similar states, in Europe and in other regions. 
In sum, this thesis found evidence for domestic role contestation and differences in 
role socialisation, in France and Germany, on the domestic level. The research was not 
designed to compare nor to make causal claims or predict future outcomes. Yet, 
France's role enactment and opposition parties' contestations of the national role 
interpretation it represented suggests that this role was being reinterpreted and that 
no consensus had been reached.  The German decision to abstain and not participate 
in the mission can also be understood as national role reinterpretation. It was an effort 
to reframe responsibility norms and expectations toward aspiring, rising powers such 
as Germany, but also China, Brazil or India. It can be speculated that differentiated 
 




domestic role socialisation can have effects on decision-making and on international 
normative development, and future alter-role socialisation pressures towards states 
with the status and/or capabilities such as the two studied here.  
2. Contributions 
This thesis contributed to role theory a direct study of parties and a conceptual 
discussion of responsibility within national roles. It also added knowledge to research 
at the intersection of FPA and party research.  
2.1. Role theory: parties as the level of analysis 
Role theory has made important contributions since renewed interest in the approach 
began. Some scholars have worked on the socialising effects of the international 
system and other states. They have focused on the role location process and the 
pressures on states due to their social position and capacities in the international 
system of states (e.g. Thies 2010, 2012, 2013). Other scholars have looked at 
assumptions of role consensus within national elites and between elites and the 
public. Unpacking ego, they have located domestic role contestation in a number of 
states (e.g. Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016b). Moreover, role theorists have started 
focusing on the sources of national role conceptions, paying attention to foreign policy 
traditions, international norms and ideologies within foreign policy narratives (e.g. 
Wehner and Thies 2014; Hansel and Möller 2015). Some of the existing scholarship 
paid indirect attention to parties or mentioned parties in passing (Brummer and Thies 
2015). However, parties remain largely overlooked. 
Thus, through a focus on parties, this thesis adds to research on role socialisation, a 
domestic level study that can refine the role location process. Parties were shown to 
select different roles and react differently to the same/similar alter-role expectations. 
These expectations and those based on international norms had different effects on 
different parties. This was based on ideological predispositions, an engagement with 
international norms and the selection and interpretation of foreign policy traditions. 
Related, this study of parties adds to research on domestic role contestation. It found 
that parties sometimes select and/prioritise different roles in the same situation 
(inter-party contestation) and/or interpret them differently to other parties (intra-
party contestation). The focus on parties was doubly interesting. This thesis added to 
knowledge on horizontal role contestation. Through parties' link and representational 
 




functions, it also provides indications of vertical role contestation and indicated the 
presence of the public as a significant other putting pressures on parties. Finally, the 
use of narrative methods contributed to systematising this role theory tool.  
2.2. Role theory and the concept of responsibility 
Role theory approach studies rarely focus on concepts within national role 
conceptions. Some scholars, using the interpretive methodology, identify differences 
and dilemmas between domestic actors. There is a large body of IR research on 
concepts such as responsibility. This particular concept is also omnipresent in studies 
of French and German role research and foreign policy analysis. This seemed to 
suggest that it is central to understanding these two (and other states') foreign policy 
actors' national role conceptions. However, there is an absence of studies looking at 
key concepts within national roles in general or in the case of particular country cases. 
This thesis addresses this gap with an exploration of the concept of responsibility in 
national role statements of French and German parties. The choice of responsibility as 
the theme to explore in more depth was based on content analysis. The ubiquity of 
responsibility and related words in the primary data was not surprising. Closer 
attention suggested that parties interpreted it differently. This had an effect on which 
national roles were selected and how they were interpreted. The argument of this 
exploration is that national role statements include and are linked to responsibility. 
How parties define responsibility can be traced in their narratives. The concept of 
responsibility appeared to shape parties' views on how the state ought to act, Thus, 
studying responsibility in role statements can grasp variations in role interpretation 
and the sources of domestic role contestation. It can also inform on domestic 
differences in role socialisation, when parties interpret responsibility differently and, 
hence, engage with a concept or international norm such as R2P differently.  
This thesis could also add to the study of responsibility in IR and challenge scholarship 
that assumes a definition of responsibility and responsible behaviour for states of 
certain capacities and social positions in the international system.  
2.3. Parties and foreign policy of military interventions 
This study makes contributions to parties and military intervention studies. Some new 
studies started looking at military intervention as policy issue across the spectrum. 
(Wagner et al. 2017a, 2017b) This study added a study of French and German parties 
 




across the political spectrum and foreign policy and a closer look at underlying ideas 
in national roles regarding one specific policy issue. It further substantiates that left-
right typologies are hard to make on military intervention as much as on national roles 
or interpretations. This thesis provides empirical evidence for differences between 
parties on military intervention based on ideas through a national role lens. It 
confirmed an ideological convergence at the centre where a pro-interventionist stance 
was notable and combined with ethical reasoning. There was also a stark ideological 
divergence within the left, with radical left-wing parties rejecting intervention on 
similar bases across borders and centre-left parties seemingly in favour for similar 
reasons and more influenced by innovation in the international normative context.  
A second contribution is a focus on parties and foreign policy more generally. 
Moreover, much of the research on European parties and foreign policy focus on 
Europe, or rather the EU, as a policy issue. Second, this thesis confirms that role theory 
is a useful tool for studying parties' foreign policy stances and underlying ideas, 
because parties channel their ideas on the international and foreign policy agenda 
through the state lens. They need the state to put their foreign policy programme into 
practice and formulate their ideas in terms of national roles. It was noted that radical 
left parties are more likely to present generalizable national roles, albeit they also put 
a national twist on these roles. For example, in France and Germany, the radical left 
proposed a negotiator, mediator and/or UN reformer role based on ideologies. 
However, they too specified that their states could be leaders or initiators enacting 
these roles. All parties defined the proposed roles in reference to past role enactment 
and based on foreign policy traditions. 
3. Reflections on challenges and limitations  
The research process met with challenges and the thesis reached limits at various 
points. The following sections outline difficulties and limitations. Part 4 seeks to 
translate the potential weaknesses into future research ideas. 
3.1. Naming parties' national role interpretations 
A first difficulty was describing the national roles parties were interpreting. As 
Fazendeiro (2016) notes, ascribing and categorising national roles comes with various 
challenges. Each role already implies assumptions. For example, stating that someone 
is performing a leader role evokes an image of what a leader looks and ought to look 
 




like. This is particularly relevant for the case of France, where the state and its 
presidents have been ascribed leader roles. Moreover, an expectation of what leader-
like behaviour looks like seems to exist. Identifying and analysing variation in national 
roles and role conceptions proved particularly challenging in this case, because the 
role ascriptions and the role elements appear so fixed (rather than deep-rooted as I 
contend). Fazendeiro argues that by providing typologies and generalising roles, the 
scholar contributes to normalising particular views of what each role implies. This 
reduces the possibility or the parameters for the reinterpretation of roles in practice 
and, thus, can have real effects on the scope of the possible and actual role selection. 
There seemed little escape from this limitation, other than a reflection on the author's 
part in fixing meaning to roles.  
This thesis refined the identified national roles with adjectives. This qualification 
where national roles resembled each other but differed in detail and implications 
contributes to more open, less fixed definitions. In practice, this meant that role 
description changed throughout the research and the writing process. Reflexion on 
assumed role elements and how appropriate performance looks like through such 
refinement can also contribute to consideration and debate on national roles, as goals 
and means are not fixed in meaning.   
3.2. Identifying political concepts  
Another related challenge was the identification and 'categorisation' of political 
concepts. The morphological approach outlined in chapter 2 was presented as a useful 
tool because it allows the differentiation between at first similar ideologies through 
identification of central and adjacent concepts. However, in practice, parties 
referenced and appeared to stress the same political concepts, in debates and 
manifestos. Inference-making from apparently central concepts that often come in 
tandem with the same set of other political concepts difficult.  
Reading a greater variety of party materials and coding the documents party by party, 
rather than in the order of speaking in debates or document type by type addressed 
this practical difficulty. Through these adaptations, a grasp of the differences in how 
parties understand human nature, domestic and international society's respective 
nature and problems of and the ideal society was achieved.  
 




3.3. Self-reflections on the subject of research 
A third challenge of the research process was my 'situatedness'. Personal interest 
guided the choice of military intervention and Libya, as part of my teenage years were 
spent in neighbouring Tunisia. I have personal opinions on military interventions. 
While not entirely against the use of force, I am sceptical of its immediate and long-
term effectiveness in bringing about peace and a sustainable political settlement. 
Moreover, I come from a family history of party activism, heterodox economic 
perspectives and foreign policy practice. It was challenging to keep the normative 
claims thesis to a minimum and to take a step back from personal political opinions 
on the historical division on the left on foreign policy. This particular closeness bore 
the danger of being not enough or too critical of my own political preferences and 
party affinities. A lifetime exposure to criticism of mainstream economic policy-
making has instilled me with an exaggerated perception of the importance of minority 
views and the view that it all boils down to the economy and, hence, an overly 
materialist perspective. Finally, my experience of foreign policy practice in a country 
not under study brought a sense of understanding that could obscure the view on 
other possible ways of grasping the cases in this thesis.  
Identifying these personal challenges was the first step to address them. In practice, 
self-reflection has meant trying to keep normative claims to a minimum. It has also 
implied curtailing the desire to give an alternative, radical, in the two country cases 
left-wing, voices too much space. I had to balance representing these parties with 
over-representing them, given political realities and their actual and plausible future 
influence. I also tried to learn as much as possible on foreign policy decision-making 
and the role of parties in France and Germany to avoid over-relying on knowledge of 
party politics in Austrian foreign policy practices.  
3.4. Can we generalise from two countries and one intervention case? 
A first limitation of the thesis is its generalisability. One possible challenge could be 
that it only explores one case of intervention in two country cases and, by focusing on 
detail and thick description, it may say little beyond the Libya and France and 
Germany case. An early ambition of this research project was to include an analysis of 
other recent cases such as intervention or non-intervention in Ivory Coast, Mali and 
Syria to contrast with the Libyan intervention. This would have served as context and 
 




could have helped establish consistency. Space and time, and the thick description of 
the Libya case precluded the inclusion of other cases in a satisfactory way. 
The limitation of the study based on the number of intervention cases is regrettable. 
However, the declared aim was to provide thick description and analysis of one case, 
instead of a multitude of cases. Given the relative absence of role theoretical studies 
on parties, international norms and ideologies, this thesis was the first step, prior to 
more comparative and more generalisable studies. Moreover, as indicated above, 
some general conclusions can nevertheless be drawn from the case selection. Finally, 
the concluding remarks situate the thesis' broader relevance and implications and 
stress the usefulness of selecting France and Germany as the country case studies.  
3.5. Foregoing explanations and causality 
A second limitation of this study is its lack of explanatory power. One charge could be 
that it is irrelevant for understanding decision-making, decisions and outcomes. 
Moreover, not seeking to establish causality between parties' national role selection, 
interpretation, domestic role contestation and policy decision-making may 
overestimate the importance of parties and the relevance of divergences in national 
roles and role conceptions. However, research indirectly suggesting parties' influence 
exists and was the starting point for taking a step back to look at a moment prior to or 
detached from pre-occupation with such influence. Parties' opportunities and 
incentives to shape foreign policy decision-making, and distinct ideology-based ideas 
about foreign policy were taken as the starting point for an exploration of parties. 
Domestic controversies were taken as an opportunity to look closer at the differences 
that could shift, shape or influence foreign policy decision-making. 
It was never the intention to prove that parties shifted, shaped or influenced the 
debate in this decision-making case. The research question and aims were ostensibly 
not to uncover causal links and explain role performance. It was also not an aim to 
prove that parties are the only or even the most important drivers of foreign policy 
decision-making. The research strategy and design of such a project would have been 
different. The timing of the debates and controversy in the country cases would have 
complicated such a study. In Germany, the government did not put the case for 
intervention to a parliamentary vote, given that it did not seek approval for an out-of-
area mission. Moreover, the debate before the UNSC resolution vote was held under 
 




the widespread assumption that the US would veto it. In France, the debates took place 
after the country had started the military campaign.  
Taken together these challenges and limitations of a thesis that is the first step in role 
theory application to parties and foreign policy point to possible future research.    
4. Future research  
The motivation for the PhD application was an interest in the events in the North of 
Africa in 2010 and since, and a concern for the impact of the 2011 events in Libya on 
the region, not least because I spent some years growing up in Tunisia. As the research 
project narrowed down in its first year, some elements and initial ideas were 
abandoned and other components were added. This process felt natural and never 
imposed. However, some of the early elements kept reappearing as possible future 
research during the PhD process and new research ideas emerged as I was facing the 
challenges and limitations described above. Finally, the research process and 
discussions with others about drafts also raised some of the questions I propose as 
future research opportunities. 
4.1. Exploring causal links  
A first research avenue is to explore the link between partisan national roles and 
domestic role contestation, and decision-making and role performance. It could take 
a closer look at the period before the governing party or parties took a decision and 
trace whether domestic partisan role contestation affected the eventual role selection. 
Another possible research project could pay attention to the possible causal link 
between domestic political factors, such as party competition, the electoral calendar, 
and partisan role selection and role variation. It could explore, in a next step whether 
such factors affected foreign policy decision-making and behaviour.  
Such research could add to understanding the different domestic political factors that 
make up the sources of role contestation. As with a better grasp of the ideational 
sources of domestic role contestation, this could help make predictions of change and 
variation in role expression and state action. (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016b) Such a focus 
could also cast light on the still largely overlooked vertical role contestation between 
electorates/the public and elites via parties and domestic political contexts.  
 




4.2. Unpacking the party 
A second research project is a study intra-party difference in national role preferences, 
interpretations and eventual temporal selection. It could take a closer look at intra-
party fractionalisation, role contestation and selection processes and bear in mind the 
impact of key individual's legacy and influence in parties. Such a study would unpack 
the party that I largely treated as an entity and unitary actor. While I did mention intra-
party and generational differences and individuals that emerged as significant in 
national role conceptions or appeared important to role location processes, the party 
in this work remained a closed unit across the political spectrum and borders. This 
invariably obfuscated party structure, hierarchy and decision-making diversity. It 
neglected the fact that parties are invariably institutions with a number of members, 
with varying degrees of influence, and whose programmes are shaped by members, 
functionaries or leadership individuals in various ways. 
A study taking a closer look by unpacking the party, using role theory, could further 
add to understanding the ideational and political factors which shape domestic actors' 
role conceptions and the processes by and conditions under which one role and/or 
role interpretation are selected over others. This could add to the predictability of 
change and future dilemmas (intra-role and inter-role conflicts). 
4.3. Types of parties and national roles  
The third idea for future research concerns national role conceptions and types of 
parties from left- and right-wing parties to nationalist, secessionist parties. Such 
research could ask: Are there left- or right-wing interpretations of the national role? 
How do regionalist and secessionist parties select national roles? And, if they are 
elected to central parliaments: how do they vote on foreign policy if dominant national 
roles for the central state differing from their preferred aspiring state role?  
There is relatively little research on parties and foreign policy, in general. Most 
existing research focuses on parties across the spectrum or on individual parties or 
single issues, inviting a closer look at one party family or side of the spectrum. A study 
of left- or right-wing parties' (or one party family's) national role conceptions in more 
depth could advance understanding on how ideology affects foreign policy proposals 
and stances through a focus on more tangible national roles, and help predict decision-
making outcomes and how international relations may be shaped in the future.  
 




There is research on aspiring and novice states' role socialisation and selection 
processes, some of which mention the dominant nationalist parties' role conceptions. 
(Thies 2010, 2012, 2013; Beasley, Kaarbo, and Solomon-Strauss 2016; Beasley and 
Kaarbo 2017) Focusing on the national role conceptions of aspiring states' 
nationalist/secessionist parties active in central and regional legislative institutions 
could increase knowledge on role socialisation processes by adding a potential 
domestic role negotiation and selection process in such aspiring states to the equation.  
4.4. The state, parties and multiple role conceptions 
Another idea for future research is based on the observation that this thesis about 
national role conceptions is centrally about the state and ideas about the state: how to 
shape it and act through it internationally. A corollary contention of this thesis is that 
national conceptions about roles in the international sphere are connected through 
ideologies or worldviews to ideas on the domestic role of the state. Parties are not only 
potential foreign policy actors, but they also have roles to play within the state in 
political systems and, thus, have views on their own domestic role. Moreover, parties, 
as part of their ideologies but also shaped by international norms about state 
responsibilities and sovereignty, have views on the role of the state in domestic 
society. Thus, it would be interesting to contrast these three 'role conceptions' and 
their contestation (each party's role conception of parties' role in domestic society, 
their conception of the role of the state on domestic affairs/individuals' lives and their 
national role conception for the state internationally).  
This could be combined with a study of one party family. A study of liberal parties, for 
example, could help to contrast their relation to the state as a domestic actor in their 
ideologies and policy proposals versus as an international actor in their national role 
conceptions. Such a study could carve out ideological underpinnings and 
discrepancies and inherent dilemmas in national (and other) role conceptions. This 
could add depth to the understanding of the role of the state in different ideologies by 
combining different levels of analysis.  
4.5. Roles and responsibility  
Chapter 6 explored the concept of responsibility in national role expressions on 
military intervention and argued that a closer look at its definition helped to 
understand the variation in national role selection and interpretations between 
 




parties. A final future research opportunity could broaden this exploration in at least 
two ways. First, it could look at and compare the place of the concept of responsibility 
in other policy areas. Economic policy (within the EU and regarding other states, e.g. 
in the form of development, patronising) and development policy are other policy 
areas in which of the language of responsibility abounds. A look at them could help 
develop a more solid understanding of responsibility notions and the function and 
effects of its invocation in various policy debates and policy-making. Second, future 
research on roles and responsibility in the case of military intervention could include 
more intervention cases for a better cross-time understanding of the place of 
responsibility in policy debates and policy-making. It could trace the evolution of 
debates on military intervention by analysing the presence and interpretations of 
responsibility of those in favour and those against such operations.   
Conclusion: the broader relevance and some implications  
The thesis took a domestic controversy instance as the entry point to study parties 
and military intervention by way of looking at national role statements in foreign 
policy narratives. It found variation in role selection and interpretations and different 
forms of role contestation. It traced these back to three ideational layers. So what, one 
may ask. So what that French parties disagree within their agreement on a French 
leader role? So what that German parties disagree on how to interpret the alliance 
partner role or propose alternative national roles?  
The concluding paragraphs suggest that the thesis' findings matter because France 
and Germany are two key EU member states with ostentatiously different perceptions 
of the EU's common defence and foreign policy's future direction. Given the two states’ 
pivotal role in European integration history and their special relationship with each 
other since WWII, any conclusions on their national roles in relation to issues foreign 
policy are relevant for the union's future. The EU and the respective other state also 
figured prominently in the national role statements and foreign policy narratives of 
French and German parties, suggesting the continued relevance of the other. As other 
authors suggested, EU member states tend to project their national role onto the EU-
level as the EU's role (e.g. Koenig 2016). This was arguably evident in the case of Libya 
in which Germany proposed a non-violent approach and France went for a more pro-
active, interventionist leader and protector of a neighbouring, strategically important 
region role. The Libyan case also arguably affected, if not damaged, the future of the 
 




CDFP. Thus, a better grasp and closer attention to how national roles are selected, 
debated and contested domestically could inform about the direction of EU policy. To 
know more about the contestation of roles projected onto the EU can improve 
understanding future developments and the ideational sources of any proposed 
projected role. Moreover, it can contribute to a better understanding of the differences 
in international norm contestation and local adaptation between EU member states 
and, thus, inform about what direction of debate between the EU member states may 
take and how the EU may act (or not) in situations similar to Libya in the future.  
The discussion on responsibility and the findings on different meanings and attempts 
of, in particular, German mainstream parties to reinterpret German responsibility in 
combination with the redefinition of R2P adds a layer of information on how 
international norms and ideologies interact with foreign policy traditions in local 
actors, such as parties, to shape role socialisation. It was timely to look at a rising and 
an old regional leader and the definitions of responsibility put forward by their 
parties, especially as a number of other regional leaders emerge as new global or great 
powers and challenge taken for granted international norms. While the thesis does not 
suggest that role socialisation pressures of current great powers are irrelevant or even 
diminished, it will be interesting to follow any challenges to dominant meanings of 
responsibility attributed to great powers as special responsibilities, and Western 
states like Germany's role and contribution to such challenges and shifts. 
From the domestic-level perspective, the inclusion of radical parties added alternative 
understandings of the situation and role selections to the thesis. This was timely, given 
the more recent rise of populist actors from the party system fringes and from within 
some mainstream parties. This upsurge raises questions about the future of foreign 
policy in a number of states across the world today, including some of the largest and 
key EU member states. Across the political spectrum, such parties have in common a 
criticism of the national and international political order and an emphasis on 'the 
people' (defined in various ways). This thesis only lightly touched upon how different 
their national role proposals and their narratives are to centrist parties. The tracing of 
ideas underlying these alternative national roles suggested that these are viable and 
plausible for the state in question and can align with ideas and values others share. 
Thus, they may represent popular alternatives.  
 




In final conclusion, this thesis did not set out to be a normative project or prescriptive 
in its findings, arguments or contributions. However, it is the belief of the author that 
debate is not only healthy in but necessary for democracy. Taking an agonistic view, 
along the lines of the political theorist of democracy, Chantal Mouffe (2013), it is 
proposed in conclusion that foreign policy is intrinsically political. The discussion of 
policy options and alternatives, moderately to radically different views of what society 
and/or state we want to be and which role we want to perform in the world, and the 
contestation of these options, is crucial for coming up with new ways of thinking about 
foreign policy, roles or role interpretations and different policy tools as those already 
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Appendix 2: semi-structured interview  
Introduction 
The rationale for semi-structured interviews was laid out in chapter 3. Part 1 details the 
preparation and provides an annotated questionnaire. Part 2 is the list of interviewees.  
Preparing the questionnaire 
The interviews were organised around two main questions based on the breakdown of the 
research questions and aims of the thesis laid out in chapter 1. The aim was to word open, 
non-predetermining questions to have the interviewees feel at ease to talk about their 
experience of the period, their understanding of the situation and events, and national roles. 
The need for follow-up questions was anticipated and they were prepared to ask for 
clarification when interviewees evoked central concepts and themes drawn from the 
secondary literature and text-based primary sources. These questions were asked based on 
the comments the interviewees made and clearly marked them as such in the notes. 
Interviewees were asked to clarify concepts or explore themes in more detail and depth. The 
aim was to refine understanding of their perceptions and interpretations. These questions 
were also designed to probe the nuanced interpretations of roles. 
Two secondary questions were prepared. They were direct queries about national roles, in 
case the interviewees did not mention key themes and concepts. In the end, all interviewees 
were asked these questions even when key themes and concepts came up during the 
interviews. 
The interviews were conducted in French and German respectively. The questions were 
translated and adjusted for each country, to each party and individual.  
The following is an annotated sample template of the semi-structured interviews: 
Opening the semi-structured interviews 
Each interview began with an opening statement. Interviewees were told about the thesis 
and verbal agreement to conduct the interview was asked for. The interviewees were asked 
about their confidentiality requirement and granted anonymity. It was mentioned that there 
would be no recordings and notes would be taken by hand. Interviewees were, further, told 
that extracts would figure in the thesis and that they could interrupt or end the conversation 
at any point.  
Main questions about national roles and national role conceptions  
Question 1: Can you tell me your recollections of the conflict in Libya 2011, your party or your 
parliamentary group’s view on how to address it and why, and how your country decided and 
acted? 
This question was worded bearing in mind Holsti’s definition of national role conceptions:  
‘[...] the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, 
commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of functions if any, their 
state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or subordinate 
regional systems. It is their “image” of the appropriate orientations or functions of 
their state toward, or in, the external world.’ (1970, pp.245–246 emphasis not in 
original) 
These questions were formulated in general terms to elicit an account that would permit the 
identification of conflict and intervention narratives. They asked about perceptions of the 
state’s decision-making and action to get more detail about how it was viewed at the time 
and how it is viewed with the benefit of hindsight. The purpose was to prompt national role 
statements by indirectly asking about national roles and role interpretations.  
 




Possible follow-up questions included whether the decision and action corresponded to their 
personal or their party’s expectations, represented continuity and what implications the 
decision and action had for Syria, future conflicts and their state’s responses to them. In order 
to broaden the context, interviewees were asked to elaborate on narratives and, if they 
mentioned them, on analogies and learning. 
The central concepts and terms identified prior to interviews for follow-up were: (1) role, (2) 
duty, obligations, (3) expectations, (4) responsibility, (5) identity and (6) alternatives. 
Question 2: What was the process by which your party or parliamentary group came to their 
position on the way forward to address the conflict? 
This question was designed to gain more insight into party-internal functioning regarding 
positioning on foreign policy issues in general and specifically in the case of Libya, and the 
part national role conceptions play in this. While this thesis is about the party and not party-
internal processes or differences, this question was aimed to get an understanding of the 
degree to which there were intra-party discussions and agreement. Questions included the 
process to get more detail on how party-internal mechanisms worked in the case of Libya 
and to find out when the party started discussing the issue and whether the decision on 
positioning was taken by an individual, small group or through more formal party internal 
processes and to learn more about intra-party differences, factions and how disagreement is 
settled. This question also had the potential to elicit role statements especially if parties had 
clear principled positions on the issue of military intervention or had started discussing the 
case of Libya in advance of events. Secondary purposes were to find out if manifestos and 
other policy documents were referenced, the views on electorate’s foreign policy opinions, 
expectations and role conceptions, and the part they played in parties’ rationale.  
The possible follow-up questions were: (1) whether there was agreement (2) how 
disagreement was settled and (3) whether alternatives, the opposite position and 
consequences for Libya and the respective state were discussed.  
Secondary questions on national roles and national role conceptions 
Question 3: Do you think the role your country played in addressing the conflict in Libya is 
consistent with your country’s traditional role in the world, and why yes or no? 
This question was added for the case the interviewee had not mentioned or alluded to 
national roles in the answers to the main and to follow-up questions. Unlike the two first 
questions, it directly asks about national roles. In effect, this question was asked even if 
national roles were mentioned to clarify what interviewees meant by them and to lead them 
to statements about their parties’ views on the ‘traditional’ national role contrasting them 
with the role played in Libya and detailing what their parties’ national role conceptions are.  
Possible follow-up questions focused on perceptions of other parties’ role propositions in the 
case of Libya. The central concepts and themes that prompted follow-up questions for 
clarification included: (1) responsibility, (2) duty and (3) obligation. 
Question 4: How do you think parties disagree on foreign policy in your country? What are the 
key differences in terms of foreign policy between the parties in your country? Are these nuances, 
differences in priorities or fundamental differences?  
The final question was designed to elicit parties’ account of other parties’ foreign policy 
positions. The aim was to have interviewees provide statements about the foreign policy 
consensus in their state. Another intention was to indirectly prompt them contrast and carve 
out their own parties’ positioning on the central foreign policy issue of military intervention.  
Possible follow-up questions were: (1) queries about the roots or origins of these differences, 
and (2) whether there are foundational texts or personalities that shaped the party’s or 
factions of the party’s positions on foreign policy and in particular the issue of military 
interventions.  
 




Interview partners (alphabetic order) 
Assouline, David (PS) May 23, 2017 
2011: PS senator since 2004. From May 2012 to April 2014, he was PS spokesperson. 
Ayrault, Jean-Marc (PS) May 9, 2017 
2011: Leader of the PS parliamentary group from 1997 to 2012. In 2017, he was PS foreign 
minister under president Francois Hollande. 
Boucheron, Jean-Michel (PS) 23 May, 2017 
2011: PS member of parliament. In 2017, he was strategic affairs and defence adviser to 
president François Hollande.  
Fath, Jacques (PCF) May 24, 2017  
2011: PCF member of the national council, executive committee and national coordination, 
in charge of international relations. In 2017, he was no longer in any party function or a party 
member. 
Gloser, Günter (SPD) June 7, 2017 
2011: SPD member of parliaments, 2005-2009 secretary of state for Europe in the foreign 
ministry. In 2017, he was retired from parliament. 
Hunko, Andrej (Die Linke) July 4, 2017 
2011 and 2017: member of parliament since 2009. 
Koenigs, Tom (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) July 4, 2017 
2011: since 2009 member of parliament. Previously a high functionary of the UN, he was 
special envoy of the UN secretary general for Kosovo and later Guatemala. From 2005 he was 
the German government's envoy for human rights and humanitarian aid in the foreign 
ministry. From 2013, he was human rights speaker of the parliamentary party. 
Neu, Alexander (Die Linke)  
2011: 2006-2013 he was security policy officer in the parliamentary party. Since 2013 where 
he is member of parliament and Die Linke chairperson of the defence committee and deputy 
member of the foreign affairs committee. 
Nouripour, Omid (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) July 3, 2017 
2011: member of parliament since 2006. In 2011, he was also member of the defence 
committee.  From 2014, he was a member of the foreign affairs and the human rights and 
humanitarian aid committees.  
Polenz, Ruprecht (CDU) June 7, 2017 
2011: chairman of the foreign affairs committee 2005-2013, delegate to NATO parliamentary 
assembly. In 2017, he was retired from parliament. 
Schuster, Marina (FDP) June 12, 2017 
2011: member of parliament (2005-2013); party speaker on human rights and humanitarian 
aid; and member of the foreign affairs and the human rights and humanitarian aid 
committees.  
Stinner, Rainer (FDP) June 7, 2017 
2011: member of parliament 2002-2013; member and FDP chairperson of the foreign affairs 
committee and deputy member of the defence committee. He did not stand for re-election in 
2013. 
Van Aken, Jan (Die Linke) June 6, 2017 
2011: member of parliament since 2009. From 2011, deputy leader of the parliamentary 
group and from 2012 its foreign policy speaker. In June 2017, he was still member of 
parliament, however, he did not stand for re-election in 2017.  
 




Appendix 3: annotated coding manual 
This appendix provides the coding manual, describing the coding instruction evolution and 
coding decisions taken, across the three coding cycles.  
The coding cycle 1 and the first part of cycle 2 were conducted over a period of two years 
(2014-2016). The process was interrupted several times for weeks during cycle 2. These 
breaks made the process longer but also meant that coding was approached with fresh eyes 
several times. The final coding took place over in mid-2017.  
The annotated coding manual is structured along these cycles. Cycle 1 details, first, the 
rationale for coding categories. It was based on the review of the literature and the aims of 
the study. It also provides the structure of the manual along four coding chapters: national 
roles, narratives, ideas and context. Cycle 2 shows the evolution and precision of the coding 
manual and describes the themes of the last coding stage. 
Cycle 1: the structured coding of national roles  
Document specific questions helped their orderly recording. They included: 
 Which state? 
 Who speaks, who for (government party, parliamentary group, personal capacity) 
and in what function (minister, parliamentary group speaker)? 
 Type of document? 
 Date of document? 
 Is this document about the 2011 Libya intervention or other? 
In practice this meant that for a debate in which six people spoke, six digital documents were 
created into which the coding manual template was copied. They were saved as date_party 
document type_speaker (if applicable).  
Coding chapter 1: national roles 
The next step consisted of identifying national roles in sources. A role was roughly identified 
by the mention of France or Germany, the government or head of state, associated pronouns 
(we, us) or references to 'the people', in relation to an action or social position, such as 'the 
French led the initiatives'.  
What national role conceptions or national roles are invoked? 
 Dropdown menu of pre-determined roles for each state (see below for coding 
expectations/categories) 
 Other, specify 
 
 More than one or others? 
 
 How? (e.g. others' expectations, others' perceptions, who is the other, relationship 
with other) 
 









Coding expectations/categories based on the secondary literature 
French national roles Key role components Literature sources 
Regional leader with 





Active independent distance from US and 
NATO to find middle 
power in bilateral 
world and maintain 
independence of 
decision-making 
Thumerelle and Le 
Pestre (1997) 
Regional leader Europe as stepping 
stone for global leader 
role 
Thumerelle and Le 
Pestre (1997) 
Global leader presence, nuclear 
power, UNSC 
permanent seat 





implicit in value 






implicit in the 
construction of the 
intervention in Libya as 
international 




German national roles Key role components Literature sources 
Civilian power  
also: regime builder, 
promoter of the rule 
of law, regime 
enlarger, supporter 
of strong UN 
multilateralism, 
international law, 





Alliance partner part of the civilian 






part of civilian power 





Normal ally or 
country 
normalising German 
foreign policy whereby 
Oppermann (2012) 
 




it competes with 
domestic political 
needs 
European leader   Harnisch (2015), 
Paterson (2011) 
Economic hegemon   Paterson (2011) 
Supporter  Brockmeier (2013) 
Coding chapter 2: conflict and intervention narratives 
Stances on and approaches to violent conflict abroad were divided into smaller categories 
prior to coding cycle 1. The rationale was that these narratives would provide information 
about how parties understand intra-state violence and what ideas inform this understanding 
and the policy approaches to conflict. It was anticipated that parties' framing of conflict would 
be related to the type of national role they proposed. The mention of Libyan actors was part 
of this coding, in part to identify perceived alter-role expectations and perceptions of 'other'. 
Guiding questions 
 How did parties understand the conflict, its origins and possible resolution? 
 How did parties describe the conflict and intervention evolution and process? 
 What Libyan actors are mentioned, including Gaddafi, insurgents and civilians, and 
how? 
Coding categories Detail and examples 
Origins of conflict Does the speaker address root causes of the conflict? 
Which ones? 
Conflict resolution Does the speaker refer to and how the conflict could 
end? 
Conflict evolution How does the speaker explain conflict from Winter 
to Summer 2011? 
Intervention 
evolution 
Description of the military operation 
Regional 
developments 












Does the speaker refer to alternatives to approve or 
reject them? 
Risks and future  Does the speaker address the risks and 
consequences intervention or non-intervention? 
Objectives Does the speaker detail the planning and overall 
strategy of the interventions or alternatives 
considered? 
Relationships Are regional, inter-state, Occident-Orient, or other 
relationships referred to? 
 






Coding chapter 3: ideational layers 
The primary sources were also coded for the direct or implicit mention of international 
norms and for key concepts and their relationship to each other. Moreover, direct or indirect 
references to foreign policy traditions were also noted, for example, if a speaker directly 
referenced a former president or foreign minister or one of their key foreign policy 
'doctrines' or ideas. The rationale for coding for ideas was based on the theoretical 
framework, detailed in chapter 2. 
Guiding questions 
 What ideas were invoked? 
 What was the relationship between them? 
Coding categories Detail and examples 
Political concepts Democracy, justice, legitimacy, liberty/freedom, 
human rights, solidarity etc. 
International norms R2P, humanitarian intervention, state sovereignty, 
non-interference, international law, legal obligations 
or duties etc. 
History and culture National histories, wars, colonisation etc. 
Negative key words 
(as experienced by 
speaker) 
Challenge, fatality, doubt, guilt, impotence, fear, 
threats, weakness, oppression etc. 
Positive key words 
(as experienced by 
speaker) 
Courage, determination, dignity, honour, pride, hope, 
modernity, progress, success etc. 
Key themes Were they any recurring and apparently important 
key themes? 
Coding chapter 4: domestic context 
Attention was paid to the domestic processes and events mentioned, given the focus on 
parties, their domestic roles as interest representing and office seeking and given the 
likelihood of intra-party differences. This coding chapter was also part of an effort not to 
black-box the party entirely. Intra-party processes where they were mentioned seemed 
important, because they provided indication of salient audiences and political costs and 
incentives to position on issues, for example, if decision-making and programmatic processes 
are top-down or bottom-up provides indications of the role and relevance of the party-
internal membership audience. Traditions of party-discipline or freedom of expression and 
conscience on some issues also provide information about whether or not expression of party 
internal disagreement is encouraged and, hence, more likely to surface in primary sources.  
Guiding questions 
 Was there open and direct intra-party disagreement? 








Coding categories Detail and examples 
Intra-party 
processes  
Evidence of formal or informal debate and position-




Expression of disagreement  
Party history References to party materials, manifestos, key 
personalities etc. 




Mention of parliament, presidents, courts etc. 
Electoral calendar Elections (reference to and actually on the radar) 
Coding cycle 1 challenges 
A first difficulty was that "we" and "us" is often used without apparent indication of whether 
"we" refers to party or state through preceding or following sentences. The decision whether 
quotes were the expression of a national role or a party policy proposal justification was 
made on a case by case basis, looking at context, the specific issue addressed and whether 
party or state made more sense in each case. Eventually, the assumption was made that even 
if "we" referred to party's programmatic proposal on the state's best action, it was still a 
reflection of the party's national role conception, as it was likely to project a partisan national 
role proposal onto the state.  
The most important challenge was the finding that the national role categories expected 
could not capture what appeared to be important differences between parties. During the 
first coding cycle, it became clear that parties often agreed on the national role. However, 
they differed on the details, implications and sometimes means. This meant that parties did 
not agree in practical terms on what a same national role entails. The initial national roles 
identified in the literature appeared inadequate for capturing these differences. The decision 
was taken to qualify these roles with adjectives that describe them rather than invent a new 
national role typology or add to the inventory of national roles for the two country cases. The 
rationale was that parties often agreed on the same national role but not on its interpretation. 
Thus, cycle 2 was an inductive approach. It was expected to refine the national roles in light 
of how the parties interpreted consented on roles. Only alternative national roles were given 
separate names and not qualified unless several interpretations over them were apparent.  
At this stage of the coding and gathering of evidence, no judgement was made on whether 
such a national role proposals were a viable option for the state in question. This was left to 
the analysis stage in each empirical chapter. 
Cycle 2: the refinement of the structured coding  
The second cycle was focused on adding precision and identifying the differences between 
parties who seemed to agree but contested each other on the national role. During the second 
coding cycle, less attention as paid to the mention and frequency of mention of national roles. 
Instead, the focus was on recurring arguments and themes, on what words appeared together 
and how did parties justify or defend their national role selection. The below coding 
categories and guiding questions were designed to refine and specify the roles and gain a 








Refining roles: coding for parties' national role interpretations 
 What role topic does the speaker address? 
 
 How was the role justified or argued in detail? (justification for or against, 
alternatives, objectives/goals) 
 
 Is there a possible redefinition of the national role? (qualification or descriptor) 
 
Relation between national roles and ideas 
 What political concepts were mentioned as part of national roles? 
 
 What international norms were mentioned as part of national roles? 
 
 What is the relationship between these ideas? 
 
Structured coding of the recurring theme  
The final coding paid attention to these recurring topics with particular focus on 
responsibility. They included:  
 Past interventions 
 Analogical reasoning/lessons learning 
 TINA (there is no alternative) 
 Alternatives 
 War/not war 
 Responsibility 
The coding question for the identified themes in national roles were 
 Did the party (representative) mention one or more observed themes? 
 
 What is the relationship between the themes? 
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17 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-11-2_en.htm (01/12/2015) 
18 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12723554 (01/12/2015)  
19 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-g8-libya-idUSTRE72E0BX20110315 (23/07/2017) 
20 http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/03/15/paris-veut-convaincre-ses-partenaires-d-
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